Integration and Disintegration in NATO: processes of alliance cohesion and prospects for Atlantic community by Beer, Francis A.
By Francis A. Beer 
Integration 
and Disintegration in NATO 
Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects 
for Atlantic Community 
Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
by Francis A. Beer 
Assessing the current prospects of the North 
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t ional goals and the crisis precipitated by the 
French withdrawal, Mr. Beer investigates the extent 
to which effective policy consensus and integrated 
programs can be achieved under the present 
organizational structure. In spite of the numerous 
refinements in administrative procedure that have 
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more far-reaching integrative tasks have not been 
accomplished. 
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political consultation, military forces, armaments, 
infrastructure, and science—a pattern of national 
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Although such results might have been expected 
in sensitive sectors such as political consultation 
and military forces, they prevailed as well in arma­
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ing situations of international crisis in spite of the 
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of persuasion in appealing to the common percep­
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Introduction: 
NATO and International Integration 
During the last several years the bipolar configuration of interna­
tional politics has appeared to be loosening. Growing difficulties 
within the major blocs—between the Soviet Union and China, 
between the Soviet Union and some of its East European neigh­
bors, and between the United States and France—have all indi­
cated that a less rigid international order may be possible in the 
foreseeable future. While this new order has looked as if it may 
bring with it increased tension in Asia, new opportunities for 
co-operation in Europe have also appeared possible. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been one of the 
cornerstones of the postwar international system. During the late 
1960's, however, NATO'S future has appeared uncertain. Not only 
has there been some doubt about the continuity of NATO institu­
tions, but also over the extended participation of at least one 
major actor. Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides 
that, ''after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years any 
Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of de­
nunciation." Thus, depending on legal interpretation, any nation 
may secede in either 1969 or 1970. 
The intentions of French President de Gaulle are couched in 
ambiguous terms. In his note of March 7, 1966, to President 
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Johnson announcing his decision to withdraw militarily from 
NATO'S activities, de Gaulle stated France's intention to remain a 
Party to the Treaty in 1969, provided that there had been no 
"basic'' change in East-West relations, and that she was deter­
mined "to fight on the side of her Allies'' should aggression 
against one of the them be "unprovoked." The French Aide-
Mi emoire to the fourteen other NATO members on March 10, 
1966, repeated the cloudy message, declaring that "the Alliance 
must continue as long as it appears to be necessary." 1 
These undecided circumstances have prompted NATO Secre­
tary General Manlio Brosio to state that one can not "guarantee 
automatically that the Alliance will continue without changes 
and without defections after its twentieth anniversary." 2 They 
also help to justify a study of NATO'S state and processes of 
cohesion through a focus on integration in NATO. Such an analy­
sis may help to refine general ideas concerning alliance solidar­
ity. More narrowly it may provide new information and insights 
—or recast old impressions—about the firmness of an organiza­
tion which importantly affects the security of the United States, 
the Atlantic area, and the Western world. 
According to NATO tradition, the Alliance's military command 
structure and infrastructure have often been referred to as "inte­
grated," meaning that they are either jointly manned or jointly 
owned by the Allies. Such usage is obviously helpful in distin­
guishing what "belongs" to NATO from what does not. At the 
same time it would probably be unwise to lift the term from the 
Alliance quarry and place it as the cornerstone of the present 
analysis. Joint manning or joint ownership are criteria of integra­
tion which are too limited to serve as major analytical tools in a 
general study of NATO cohesion. 
Other current uses of the term integration have appeared in 
the growing body of literature centering around the architecton­
ics of international political communities. The complexity of 
social change has been obscured in some of these studies for a 
number of reasons: (1) integration has been defined in terms of 
a condition rather than a process; (2) the importance of institu­
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tions has been de-emphasized; (3) there has been a concentra­
tion on environmental configurations as causal factors and a 
neglect of the immediate motives and expectations of key politi­
cal actors.3 
In the present study, a concern for the mechanisms of change 
leads to a definition of integration as a process. The substantive 
focus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, requires a discus­
sion of formal institutions. Limited resources make it not only 
desirable but necessary to concentrate on the immediately re­
lated perceptions of specifically affected actors. We, therefore, 
shall understand integration as "the process whereby political 
actors in several discrete national settings are persuaded to shift 
their loyalties and political activities toward a new center, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states." 4 
The new center under consideration is NATO viewed in terms 
of formal political-administrative institutions and informal pat­
terns of actor participation. Political actors are those groups at 
both the national and subnational levels which appear most 
relevant in NATO-related decision-making, as represented by their 
leaders. They include the dominant states in NATO—the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—other states being considered when especially 
relevant. Various domestic groups of importance include political 
parties, governmental agencies, and interest groups. 
Integration in NATO can be described by three sets of indica­
tors which subsume various aspects of the shift to the new center 
of actor loyalties and activities. The first integrative indicator is 
institutional autonomy: the growth of the new center may be 
measured by the increase in differentiation and scope of the 
common structures and the tasks they are called upon to per­
form. Important indices are proliferation of NATO agencies and 
programs, increases in binding NATO procedures, such as the 
evolution of voting procedures away from unanimity, and NATO 
budgets. The second indicator is authority: shifts in actor activi­
ties and loyalties toward NATO may be viewed in terms of the 
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growth of compliance, willing or not, with Allied decisions. 
Indices of growing NATO authority may include increasing ac­
ceptance of direct rather than indirect NATO decision-making and 
implementation of decisions arrived at through NATO institu­
tions. The third indicator is legitimacy: the shift of actor activi­
ties and loyalties may be seen in attitude changes showing 
increased belief in the values of NATO symbols, institutions, and 
programs. Indices of change comprise various aspects of program 
support—contributions of money, personnel, and facilities—as 
well as verbal support.5 
The degree of integration having been established, its dynam­
ics may be examined in terms of three major assumptions. The 
first of these is the belief that integration is more likely (a) when 
the alliance leadership combines ideological clarity with ambigu­
ity, (fc) when decisions are made jointly by independent experts 
and instructed delegates, and (c) when coalitional support is 
varied according to the program in question.6 
No matter what kind of activity is involved, energetic execu­
tive leadership is likely to be helpful in moving the actors toward 
greater institutional autonomy, authority, and legitimacy; the 
most crucial phases of this interaction are those of ideology, 
decision-making, and coalition formation. In all of these phases, 
integrative leadership must avoid approaches that are overly re­
sponsive to either political or technical considerations, such as op­
portunism, which attempts to meet political conflicts by sacrific­
ing longer-range integrative goals, or utopianism, which ignores 
such conflicts and assumes a non-existent technical consensus. 
Leadership which is to have integrative effects must formulate 
ideology with a mixture of ambiguity and clarity so that long-
range goals which imply the strengthening of the organization 
may be implemented through an action program. Ambiguity is 
required for leaders to be able to appeal to a diverse audience 
made up of groups both inside and outside the organization. At 
the same time clarity is necessary if leaders are to advance goals 
in terms of specific plans and programs.7 
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For the chosen ideology to be effective, it is important to have 
a pattern of decision-making which combines analysis and bar­
gaining between independent experts and instructed delegates. 
Such a decision-making structure represents a contact point at 
which the leadership, through its specialist cadres, can hope to 
persuade clients to follow its goals. 
Finally, if the ideology and decisions are to be translated into 
action, it is well for leaders to build variable supporting coali­
tions, composed differently for each issue. In this way, the 
leadership's program is backed by relatively stable aggregates, 
which are still sufficiently dispersed to prevent their subverting it. 
NATO leaders are identified by formal role rather than by 
informal influence; here the vital question is "Who speaks for 
NATO?" rather than "Who governs?" Of special importance are 
the incumbents of two positions: the Secretary General and the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who stand at the apex of 
the NATO civilian and military bureaucracies. The ideology of the 
leadership may be considered in terms of a continuum ranging 
from generality to specificity, from public support of NATO in 
whole areas of activity to public support of concrete programs. 
The influence of the leadership on decision-making may be 
weighed by the extent to which decisions advance the ideology, 
and by the influence of experts and delegates of varying degrees 
of independence and instruction. Experts are separated from 
delegates in rather gross terms as one moves across a spectrum 
which includes persons drawn from specialized fields of compe­
tence outside formal NATO or governmental structures, persons 
who are members of the NATO International Staff/Secretariat or 
military bureaucracy, high-level national officials who are not 
members of national delegations, and members of national dele­
gations. The independence of the expert may be gauged by 
assessing his professional and political stature; the independence 
of the delegate will depend not only on such factors, but also on 
his influence in the drafting and revision of his instructions. 
Finally, the ability of the leadership to foster coalitional variety 
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in support of different programs may be judged by the positions 
of specific actors toward such programs and by the permanence 
of groupings. 
The second assumption is that integration is unlikely in those 
sectors of alliance activity which are most political, but becomes 
increasingly possible when a technical leaven exists.8 The do­
main of politics includes activities of major importance to entire 
societies—or substantial portions of them—where intense con­
flicts of interest may be expected. Gigantic resources are in­
volved, making high the stakes and risks of the game, and 
frequendy leaving coercion as the only effective sanction. Tech­
nical affairs, on the other hand, have a more limited scope. 
Co-operative patterns of behavior are increasingly likely when 
resources are reduced, and utilitarian and normative incentives 
are likely to be decisive. 
This "functionalist" assumption may be examined in NATO by 
investigating integration in five sectors which promise to cut 
across a spectrum from most to least controversial—political 
consultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and sci­
ence, NATO political consultation and military forces are the 
traditional arenas of foreign and strategic policy, in which the 
full resources of national entities are pitted against one another 
in a pattern which often includes violence, and the dominant 
personnel are the symbolic political representatives of nations. 
NATO armaments, infrastructure (military construction) and sci­
ence are less political sectors, and a larger technical admixture 
may be expected. The interests of various actors should tend to 
greater convergence as resource shares become more moderate, 
utilitarian and normative sanctions more common, and techni­
cally trained personnel ubiquitous. 
The third assumption both extends and limits the second. Al­
though integrative tendencies should be most pronounced in 
those alliance sectors which are less political, nevertheless, activi­
ties in these sectors are not likely to 'spill over." Integrative 
advance may take place under the stimulus of crisis; but it is 
unlikely that the actors' interests will be sufficiendy convergent 
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through time to sustain a consensus promoting alliance growth.9 
The term 'spill-over" refers to the process whereby integration 
in a technically infused sector, where interests are identical or 
convergent, gradually extends into more political areas. While 
the actors may not originally have intended such expansion, the 
logic of the situation requires further integration if they are to 
achieve their particular aims. Such spill-over has occurred in the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the European Eco­
nomic Community. 
Spill-over is less likely in an alliance because the focus on 
defense implies that sectors of activity which might otherwise 
provide a technical impetus for growth will be dominated by 
political characteristics; in these areas the dynamic of conver­
gence is likely to be undermined by conflict of interest. While 
high tides of crisis may temporarily submerge the reefs and 
shoals of inter-allied differences, receding seas and routine water 
levels will leave prospects for integrated programs aground.10 
The working of spill-over in NATO can be investigated by 
comparing the convergence of actor interests over an extended 
period that includes situations of perceived crisis as well as 
routine circumstances. If the presumption is correct, and spill­
over does not routinely take place in alliances, NATO growth and 
interest convergence will occur mainly during crisis periods. 
Further discussion should help to answer such questions as: 
To what extent does integration occur in alliances such as NATO? 
What is the relative importance of each of the following factors 
in advancing integration in NATO: the dynamics of leadership, 
the relative predominance of political or technical types of activ­
ity, the spill-over' of technical activity into more political sec­
tors, and the impact of crisis situations? It is also the purpose of 
such discussion to clarify the essential factors to be considered in 
assessing the prospects of NATO in the 1970's. 
The chapters which follow attempt to paint in greater color, 
depth, and complexity the various sections of the canvas which 
have just been sketched out. The processes of NATO integration 
are now to be examined in the discrete sectors of political con­
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sultation, military forces, armaments, infrastructure, and science. 
In thus presenting specific cross sections of NATO activity, the 
aim is to open a door to the benefits of comparison, and to 
provide a foundation upon which to build conclusions concern­
ing integration in NATO. 
ORIGINS OF THE ALLIANCE 
The precedents and preparations for the Atlantic Alliance 
were laid during the years from the end of World War II 
through 1949; and much of the stimulus for joint action was 
contributed by an atmosphere of deepening international con­
frontation. During the war, Western statesmen had been aware 
that the postwar period would bring significant differences with 
the Soviet Union. Only as the immediate postwar era developed, 
however, did activities on both sides produce a situation in 
which Western decision-makers perceived the Soviet Union as 
an immediate military danger to Western security and in which 
they ultimately established NATO'S fundamental institutions.11 
With the coming of Allied victory, first in Europe and then in 
Asia, the Grand Alliance of World War II began to dissolve and 
the shape of a new international system to appear. A rough 
configuration of this world had been foreseen in preceding years. 
Thus the eminent British geopolitical analyst and strategist, Sir 
Halford Mackinder, had looked to the postwar emergence of the 
Soviet Union as the dominant global land power and to the 
formation of a strategic Atlantic Community consisting of West­
ern Europe and North America. Although they had emphasized 
the Soviet threat less than European-American ties, wartime 
variations on this theme had been played in the Atlantic Charter 
signed by Roosevelt and Churchill; in the writings and speeches 
of Americans of disparate influence such as Wendell Willkie, 
Clarence Streit and Walter Lippmann; by the Federal Union of 
Great Britain; and by continental Europeans, especially in Bel­
gium and Norway.12 
As the war drew to a close and the Soviet Union moved 
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toward dominant positions in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ru­
mania, and Albania, Western leaders began the formation of an 
opposing coalition. In his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, on 
March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill publicly referred to the "iron 
curtain" which had bisected Europe. George Kennan, in a long 
dispatch from Moscow on February 22, 1946, described an at­
mosphere of extreme Soviet hostility and prescribed a policy of 
containment in his "X" article which subsequently appeared in 
Foreign Affairs.13 
On March 4, 1947, France and the United Kingdom signed a 
fifty-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance at Dunkirk. 
Although specifically aimed at the possible resurgence of the 
German threat, this treaty was to be the first in a series of 
Western security agreements to be directed against the Soviet 
Union. On March 12, alarmed by Communist pressures in 
Greece and Turkey, President Truman enunciated the doctrine 
which called for United States support for other nations against 
various forms of armed pressure and requested Congress to 
appropriate financial aid for Greece and Turkey. In June Secre­
tary of State Marshall, in a commencement speech at Harvard, 
proposed his plan for United States support for a co-ordinated 
European program of economic rehabilitation. Although Mar­
shall defined Europe broadly enough to include the Communist 
sphere, the Soviet Union objected to such a co-operative effort, 
and in July the British and French Foreign Ministers decided to 
go ahead without Soviet participation, inviting all the other 
European governments except Spain to participate in an organi­
zation for European recovery which would begin by studying 
Europe's needs and resources. 
In response to the Western actions, particularly the Marshall 
Plan, the Soviet Union organized the Cominform and supported 
the insurrectionary strikes which swept France and Italy in 1947 
and 1948, as well as the coup of February 22, 1948, which 
gained control of the Czechoslovakian government. 
The scope and pace of Western action expanded. Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, speak­
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ing to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 
1947, proposed a defensive alliance. On January 22, 1948, Er­
nest Bevin, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested the 
formation of a "Western Union," based on the previously con­
cluded Dunkirk Treaty, including Britain and France, and add­
ing Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and other European 
countries, including Italy. Representatives of the Dunkirk and 
Benelux governments assembled in Brussels on March 4 to draft 
and, two weeks later, sign, the Brussels Treaty, afifty-year treaty 
of collective self-defense and economic, social, and cultural co­
operation. On the day of signature, President Truman indicated 
to Congress his intended support. In June the United States 
Congress enacted a Selective Service bill. 
The Soviet blockade of the land access routes to Berlin which 
began on June 24 gave further impetus to the formation of NATO 
itself. On April 11, United States Secretary of State Marshall 
and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett had initiated 
conversations with Senators Vandenberg and Connally on Euro­
pean and American security problems. Two months later the 
United States Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution which 
called for "progressive development of regional and other collec­
tive arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in 
accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the 
[UN] Charter" and which aimed at "contributing to the mainte­
nance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the 
right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 
should any armed attack occur affecting its national security." " 
On July 6, negotiations began in Washington between Lovett 
and the ambassadors of the Brussels Treaty powers and Canada 
concerning North Atlantic defense. These talks continued 
through the summer and autumn, when the Foreign Ministers 
took over. On September 9, they concluded with a report on the 
general form which should be taken by the proposed treaty of 
common defense. At the end of October the Brussels Treaty 
Organization Consultative Council announced "complete agree­
ment on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic 
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and the next steps to be taken in this direction." On December 
10, negotiations began in Washington focussed around the ac­
tual drafting of the treaty; and on March 15, 1949, the Brussels 
Treaty nations, the United States and Canada formally invited 
the governments of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portu­
gal to join.15 
On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 
Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Den­
mark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
On August 24, subsequent to ratification, the Treaty entered 
into effect. Against the perceived Soviet threat had rallied a 
bipartisan American majority, British Conservatives and Labour­
ites, French parties of the right and center, and similar groups in 
the other member nations. Nevertheless, there remained signifi­
cant opposition to NATO. In the United States the Republican 
right wing was still a force to be reckoned with; in Britain the 
Labour left was hostile; in France NATO was opposed not only by 
Thorez' Communists, but also by budding neutralism which he 
Monde would support and which would eventually include 
groups surrounding other organs of public opinion such as Esprit 
and France Observateur; in Italy there was opposition from 
Togliatti's Communist party and Nenni's left wing Socialists.16 
Political Consultation in NATO

1 
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty laid down the foundation 
for political consultation in the NATO framework by stating that 
"the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of 
any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or 
security of any of the parties is threatened." x 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
During the early years of the Alliance, political consultation 
occurred in NATO'S major decision-making body, the North At­
lantic Council, on an ad hoc basis. In 1950 and 1951 interest 
focused on the problems of German sovereignty, rearmament, 
and reunification. In 1952 the Council broadened its scope to 
include matters outside the North Atlantic Area, passing a reso­
lution which supported the United Nations in Korea and the 
French in Indo-China.2 
Between 1952 and 1956 ad hoc political consultation con­
tinued in the Council. Prior to the Big Four Summit and For­
eign Ministers Conferences, the United States, Britain, and 
France informed the Council of their proposals. Discussions took 
place on such subjects as East German recognition, the Austrian 
State Treaty and the roles of SEATO and CENTO in Far and 
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Middle Eastern Affairs. On the other hand differences over 
independence for Cyprus—involving the British, Greeks, and 
Turks—were negotiated largely outside the Council; and the 
British and French clandestinely prepared their October, 1956, 
intervention in Egypt over the Suez Canal.3 
In January, 1957, a Committee of Political Advisors, meeting 
once a week, was established to act as a staff arm to the Council. 
Later, Groups of Experts focusing on broad regional areas—the 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, 
Latin America, Africa—and on disarmament questions began to 
assemble approximately twice a year. An Atlantic Policy Advisory 
Group was created in 1960 to convene twice a year and examine 
long-term problems. Following the French military withdrawal, 
the Council decided in December, 1966, to move NATO'S civilian 
headquarters, including its political institutions, from Paris to 
Brussels; and on October 16 of the following year the transfer 
was officially consummated. In its new location, the Council for 
the first time was to have "a central intelligence and communica­
tions center, equipped and staffed to provide rapid and continu­
ous support for crisis management." * 
In spite of such advances, binding institutional procedures did 
not grow. The major NATO political structure, the Council, 
usually met twice a year at the Ministerial level, mainly to 
exchange information, make soundings, and gain sympathy for 
national positions. Often informal and exclusive gatherings 
proved more valuable for these purposes than the full-dress 
meetings of the whole Council. What decisions the Ministers 
made tended to focus on administrative matters and NATO activi­
ties in other issue areas. 
The Council at the level of permanent representatives was the 
highest regular body, acting not only as the main device for 
political consultation within NATO, but also as a day-to-day Board 
of Directors. The unanimity rule was implicit, with each nation 
preserving a possible veto on decisions. Ordinarily the Perma­
nent Council produced no common paper, but only a record of 
the presentations of the national Ambassadors and the Chair­
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man's summary. Political communication was emphasized rather 
than political decision-making. While smaller countries seemed 
to benefit, national officials from some of the larger nations 
claimed that the political information was generally not far 
ahead of newspaper dispatches and that traditional bilateral 
diplomatic channels were more instructive. 
The Committee of Political Advisors consisted of officials from 
national delegations and dealt with those matters referred to it 
by the permanent representatives. Although the political advi­
sors had relatively exclusive authority in some areas, decision-
making was not usual; rather meetings were focused upon pa­
pers delivered by members of national delegations. There was 
ordinarily no common paper but only a record of the meeting; 
and the Chairman summed up his interpretation of consensus 
which was inserted in the record. 
The Groups of Experts ordinarily convened immediately to 
precede Ministerial Councils. They concentrated more on data 
than policy and produced common papers which were drafted by 
a member of the Secretariat and underwritten by the responsibil­
ity of the Committee. The papers provided no explicit recom­
mendations to national governments but merely conclusions—in 
which recommendations might be implicit—from which govern­
ments drew their own inferences. Meetings of the Atlantic 
Policy Advisory Group focused on papers given by national 
delegates on particular long-range problems. Subsequently the 
Chairman wrote a paper, for which he took responsibility, sum­
marizing all delegate papers and comments. 
In this process, the major tendency towards autonomy was 
presented by the International Staff/Secretariat. The Secretary 
General in his role as Chairman presided at and summarized the 
meetings of the Council, and was responsible for an annual 
appraisal of NATO'S political activities. The Assistant Secretary 
General for Political Affairs and his staff supported the Secretary 
General, administered, summed up, and wrote occasional com­
mon papers for the meetings of the Committee of Political 
Advisors; drafted the papers of the Groups of Experts; and both 
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drafted and took responsibility for the papers of the Atlantic 
Policy Advisory Group. Nevertheless, such activities were insuf­
ficient to produce binding decisions. 
Several bodies were tangentially related to NATO'S political 
sector. Most important of these was the NATO Parliamentarians' 
Conference (renamed the North Atlantic Assembly in 1967), 
which first met in 1955. The NPC was an annual meeting of 
legislators from NATO nations, with a small Secretariat, and an 
annual budget of a little over $200,000, but with no official tie to 
NATO. In the years 1955-63, one analyst, J. Allan Hovey, esti­
mated that the NPC made forty-four formal political recommenda­
tions; 5 however, the force of these recommendations was reduced 
by several facts. First, the NPC—although it made recommenda­
tions concerning NATO activities and institutions, and although 
it was usually addressed by high NATO dignitaries—had no 
official tie with NATO. Second, NPC recommendations tended to 
generality, as indicated by Hovey's estimate that only four of the 
forty-four resolutions were ''operative." Third, the participants 
did not seem to have a high and widespread feeling of efficacy. 
Although legislators did not often publicly air such linen, oc­
casional comments indicated malaise. Thus Senator Karl Mundt 
of South Dakota, in a series of hearings on the Atlantic Alliance, 
said: 
I have been Chairman of a NATO Parliamentarians' Conference 
Committee for some time. For many years before that, I was a 
member. I must say that I have had the feeling that we pass 
more resolutions and get fewer results than any other body 
with which I have ever been connected. The NATO 
Parliamentarians' Conference, it seems to me, is just a nice 
social gathering where we engage in a lot of oratory which 
results ultimately in futility.6 
AUTHORITY 
The general weakness of NATO institutions went together with 
a lack of NATO authority in specific situations. Thus NATO politi­
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cal consultation did not lead to authoritative decision-making on 
issues of primary importance to the participants—issues such as 
Algeria and Tunisia, Cyprus, Berlin, the Congo, Cuba, arms 
control, or Vietnam. Occasional exceptions—like Malta—to­
gether with the co-ordination of some minor issues were only 
dim candles. 
Algeria and Tunisia 
The Algerian rebellion, which began in 1954 and continued 
until 1962, was never a subject for NATO political decision-mak­
ing. The French conceded that NATO should not increase its 
infrastructure investment in Algeria, but successive French gov­
ernments refused to submit the conflict for political review, ar­
guing that it was a domestic matter.' 
Frances allies undertook actions, either in the United Na­
tions or elsewhere, damaging to French pacification efforts. Thus 
on November 15, 1957, the Americans and British, without 
prior NATO consultation, delivered arms to neighboring Tunisia. 
Ostensibly the shipments were to preclude Communist sales, but 
they indirectly aided the Algerian nationalists. What consultation 
there was occurred after the incident. They brought the matter to 
the NATO Council "only after the damage had been done," said 
Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak. "How much better it would 
have been if they had done it before." 8 
Even the removal of the newly independent Algeria from the 
area of NATO competence seemed to have been determined with­
out prior consultation. A NATO press communique' of January 24, 
1963 implied that the French representative had recently in­
formed the Council that the French grant of independence to 
Algeria in July 1962 automatically made "inapplicable" the 'rel­
evant clauses of the North Atlantic Treaty."9 
Cyprus 
Successive outbreaks of violence on Cyprus led to attempts by 
NATO Secretaries General to use their good offices to settle a 
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dispute involving three NATO members;10 however, their success 
was limited. In March, 1957, Lord Ismay offered his services as 
mediator to the British, Greek, and Turkish governments; 
though the British and Turks agreed, Greece refused. During 
1958, Secretary-General Spaak, encouraged talks among the 
three powers and tendered his good offices for possible negotia­
tions. When Greece again remained reluctant, he paid a surprise 
visit to Athens to press his proposal. On September 24, Spaak 
submitted a Cyprus plan to the NATO Council in Paris, for which 
he requested immediate acceptance in principle and subsequent 
consideration of detail. The British delayed their acceptance; 
and, though discussions continued for another month, by No­
vember they had broken down. At the December Council meet­
ing Greece and Turkey scheduled talks outside NATO which ulti­
mately led to the Zurich and London agreements.11 
Beginning in late 1963, violence between Greece and Turkey 
once again seemed imminent. General Lemnitzer undertook a 
fact-finding mission and Secretary-General Stikker sent "notes to 
the two countries apprising them of my official interest and my 
desire to help in resolving the dispute." In February, 1964, 
Britain and the United States advanced a plan under which the 
NATO countries would provide peace-keeping troops and a neu­
tral mediator. This proposal, though accepted by Greece and 
Turkey, was rejected by Archbishop Makarios, who demanded 
that any troops be placed under the U  N Security Council. In 
March a U  N peace-keeping force and mediator arrived; and in 
May, the NATO Council gave Stikker a "watching brief;" he "was 
to follow the situation closely and consult the Council whenever 
he deemed it necessary.'' In December, this watching brief" was 
renewed for Stikker's successor, Manlio Brosio.12 
When it looked as though the peace would once more be 
broken in November, 1967, the Turkish and Greek governments 
accepted the Council's offer of the Secretary General's good 
offices. Brosio shuttled back and forth between Ankara and 
Athens, and the waters were eventually calmed. It remained 
uncertain, however, whether the emergency had been resolved 
through Brosio's efforts; because of the good offices of Cyrus 
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Vance, President Johnson's special envoy; or because the Greek 
and Turkish governments by themselves had not wished to cross 
the brink of war.13 
Berlin 
During the Berlin crisis of 1958-62 NATO was involved only 
to a limited extent. On November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier 
Khrushchev announced that the USSR wished to terminate the 
Four Power agreement on the status of Berlin, thereby begin­
ning a period of Soviet pressure on Allied rights which reached a 
peak on August 13, 1961, when the East German government 
erected a wall sealing the border between East and West Berlin. 
On December 16, 1958, the Council made a relatively strong 
statement, declaring that: 
no State has the right to withdraw unilaterally from its inter­
national engagements. It considers that the denunciation by 
the Soviet Union of the inter-allied agreements on Berlin can 
in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve 
the Soviet Union of its obligations. Such methods destroy the 
mutual confidence between nations which is one of the foun­
dations of peace. 
The member states of NATO could not approve a solution of 
the Berlin question which jeopardised the right of the three 
Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsi­
bilities require it, and did not assure freedom of communica­
tion between that city and the free world. 
The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be 
settled in the framework of an agreement with the USSR on 
Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western Powers have 
repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem 
as well as those of European security and disarmament. They 
are still ready to discuss all these problems.14 
In ensuing years, Council communiques made frequent refer­
ences to the problem of Berlin and to the Declaration of Decem­
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ber 16, 1958, but NATO'S political machinery played a secondary 
role. The NATO Council was not extensively used as a forum of 
consultation nor for the evolution of plans, though it was kept 
informed about the Berlin situation and the reactions of the four 
major powers. The primary arena for political consultation and 
planning was the Ambassadorial Working Group in Washing­
ton which included the three former occupying powers—the 
United States, Britain, and France—and eventually Germany. 
Only when discussions among the Four Powers in Washington 
broke down were they transferred to Paris. There meetings that 
included representatives from the fifteen member nations were 
conducted in Secretary-General Stikker's office for several weeks 
to facilitate agreement. On some other occasions, NATO drills 
were held in order to ensure that each nation had a representa­
tive able to appear on immediate notice.15 
The Allies participated in the formation of an Emergency 
Defense Plan but this was mainly a back-up structure, removed 
from current policy decisions. Thus a former British Minister in 
Berlin revealed that "NATO as such was only brought into the 
Berlin problem in connection with economic or other measures 
which would be necessary if the situation were to deteriorate to 
the brink of war or simply to ensure that all the Western Allies 
knew what was afoot." 16 At the level of more immediate contin­
gency planning, the Allies were only generally informed of the 
work of the Ambassadorial Working Group. The NATO military 
command structure in Europe was bypassed. "Live Oak"—the 
Ambassadorial Working Group's military agency for the imple­
mentation of contingency plans—took orders from General Nor­
stad and later General Lemnitzer, but the generals spoke as 
CINCEUR, not as SACEUR.17 
Even outside NATO'S structures, there was limited accord be­
tween those Allies most concerned—the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. The Ambassadorial Working 
Group and its subordinate working parties by the spring of 1961 
had ''succeeded in establishing agreement on the central facts 
about Berlin and its environment," and had "eliminated several 
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hypothetical Western initiatives or reactions that proved on 
closer examination to be unrealistic.'' At this time the United 
States proposed "that agreed contingency plans for a Western 
response to a Soviet threat to Berlin should now be finalised."1S 
Two militarily oriented plans were immediate candidates for 
adoption. One of these was the program of former Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, whom President Kennedy had directed, in 
March, to undertake special studies of the problems of NATO and 
Germany. When Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington 
in April, Acheson presented his suggestions on Berlin, conclud­
ing that "the moment there was an interruption of access itself, 
we must act; first an airlift—and then, if that could not be 
sustained against Soviet counter-measures, a ground probe in 
force too large to be stopped by East German troops alone."19 
A second military plan had been developed during the Eisen­
hower administration and was reported to have the backing of 
the American and British military staffs. According to this 
projection, airlift was ruled out as the response to a new Berlin 
blockade. Instead, an American-British-French military task force 
would seize control of the Autobahn control post on the other 
side of the border and undertake small-scale penetration in East 
Germany. Initially the tripartite force would use only conven­
tional armament, but it would respond in kind if East German or 
Soviet troops used nuclear weapons.20 
Eventually these two plans were superseded by a complicated 
series of scenarios which foresaw a possible Soviet blockade of 
Berlin along several dimensions, including means of access 
(road, rail, air) and target groups (Allied soldiers, all Allied 
nationals, German nationals, and others). The Allies might 
reply to such types of provocation with limited road and rail 
probes, an airlift combined with the utilization of existing Berlin 
stocks, a global diplomatic/economic offensive, a propaganda 
barrage, and other forms of harassment. Between six months and 
a year later, the stocks in Berlin would have run down and the 
global diplomatic economic offensive would have been played 
out. At this time there might be limited military actions on East 
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German territory, larger Allied operations up to the divisional 
level, and finally nuclear warfare. 
In the end an overall Allied contingency plan was either 
never adopted or, if it was agreed upon, the four governments 
refused to commit themselves to automatic implementation with­
out further intergovernmental consultation in the light of future 
specific challenges to West Berlin.21 The British and French 
refusals were reported to be particularly emphatic. Allied differ­
ences on military projections were crucial. France and Britain 
were reluctant to plan for a military land probe or a riposte on 
East German soil. The reasoning here was that the conventional 
forces in Europe would probably be insufficient to reopen the 
road to Berlin if it were closed, and that nuclear escalation would 
be inevitable to re-establish Allied access. In this case, they felt 
that the risk might outweigh the objective.22 
President Kennedy, in July, announced his intention to re­
quest an increase in the defense budget, to call up certain reserve 
and National Guard units, to procure new weapons, and to 
enlarge the program of civil defense. The Germans extended the 
period of conscription from twelve to eighteen months, and 
increased the Bundeswehr force target from 350,000 to 500,000 
men, reversing the change of 1956.23 Neither the British nor the 
French, however, undertook dramatic steps toward mobilization. 
Kennedy emphasized American willingness to negotiate, stat­
ing that 'we are willing to consider any arrangement or treaty in 
Germany consistent with the maintenance of peace and free­
dom, and with the legitimate security interests of all nations.'' 
This position was strongly supported by the British; the Ger­
mans agreed with reservations; the French 'remained flatly hos­
tile to the whole idea." 2i 
Allied contingency plans had concentrated on the possible 
repetition of, or variation on, the Berlin blockade of 1948—49. 
Instead, on August 13, the East German government erected 
barriers sealing off East from West Berlin and effectively ending 
Berlin's quadripartite status. The Allies—either caught by sur­
prise, or willing to accept the border closing in order to cut off a 
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large and potentially destabilizing flow of refugees—responded 
relatively mildly.25 Notes of protest were dispatched to the East 
German and Soviet governments; and the garrisons in Berlin 
were reinforced. The United States sent a 200 vehicle convoy 
and 1,500 men; the British and French sent 34 and 26 armored 
vehicles respectively. American Vice-President Lyndon Johnson 
and General Lucius Clay, who had dealt with the earlier block­
ade, were dispatched to Berlin.26 
By April, 1962, there were obvious disagreements about fur­
ther Western response. The United States favored a plan which 
provided for an International Access Authority with equal par­
ticipation by East and West German regimes, ''a number of 
East-West German commissions to deal with technical problems, 
a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and 
an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other 
countries.'' The Germans, afraid of Soviet "salami tactics,' 
leaked the plan to the press in order to destroy it, and Chancellor 
Adenauer publicly opposed further 'exploratory" talks.27 
Congo 
The initial Belgian decision concerning Congolese independ­
ence was made without prior consultation, though NATO played a 
slightly larger role afterwards. Prior to Belgium's grant of inde­
pendence to the Congo of July, 1960, "Belgium never put its 
quandary to its Allies and asked for advice and help in advance, 
nor did the latter offer any."2S 
Following his retirement as Secretary-General, Belgian For­
eign Minister Spaak began a series of frequent trips to NATO, one 
result of which was the declaration of the Permanent Council on 
November 24, 1964, which "unanimously expressed its under­
standing and appreciation'' of the Belgian paratroop action to 
save foreign hostages at Stanleyville.29 Nevertheless, when 
United States airplanes took off from Evreux airbase in France, 
in order to airlift Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville, and later 
used the base at Chateauroux as a rallying point for United 
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Nation troops on their way to the Congo, the French govern­
ment claimed that it had not been consulted.30 
Cuba 
Political consultation prior to the Cuban crisis of October, 
1962, had little authoritative impact. For some time prior to the 
crisis, the United States had attempted to persuade its NATO 
Allies to end their trade with Cuba. In February, 1962, a special 
mission headed by Walt Rostow had requested Allied co-opera­
tion in the restriction of Cuban trade; there had been repeated 
requests both in the Council and to Allied ambassadors in Wash­
ington; and finally, on October 16, Abram Chayes, State Depart­
ment legal advisor, arrived in Paris to inform the Allies of the 
Kennedy administration's plans for economic sanctions against 
nations whose ships were trading with Cuba.31 
Relations became particularly strained between Britain and 
the United States. Although the British government had refused 
export licenses for arms to Cuba for approximately two years, 
and although overall British exports to Cuba had fallen drasti­
cally from a six-month average of £7 million in 1959, it was 
estimated that Britain was still exporting a six-month average of 
£1.3 million in 1962. On September 10, members of a Cuban 
exile group operating out of Puerto Rico, Alpha 66, attacked a 
British vessel in the Cuban port of Caibarrien; and, on October 
11, they announced that they would attempt to attack all mer­
chant ships carrying supplies to Cuba.32 The reaction of the 
American government was mild. Following the September at­
tack, President Kennedy stated in a press conference, "Our 
friends in NATO must realize the implications of their ships 
engaging in Cuban trade. We shall continue to work with 
Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that 
nation's future return to freedom."33 Following the October 
announcement, a representative of the State Department stated 
that the United States was not prepared to act against the exiles, 
for shippers ran risks in trade with Cuba. The United States did 
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not sanction the assaults, but there were difficulties in guarantee­
ing peace in the Caribbean. On the other hand the British 
government took ''a serious view'' of the Alpha 66 attacks; and 
the Admiralty announced that the British Royal Navy would 
protect British ships if they were attacked by Alpha 66 on the 
high seas.34 
The American decision to institute a military blockade of 
Cuba was taken almost completely without Allied consultation. 
The public announcement was made on October 22; most Allies 
were informed only hours before the public announcement and 
none had been "consulted." The British were the first to know, 
having learned of the imminent blockade by October 19; the 
other Allies were informed through the NATO Council and presi­
dential emissaries on October 22. The nature of the transaction 
was highlighted by the exchange between de Gaulle and Ache-
son, eight hours before Kennedy's public speech. 
De Gaulle raised his hand in a delaying gesture that the long-
departed Kings of France might have envied. "May we be 
clear before you start," he said. "Are you consulting or inform­
ing me?" Acheson confessed that he was there to inform, not 
consult. "I am in favor of independent decisions," de Gaulle 
acknowledged.35 
Arms Control 
With regard to arms control, NATO made frequent statements 
in its communiques, and representatives to the Geneva disarma­
ment conference often visited the Council to keep it informed. 
Nevertheless, most of the Allies received very limited prior 
information when advances took place. Thus, prior to the signa­
ture of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty in 1963, no consultation 
took place in any of the numerous European bodies; neither did 
any take place in the Atlantic framework. Several of the Euro­
pean allies of the United States were informed of the details of 
the Treaty negotiations only at a very late date, or not at all."36 
On other occasions discussion meant open conflict. In April, 
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1967, the Permanent Council was unable to agree on a draft 
non-proliferation treaty. The United States, Britain, Denmark, 
and Norway wished to seek immediate agreement with the 
Soviet Union. The Germans and Italians objected to the possible 
impact of inspection and control provisions on the development 
of peaceful atomic technology; and they preferred inspection by 
EURATOM to inspection by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency—which the United States claimed the Soviet Union 
would not accept. Belgium and Canada stated that the treaty 
discriminated against the non-nuclear powers. The French had 
already announced that they would refuse to join.37 When a 
non-proliferation treaty was finally signed on July 1, 1968, Bel­
gium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth­
erlands, Portugal, and Turkey did not participate. 
Viet-Nam 
As United States military involvement in Viet-Nam deep­
ened, Secretary of State Rusk, Under-Secretary of State Ball, 
Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Harri­
man, and other American officials visited NATO to explain the 
American position and request Allied support. Nevertheless, 
Secretary General Dirk Stikker reported that "the response from 
other members in the Council was vague. Sometimes there was 
complete silence," he said, "and ambassadorial silence is never a 
good omen for spontaneous loyal support." The British, Greeks, 
and Turks continued to trade with North Viet-Nam; the French 
called for an end to foreign intervention; and Allied aid to 
American efforts remained uneven and relatively meager.38 
Middle East, 1967 
The Middle East crisis of 1967 had implications for NATO. 
Part of the United States Sixth Fleet, which operated in the 
Mediterranean, was earmarked for NATO in case of emergency; a 
British base remained on Malta; and the security of Greece and 
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Turkey, should the conflict seriously escalate, might be threat­
ened. 
Nevertheless, the Allies did not tightly concert their activities. 
On May 23, the United Arab Republic closed the Gulf of 
Aqaba to Israeli ships and to strategic materials destined for 
Israel. The following day President Johnson declared the block­
ade illegal; and on May 24, the French government suggested 
that the Big Four—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, 
and France—co-operate to maintain peace. Although the British 
government quickly supported the idea of Four-Power talks, the 
United States awaited the Soviet response before committing 
itself.39 
During the next two weeks the United States and Britain 
sponsored a declaration of maritime nations that the Gulf of 
Aqaba had the status of an international waterway through 
which all ships had the right of passage. The French did not 
associate themselves with the diplomatic offensive.40 
On June 5, armed conflict began between Israel and the 
Arabs. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany an­
nounced their neutrality the same day. On June 1, the Turkish 
government had taken a public anti-Israeli position by announc­
ing that no military bases on Turkish soil could be used against 
the Arabs; Greece was to join Turkey on June 7.41 
Britain, France, and Germany announced the suspension of 
arms shipments to the belligerents on June 5 and 6. A spokes­
man for the Netherlands Ministry of Defense stated that the 
Netherlands would continue to supply arms to Israel.42 
On June 17, the United Nations General Assembly convened 
in emergency session; and on July 4, it voted on a series of 
resolutions. Three of these votes, summarized in Table 1, 
showed serious division in NATO ranks. A resolution sponsored by 
eighteen non-aligned nations, with strong Soviet support, called 
for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. Ten 
Allies voted against it; Portugal abstained; France, Greece, and 
Turkey favored it. A resolution sponsored by the Latin Ameri­
can nations linked the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the cessa­
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tion of Arab belligerency. Ten Allies favored it; France, Greece, 
Portugal, and Turkey abstained. A Pakistani resolution criticized 
Israeli steps to annex Jerusalem. Ten Allies voted for; Iceland, 
Italy, Portugal, and the United States abstained.43 
TABLE 1 
PARTICIPATION BY NATO MEMBERS IN

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY EMERGENCY SESSION

ROLL CALL VOTES, JULY 4, 1967 *

Country 
Non-Aligned
Resolution 
Latin American 
Resolution 
Pakistani 
Resolution 
Belgium 0 F F 
Canada 0 F F 
Denmark 0 F F 
France F A F 
Greece F A F 
Iceland 0 F A 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
0 
0 
0 
0 
A 
F 
0 
0 
F 
F 
F 
F 
A 
A 
F 
F 
A 
F 
F 
F 
A 
F 
F 
A 
• Associated Press Release, July 4, 1967. Abbreviations in the table are as follows: O = Opposed, 
F = Favored, A = Abstained. 
Secondary Issues 
Authoritative political consultation occasionally occurred in 
less important areas, but even here, the record was slight. 
"The emergence of Malta as a sovereign state in 1964 was 
handled with close reference to the views of Britain's NATO Allies 
in the Mediterranean, in a working group of the Council headed 
by the Secretary General"; ** and Manlio Brosio served as nego­
tiator between the Council and the Maltese government in talks 
about the maintenance of a NATO base there. Upon Malta's 
accession to independence, the Council adopted a resolution 
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which included Malta in the consultative framework: The reso­
lution stated that 'consultation should take place between NATO 
and the Government of Malta, whenever, in the opinion of the 
Government of Malta, or of any of the members, the territorial 
integrity, political independence, or security of Malta is 
threatened. "45 
The Committee of Political Advisors made decisions in a few 
sequestered areas. It issued general guidelines to the Allied 
Travel Office in Berlin for travel of East Germans to NATO 
countries, specific instructions for the issuance of East German 
Temporary Travel Documents, and rules for Allied participation 
in East Germany's Leipzig Fair. 
LEGITIMACY 
The frailty of NATO authority in cases such as these was 
matched by a lack of legitimacy, for acceptance of NATO as a 
forum for political consultation was not implicit in the policies of 
the member nations. Suitor nations solicited NATO legitimation 
for their own policies without necessarily accepting NATO influ­
ence on policy formation; the nations courted were reluctant to 
provide the desired concurrence. 
Three successive American Secretaries of State verbally fa­
vored the expansion of political consultation. John Foster Dulles 
called for the advancement of NATO "from its initial phase to the 
totality of its meaning." Christian Herter proposed greater politi­
cal consultation within NATO. Dean Rusk suggested common 
NATO policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, 
Dulles made it clear that the United States would act in critical 
areas, such as Formosa, without necessary prior consultation 
within the Council; and Rusk assumed that a' common NATO pol­
icy in Asia would be one which would support the American 
position there.46 
Shortly after his return to power, General de Gaulle had 
supported the deepening of political consultation between 
France, the United States, and Britain. On September 17, 1958, 
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he wrote to President Eisenhower and "called for a tripartite or­
ganization on the level of world policy and strategy to take joint 
decisions on political questions affecting world security." " Al­
though there is insufficient public information available to be 
certain that such political consultation was intended to bear the 
NATO label, De Gaulle probably felt that it should be related to 
the Alliance. In his speech of September 5, 1960, he joined the 
directoire proposal and NATO by asking, "if there is no agreement 
among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on mat­
ters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely 
maintained in Europe?" 48 It was clear, however, that De Gaulle 
saw his proposal mainly as a means of obtaining American 
support for French policies. On December 15, 1958, he talked 
with Secretary of State Dulles. After discussing the possibility of 
beginning tripartite planning and "the absence of such tripartite 
co-operation in Africa in recent years, particularly in North 
Africa , de Gaulle stated that he would nevertheless wel­
come genuine three-power planning in Africa, even if tardy. He 
then concluded , 'Of course, a common policy in North 
Africa would necessarily be a French policy.' " 49 
If a nation brought its political problems to NATO for consulta­
tion, other nations attempted to remain uninvolved. Thus when 
the United States introduced the issues of Formosa and the 
Offshore Islands to the Council, and when the United States 
and Britain discussed the circumstances in Lebanon and Jordan 
prior to their intervention, Secretary General Spaak reported 
that "the reserve and caution of certain countries was very 
great. A number of countries remained silent." 60 
Non-national advocacy of NATO political consultation was spo­
radic, even though the political issues were often the focus of 
strong attitudes. The most consistent support, while it had little 
apparent effect, came from the NATO Parliamentarians' Confer­
ence. This group had backed the expansion of political consulta­
tion since its inception. In 1956, an NPC Resolution cited Article 
4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and then called upon the North 
Atlantic Council to "give full scope to such interpretation (of 
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Article 4) and consultation so as to develop greater unity within 
the Atlantic Community.' In 1965, the NPC urged "NATO Gov­
ernments to maintain their efforts to solve the problems of the 
co-ordination of their policies and their forces," and recom­
mended "that special attention be paid immediately to the prob­
lems of political and operational planning." 51 
LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
Although their success seemed slight, NATO'S Secretaries Gen­
eral provided leadership for political consultation. They were all 
distinguished and they all expounded an ideology which in­
cluded liberal doses of general exhortation. Nevertheless, only 
one of them, Paul-Henri Spaak, strove forcefully to drive home a 
substantial series of proposals for specific NATO structures and 
tasks. 
On March 12, 1952, the Council of Deputies appointed Lord 
Ismay to be the first NATO Secretary General and Vice-Chairman 
of the Council. Lord Ismay was a British soldier who had made 
his early career in the outposts of the British Empire and who 
had served closely with Winston Churchill; at the time of his 
new appointment he was British Secretary of State for Common­
wealth Relations. When he appointed Lord Ismay, Churchill 
told him that NATO was the best, if not the only, hope of peace 
and that it "must be more effectively organized and managed," a 
task to which Lord Ismay set himself.52 
In 1956, following four years of service, Lord Ismay resigned, 
and the Council selected Paul-Henri Spaak to succeed him. 
Spaak, a Socialist, had been Prime Minister and several times 
Foreign Minister of Belgium, President of the United Nations 
General Assembly, President of the Council of Europe, and 
President of the ECSC Assembly. He was, to say the least, a 
seasoned politician. He hoped to expand the scope of NATO 
through the broad co-ordination of policies outside the purely 
military and strategic areas and specifically emphasized "the 
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necessity for giving the organization of the Atlantic Alliance a 
political and also an economic basis." 5S 
Spaak resigned in 1961 and was replaced by Dirk Stikker, 
who had a varied background in business, politics, and diplo­
macy. During the postwar years in the Netherlands, Stikker had 
been President of the Fondation du Travail; President of the 
Parti de la Liberte et la Democratie (Liberal); Foreign Minister; 
President of the OEEC; President of the Netherlands delegation 
to the UN Economic and Social Council; and Ambassador to 
Iceland. Immediately preceding his appointment to the post of 
NATO Secretary General he had been Permanent Representative 
to NATO and the OEEC. The French initially opposed his appoint­
ment; and during his three-year term as Secretary General, 
President de Gaulle received him only once. The role which 
Stikker set for himself seemed more limited than that of the men 
who had preceded him. He defined his major aims in terms of 
ensuring the survival of NATO and of making conflicts between 
Allies manageable.54 
Manlio Brosio succeeded Stikker in August, 1964. Brosio was 
an Italian politician and diplomat, who had been associated with 
the Liberal Party and had been Ambassador to Moscow, Lon­
don, Washington, and Paris. One advantage that he enjoyed 
over his predecessor was a more friendly personal relationship 
with De Gaulle. Indeed it was rumored that he had been the 
candidate for Secretary General supported by the French at the 
time of Spaak's resignation. Brosio's style was lower-key than 
that of his predecessors. While Spaak and Stikker had often 
taken their own initiatives to national governments, Brosio pre­
ferred to use existing national positions and Allied consensus as 
bases for action.65 
Lord Ismay had laid the general ideological groundwork for 
political consultation in his farewell address, which presented 
five "Rules for NATO Conduct." Two of these rules warned of the 
dangers and lessons of the continuing Soviet threat. "Never 
relax your vigilance," Ismay said, "unless it is absolutely certain 
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that the danger has passed. Remember the recent past. The 
Soviet has always hated NATO; they have always tried, and are 
still trying to disrupt it." "Do not forget," he continued, "that the 
North Atlantic Treaty is not only a solemn obligation but also an 
insurance—a collective insurance—against measureless catas­
trophe.'' A third rule exhorted the Allies to consult early and in 
depth. It was "imperative that the partners should keep in the 
closest touch with each other on all matters great and small 
which affect the Alliance.' This meant that none of them 
"should take action or reach firm decisions on such matters 
without consulting (their) allies or, at the very least without 
keeping them fully informed." A fourth injunction called upon 
the member governments to formulate and abide by common 
policies for the extra-treaty area. They were not to forget that, 
"the world in which we live is now a small place and that there 
may be developments outside the NATO area which may exercise 
a permanent influence on the security of that area, NATO must 
therefore always have an agreed policy for dealing with such 
developments as they occur, and must pursue that policy reso­
lutely." Finally the Allies should settle internecine conflicts as 
quickly as possible'' and without involving others. To bolster his 
admonition against washing "dirty NATO linen" in public, Lord 
Ismay recalled Kipling: "When ye fight with a Wolf of the 
Pack, ye must fight him alone and afar, / Lest others take part in 
the quarrel, and the Pack be diminished by war."56 
For Ismay's successor, Spaak, the Suez crisis showed both the 
deficiencies of past attempts at consultation and the necessity of 
undertaking a major new effort. He thus moved political consul­
tation into a position of primary importance. In November, 1959, 
Spaak stated that "NATO is ten years old. For the first six years, 
the principal effort was military. During the following four 
years, it has been political." 57 
The ideology with which Spaak attempted to advance politi­
cal consultation was complex. At the highest level of generality, 
it invoked the sanctions of Atlantic interdependence and of the 
Atlantic Community. Spaak was present at the meeting between 
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President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in Octo­
ber, 1957, and contributed to the formulation of their declara­
tion of common purpose, which underlined the interdependence 
of the countries of the free world, and which led to the meeting 
of the Allied heads of government in Paris two months later. 
Elsewhere, he said that, "the Atlantic Alliance should become 
the Atlantic Community. One of our first objectives must be to 
co-ordinate Western policy." 58 
Spaak also emphasized the fact that the Communist threat 
had not diminished but had, in fact, increased since 1949, that 
the threat had expanded from a European-military to a global-po­
litical one, and that the Allies should band together politically to 
meet the danger. Less generally, he asked member states to use 
NATO machinery for consultation on and co-ordination of the 
whole range of their foreign policies—including their relations 
with Africa and Asia—at the earliest stages of policy formation.59 
At the level of particular structures, Spaak made two principal 
recommendations. The first suggestion was that the unanimity 
rule be abandoned, but Spaak doubted that this was possible for 
the foreseeable future: 
Political consultation in NATO is not what I would like, and I 
have so often expressed my personal opinion that it is well 
known. I myself believe that international organizations, 
whether they are universal, Atlantic, or European, will not 
really function well until the day when the strict rule of 
unanimity will have been abandoned. But one must certainly 
recognize that, in saying this, I or people who share this 
feeling are far ahead of their time. 
The second recommendation was that permanent consultative 
committees be formed to deal with Allied policy in different 
regional areas; but this proved unrealistic as well.60 
Spaak also commented on particular political tasks. He de­
fined a desirable position for NATO on the problems of Germany 
and Berlin: "We cannot accept the neutralization of Germany," 
he said. "We must continue to regard German reunification as 
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our objective; we can, under no circumstances, abandon the 
Berliners, which means that we must not allow civilian and 
military communication between West Berlin and the free world 
to be cut." 61 On the issue of Algeria, he suggested that France 
should present her troubles to the Allies, who would listen with 
a sympathetic ear. "If I may permit myself to reproach the 
French government,' he said, "it is for not having till now 
clearly posed the problem (of Algeria) to NATO as a whole. 
Why? Because I believe that the French position is so good that 
it must necessarily triumph. The immense majority of the 
NATO countries realize the importance for Europe and for the 
Atlantic Organization that French influence remain preponder­
ant in Algeria.  "6  2 
In spite of the primacy which Spaak gave to political consulta­
tion, the going proved rough. By 1959 he was openly discour­
aged. "While the situation was very satisfactory throughout 
1958 and during the first six months of 1959," he stated, "after 
the Geneva Conference matters became worse, and certain 
decisions were taken. The situation had thus become less 
satisfactory, causing considerable uneasiness." 63 Following the 
December, 1960, meeting of the Council of Ministers, his suc­
cessor reported that Spaak was ready to resign because he "was 
in disagreement with the policies followed by several Ministers, 
and there was, in his opinion, insufficient consultation and prac­
tically no unity of action." 6* 
Following Spaak's departure, Secretary General Stikker con­
tinued general support for political collaboration. He stressed 
that "the principal way continually to renew and strengthen the 
bonds that unite us is political consultation and harmonization of 
our foreign policies." 65 
At the same time, his remarks implied a feeling that the 
realities of NATO in the 1960's required a less ambitious approach 
to Allied politics. "The unity of the alliance was no longer what it 
had been at the beginning," he felt, and "new disagreements 
both in political and military affairs, some of them acute, were to 
arise. As I saw it, my first responsibility was to ensure that NATO 
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continued to function. My second was obviously to narrow 
the areas of disagreement to workable dimensions." 66 
Stikker supported specific institutional innovations, moving 
political consultation into a position of procedural primacy in the 
meetings of the Permanent Council. Under Spaak, the Perma­
nent Council had first attempted to clear the terrain of adminis­
trative questions, and then had dealt with political matters. As a 
result, Stikker felt that meetings had been extended and political 
discussions truncated. At its Oslo meeting in May, 1961, the 
Council of Ministers reversed the order, and subsequent Perma­
nent Council meetings began with political issues. 
In the realm of particular tasks, Stikker defined a firm policy 
for Berlin. "Through the sequence of events since the end of the 
Second World War," Stikker said, "the limits within which we 
can manoeuvre and within which we can negotiate in the case of 
Berlin are very narrow indeed. In its efforts to be reasonable and 
co-operative, the West has already over the years conceded sev­
eral points, and very little could be conceded now without our 
setting our foot on a steeply inclined and very slippery plane." 67 
Nevertheless, Stikker appeared more cautious than Spaak. 
While Spaak had stressed long-term planning in political affairs, 
Stikker focussed more closely on the military future, opposing an 
American proposal that APAG undertake long-term political 
projections for NATO because he feared that it could not success­
fully accomplish the job. While Spaak had hoped to establish a 
NATO European policy, Stikker was more skeptical. He felt that 
Franco-German conflicts would continue to prevent agreement, 
even after De Gaulle had left French politics. 
Brosio's approach was as ambivalent as Stikker's. He con­
tinued the general call for political co-operation. "We have 
concluded perhaps the first half of our soccer game one goal up," 
Brosio said, "but we are in the course of a difficult second half, 
where we are playing against the slope and the final result is 
uncertain. We should be careful, lest we find ourselves 
losing in the diplomatic field the possibility not only of a victory 
but even of a fair and honorable draw.' Brosio also placed major 
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emphasis on the goal of narrowing foreign policy conflicts. "It 
must be the purpose of our consultation process," he said, "to 
prevent at least conflicting policies and contradictory action 
within the alliance." 68 
He called for joint action and negotiation on a series of 
specific problems within the geographical area covered by the 
Alliance, under the "policy of the outstretched hand." Rap­
prochement and detente with Eastern Europe, the end of the 
political division of Germany, and balanced arms control meas­
ures were sectors in which he believed progress might be made.69 
NATO consultation on problems outside the Treaty area ''was 
also highly necessary and desirable, and in the evident interest of 
all Alliance powers." Nevertheless, Brosio felt that 'an extension 
of Alliance commitments outside the NATO area might well do 
more harm than good," and that extra-treaty area problems, 
"since they are not covered by the Atlantic Treaty, will as a rule 
not give rise to Atlantic policy." When he particularly appealed 
for Allied support of the United States in South Viet-Nam, he 
was careful to mollify the other Allies by noting that the prob­
lems there were theirs, but only "indirectly." 70 
In its generality, the ideology of NATO'S leaders aimed at all 
Alliance members. At one end of the spectrum were the larger 
powers—the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The 
Suez interventions which helped to upgrade political consulta­
tion had placed Britain and France on the opposite side from the 
United States, a critical situation which the leadership realized 
would destroy the alliance if repeated. Furthermore, concern 
with the extra-treaty area—while it could apply equally well to 
nations like Belgium and the Netherlands, if not to Portugal— 
obviously had special relevance for the Big Three. Finally, the 
emphasis on narrowing foreign policy conflict bore special im­
plied reference to the growing differences between the govern­
ments of France and the United States, both in the military and 
political spheres. At the other end of the spectrum were the 
smaller powers, who might be expected to applaud such stands 
as Spaak s rejection of de Gaulle's proposal for a political direc­
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toire, and who, it might be hoped, would share Brosio's belief 
that a "lack of timely and serious consultation" entailed "the risk 
of subjecting the minor powers of the Alliance to the conse­
quences of individual initiatives and faits accom-plis on the part 
of others."71 
The leadership's attempt to house all of the Allies under the 
roof of political consultation was most clearly articulated by 
Spaak when he defended his proposal for a set of permanent 
committees to consult on specific geographical areas of the world. 
Spaak stated: 
The most powerful members of the Alliance, who would, of 
course, be members of all the restricted committees, would thus 
acquire a general view of world problems and would be in a 
position to co-ordinate the action of the Alliance. This, it seems 
to me, would be a step towards the elaboration of a global 
strategy. 
The countries with limited interests would have the oppor­
tunity to concert their action with their more powerful allies 
and would no doubt obtain from them the help they need. 
Finally, the other members of the Alliance would not be 
kept in the dark. On the contrary, they would be informed, to 
the extent that they were interested, in accordance with the 
principles laid down in the report of the Three Wise Men.72 
While NATO leaders tried to co-opt those elements within 
national governments traditionally responsible for foreign policy 
formulation and execution, they made little attempt to bring 
arrivistes such as national legislators inside out of the cold. 
Spaak, Sikker, and Brosio all told the NATO Parliamentarians' 
Conference that they saw no immediate prospect for transform­
ing the NPC from a gathering without formal ties with NATO into 
an official parliamentary body for the Atlantic Alliance.73 
DECISION-MAKING 
Notwithstanding their efforts to advance political consulta­
tion, the Secretaries General were blocked in NATO'S decision­
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making structures. Independent experts gave them some support 
but instructed delegates ultimately remained in control. 
In NATO'S earlier years, Lord Ismay had been able to use two 
ad hoc groups of national officials acting in the capacity of 
independent experts, each of which had recommended improve­
ments in political consultation. The first of these was the NATO 
Committee on the North Atlantic Community, which made its 
final report to the Council at Lisbon in February, 1952. The 
Committee consisted of Ministers from Belgium, Canada, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Norway. Mr. Lester Pearson was Chair­
man of the Committee, and Charles Spofford, the American 
Chairman of the Council of Deputies, was the only non-Minis­
terial and large-power representative. This body recommended 
that political consultation under Article 4 be expanded, espe­
cially during "emergency situations'' and in the early stages of 
policy formation. "There is a continuing need," the Committee 
said, "for effective consultation at an early stage on current 
problems, in order that national policies may be developed and 
action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and 
interests of all the members of NATO." 7i 
The second group, the Committee on Non-Military Co-opera­
tion, was established in May, 1956, by the Council to advise it 
"on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in 
non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlan­
tic Community." This committee, later known as the "Three 
Wise Men," consisted of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, 
and Norway: Lester Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard 
Lange. During 1956 it submitted a questionnaire to the member 
governments and conducted a series of interviews with govern­
ment representatives, probing attitudes on the possible future 
role of NATO.75 
The Committee's final report devoted an entire chapter to the 
support of political co-operation. Among the institutional innova­
tions which it proposed was that there be 'preparation for politi­
cal consultation1' through the constitution under the Council of 
a "Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided 
Political Consultation in NATO [ 39 
when necessary by specialists from the capitals." For 'peaceful 
settlement of inter-member disputes," it recommended "empow­
ering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at 
any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to 
initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, concilia­
tion, or arbitration. " There was to be "an appraisal of the 
political progress of the Alliance by the Foreign Ministers each 
Spring, in preparation for which "the Secretary General should 
submit an annual report." Finally, the Committee suggested "that 
the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO 
headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences,'' 
such as the NPC, and give all possible help with arrangements 
for their meetings. Invited representatives of member govern­
ments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and 
military officers [should] attend certain of these meetings." 76 
The Report was approved by a general resolution of the 
Ministerial Council of December, 1956. The Council added a 
specific endorsement of the recommendation that the Secretary 
General be allowed to offer his good offices to initiate and 
facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbi­
tration. Ultimately the Committee's work represented the foun­
dation for the reforms which followed the Suez crisis. 
At the Ministerial Council in December, 1959, American 
Secretary of State Herter suggested that NATO develop a ten-year 
plan for the coming decade. The Ministers, in their final com­
munique, "instructed the Permanent Council to undertake 
long-term planning, to cover the next ten years, on the objectives 
of the Alliance in the political, military, scientific, and economic 
fields, and in regard to arms control." Secretary General Spaak 
was given the task of developing the details of the plan." 
Spaak constructed the exercise around the theme of the Atlan­
tic Community and used the Three Wise Men's report as a base. 
During the fall of 1960, he met with the permanent representa­
tives every week in his office. Agreement was almost impossible 
due to conflicting and constantly shifting national positions. 
In December, 1960, Spaak presented his report to the Minis­
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ters. To improve political consultation, he recommended the 
establishment of a set of permanent committees which would 
focus on regional areas.78 Membership in each would include the 
United States, Britain, and France; perhaps Germany and Italy; 
and those Allies most concerned. Thus Belgium and Portugal 
would sit on the African committee, the Netherlands on the 
Asian group, Greece and Turkey on the Middle Eastern body. 
The Council did not approve Spaak's recommendations for 
expanding NATO'S consultative organs. The United States, Brit­
ain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy were generally favor­
able, but President de Gaulle still supported the creation of a 
directoire and the Scandinavians were reluctant to assume new 
military responsibilities. 
At this point Spaak made his initial decision to resign. Not 
only had the Council refused his political proposals; it had also 
turned aside his suggestions for economic co-operation and for 
substantial increases in the science and information budgets. 
Portugal had made a presentation of her political problems; but 
nobody had replied to or discussed it. Finally the conflict be­
tween France and the United States was growing without can­
did discussion; and De Gaulle had begun military withdrawals. 
Stikker replaced Spaak in April, 1961, and at their May 
meeting in Oslo, the Foreign Ministers approved a final report 
on the Long-Term Planning Exercise. It is unlikely that this 
document conspicuously bore Spaak's imprint. Indeed, the 
Council at this time finally "rejected the idea of adding any 
permanent consultative organs to the already complicated bu­
reaucratic apparatus and decided, instead, to rely primarily on ad 
hoc committees." 79 
In the fall of 1964, the Canadian government suggested that 
NATO conduct a new exercise to study the future tasks of the 
Alliance. Pierre Harmel, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
made a similar proposal at the Ministerial Council two years 
later and the Council "resolved to undertake a broad analysis of 
international developments since the signing of the North Atlan­
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tic Treaty in 1949." Its purpose was: "'to determine the influence 
of such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks 
which lie before it, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor 
for durable peace." The Council noted particularly its intention 
to 'examine ways of improving consultation within the Alliance, 
including the European member countries." 80 
A preliminary report was scheduled for the spring, 1967, 
Ministerial meeting; and the exercise was due to conclude at the 
subsequent gathering in December. On February 15, 1967, 
high-level delegates from national capitals attended the meeting 
of the Permanent Council to discuss the implementation of the 
Harmel Plan. A week later the Permanent Council formalized 
this meeting by noting that it had set up, "'under the Chairman­
ship of the Secretary General, a Special Group of Representa­
tives designated by governments to prepare a report." 81 Under 
the Special Group were also established four subgroups, with 
different rapporteurs, to deal with the topics of East-West rela­
tions, inter-allied relations, general defense policy, and relations 
with other countries. 
Once Foreign Minister Harmel had made the original pro­
posal, Brosio assumed an important role in working out the 
specific structures and tasks of the exercise. The Harmel Plan 
represented a vehicle for putting early and with force the argu­
ment for the continued need for NATO after 1969, when Article 
13 of the North Atlantic Treaty allowed any nation to withdraw 
with one year's notice. Brosio did not hope that the study would 
"lead to NATO becoming an executive body for the implementa­
tion of a common policy; there is no question of committing now 
the Alliance as such to a definite course of bloc-to-bloc negotia­
tions," he said. "The Allies are not pursuing any ambitious goal 
such as a Political High Command.'" Rather the object of the 
exercise was to investigate ways in which the Alliance could be 
'strengthened and adapted to meet the needs of the immediate 
and of the more distant future, with specific emphasis on the 
problems of detente.82 
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Brosio's position gave him good leverage to pursue his aims at 
several levels of national instruction and independent expertise. 
As Chairman of the Council, he had access to national perma­
nent representatives at regular Council gatherings and in infor­
mal meetings. He was also chairman of the Special Group on the 
Study of the Future Tasks of the Alliance (AC 261). This 
group was composed of—and two of its subgroups were headed 
by—senior officials from national foreign ministries, as indicated 
in Appendixes A and B. Two subgroup rapporteurs were more 
independent, former Secretary General Spaak, who had retired 
from active Belgian politics in 1966, and Dr. C. L. Patijn, 
Professor of International Political Relations at the University of 
Utrecht. Finally, Brosio headed the International Staff/Secre­
tariat which was responsible for certain research and drafts. 
It yet remained unlikely that the Harmel exercise would 
result in significantly improved political consultation. Harmel 
had suggested that a "European caucus" be created within the 
North Atlantic Council, which could speak with a single voice 
and which could concert policy with the United States on a 
more equal base than the European nations individually. By 
October, 1967, this suggestion had been shelved. The French, 
still participants in NATO'S political activities, had initially ap­
proved the exercise, but were unwilling to endorse a strong 
report. Among the remaining fourteen states were those, includ­
ing the Germans and Canadians, who wished to preserve as 
much French co-operation as still remained. Moreover the exer­
cise had been constructed only partially to improve political 
consultation. Perhaps equally important had been the desire to 
move public opinion, to persuade the electorate—especially 
young voters who had relatively dim memories of the dangers of 
the late 1940's and early 1950's—that NATO still remained neces­
83 sary.
When the Harmel report on "the future tasks of the Alliance' 
finally appeared in December, 1967, it proposed no radical inno­
vations. Major emphasis rested on the need to use "the Alliance 
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constructively in the interest of detente'' in order to achieve 
peace and stability in Europe." At the same time it made clear 
that "Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collec­
tive decision'' and that the most desirable situation would be one 
in which the Allies remained on ''parallel courses'' rather than 
on a common tack. The Allies were to ''examine," ''study," and 
"'consult on' the future of Germany, disarmament and arms 
control, NATO'S south-eastern flank, and the extra-treaty area; but 
concrete action would have to await the Permanent Council's 
"detailed follow-up' to the Harmel study.84 
The permanent day-to-day structures and processes of political 
consultation seemed to allow little grounds for optimism about 
constructive change. Within these more permanent structures, 
the Secretary General and his experts—the Staff/Secretariat— 
could of course inject perspectives independent of national posi­
tions. Their roles as chairmen of the various consultative bodies 
involved the conduct of meetings and drafting of minutes and 
papers. 
The decision-making structure for political consultation, nev­
ertheless, remained heavily weighted on the side of instructed 
national delegates, though degree of instruction varied with the 
rank and relation of the individual with his home government, 
the gravity of the subject under discussion, and the degree of 
national commitment which might be involved. The Permanent 
Council consisted of national permanent representatives to NATO, 
the Committee of Political Advisors of representatives from na­
tional delegations, the Groups of Experts of national foreign 
office representatives, and the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group of 
national foreign policy planning officials.85 
The pattern of behavior within this framework tended to be 
one in which little change in national political positions ap­
peared. Members of national delegations stated privately that 
"convergence'' of originally disparate national positions was ex­
tremely difficult to achieve; rather, NATO structures produced less 
satisfactory outcomes of 'specialization" and 'redundancy." Is­
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sues were assigned to groups with specialized areas of compe­
tence; but when they were elevated from lower to higher groups 
the issues tended to be no closer to a joint solution than before. 
COALITIONS 
In spite of the leadership's attempts, a stable base of coali­
tional support for NATO political consultation failed to develop. 
Perhaps the best facsimile of a supporting coalition was provided 
by the United States and Britain subsequent to Suez. The two 
nations co-operated privately and informed the NATO Council 
before intervening in Lebanon and Jordan. In Cyprus, they 
proposed that the NATO countries provide peace-keeping troops 
and a neutral mediator. During the Middle East crisis of 1967 
they jointly sponsored a Declaration of Maritime Nations. Nev­
ertheless in these cases—and in joint actions such as the ship­
ment of arms to Tunisia in 1957 and the Moscow Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963—the two were more concerned that their Allies 
fall in line with American and British policies than that their 
Allies participate in the process of policy determination. 
Another possible coalition, represented by De Gaulle's pro­
posal for closer political co-ordination between the United 
States, Britain, and France, was rejected by the NATO leadership 
and by the United States on the grounds that such a grouping 
would undermine rather than advance the NATO program. Spaak 
stated that "within the Alliance most of the members are op­
posed to the idea of a 'directory.'" In spite of the differences in 
national responsibilities he felt that the "directory" proposal was 
misguided in "granting to some the right to decide for the 
others. The biggest countries must now resign themselves 
to endeavor to convince the others," he continued, "because, 
though they are larger, they are no longer large enough to make 
the decisions alone. Only the Atlantic Alliance can face up to 
the threat." 86 
In his reply of October 20, 1958, Eisenhower "declined to 
enter into any arrangements that would give our other Allies, or 
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other countries of the free world, the impression that basic 
decisions affecting their own vital interests were being made 
without their participation." 8T 
Other protocoalitions were only tangentially related to NATO 
political consultation. Co-operation between the United States, 
Britain, France, and Germany over Berlin—symbolized by the 
Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington—took place pri­
marily outside NATO. The caucus of the Fourteen, formed in the 
wake of De Gaulle's military withdrawal, concentrated mainly 
on problems in other areas of NATO activity. The decision of the 
Fourteen, announced in October, 1966, to move NATO'S political 
headquarters from Paris to Brussels—though it had profound 
political implications—was less politically substantive than an 
administrative measure to reunite NATO civilian and military 
bureaucracies. Even here there was Canadian and Danish op­
position.88 
FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER 
The failure of integration was to be expected in political 
consultation, since issues here cut to the core of national foreign 
policy and were highly controversial. While some less important 
matters, such as travel documents for East Germans, resulted in 
Allied co-ordination, activities which might in other contexts 
have been technical—for example, the exchange of information 
—remained political by reason of long traditions of diplomatic 
secrecy and considerations of diplomatic strategy. 
A major impetus toward NATO political concerting came from 
the perceived dangers of the Suez crisis. Spaak noted that the 
Report of the Committee of Three, which underlay most subse­
quent political development, "was discussed by the Ministers 
soon after the Suez crisis, and this circumstance no doubt ex­
plains why it was approved without lengthy discussion.' He 
continued: 
The Alliance, had, in fact, just been in serious danger. On a 
question of real importance, the respective positions of the 
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United States, on the one side, and France and Great Britain 
on the other, had been entirely different. 
One did not need to be a prophet to see that, if such a situa­
tion arose again in the future, it was very possible that the 
Alliance would not survive. Aware of the danger, the Ministers 
ratified the conclusions of the Three Wise Men.89 
The inability of the political program to expand substantially 
and gain popularity once the immediate crisis had passed can be 
attributed to the lack of convergent interests which might have 
made nations agree to bear extra political risks, military commit­
ments, and economic burdens. Interests were compartmentalized 
by discrete spheres of influence. In Berlin, the three former 
occupying powers and the Germans were the major nations 
concerned; in post-colonial situations such as Algeria, Cyprus, 
and the Congo, the former colonial power and the new claimants 
held center stage; in Cuba the United States acted in support of 
the Monroe Doctrine, an exclusive policy almost one hundred 
forty years old, while in South Viet-Nam it fought a battle 
which the French had abandoned and others were unwilling to 
support. Even in such non-territorial areas as arms control, inter­
ests were separated by barriers between the nuclear haves and 
nuclear have-nots, with implications not only for test bans, but 
also for such areas as non-proliferation and non-dissemination, 
reduction of nuclear stocks, denuclearized areas, denucleariza­
tion of space, regulation of conventional weapons, establishment 
of observation posts, and peaceful exploitation of atomic energy. 
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Allied cooperation in military forces also relied on explicit 
North Atlantic Treaty provisions. Article 3 stated that, "the 
Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effec­
tive self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.'' Under 
Article 5 each Party agreed that in the event of armed attack, it 
would ''assist the Party or Parties attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as 
it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.' Finally in 
Article 9 it was decided that the Council "shall establish immedi­
ately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for 
the implementation of Articles 3 and 5." 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
At its first meeting in 1949, the Council established the 
Defense Committee, normally to be composed of defense minis­
ters, and suggested to it the general outline of those subsidiary 
military bodies which it considered appropriate for the task of 
aiding the Defense Committee in recommending measures for 
the implementation of the Treaty.1 
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Among these was the Military Committee composed of na­
tional chiefs-of-staff or their representatives, normally to meet in 
Washington. The terms of reference of the Military Committee 
directed it to 'provide general policy guidance of a military 
nature to its Standing Group; advise the Defense Committee 
and other agencies on military matters as appropriate; recom­
mend to the Defense Committee military measures for the uni­
fied defense of the North Atlantic area." 
Beneath the Military Committee there was to be "a sub-com­
mittee of that body to be known as the Standing Group," consist­
ing of representatives from France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States and functioning continuously at a permanent site 
in Washington. Under its directive the Standing Group, "in 
accordance with general policy guidance provided by the Mili­
tary Committee'" was to "provide specific policy guidance and 
information of a military nature to the Regional Planning 
Groups and any other bodies of the organization as is necessary 
for their work." Furthermore the Standing Group was to "co-or­
dinate and integrate the defense plans originating in the Re­
gional Planning Groups." 
Five regional planning groups were set up on a geographical 
basis "in order to ensure speedy and efficient planning of the 
unified defense of the whole North Atlantic area": the Northern 
European Regional Planning Group, the Western European 
Regional Planning Group, the Southern European-Western 
Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, the Canadian-United 
States Regional Planning Group, and the North Atlantic Ocean 
Regional Planning Group. 
In 1951 the Council paved the way for the development of a 
set of civilian defense substructures by institutionally incorporat­
ing the Defense Committee. Following the work of a Temporary 
Council Committee, the Annual Review Committee was created 
in 1952 to promote force planning by co-ordinating yearly esti­
mates of Allied military and economic capabilities. This body 
was assisted by the Economics and Finance Division of the 
International Staff/Secretariat and supervised Annual Reviews 
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between 1953-61 and a Triennial Review in 1962. During 1952 
the Council also created the Military Budget Committee to 
oversee the operating expenses of NATO'S military establishment. 
In 1963 the Council established itself as the Defense Plan­
ning Committee (DPC) with a subordinate Defense Planning 
Working Group (DPWG) in order to examine further "the inter­
related questions of strategy, force requirements, and the re­
sources available to meet them;" and in December, 1966, the 
Council approved the formation in 1967 of a Five Year Rolling 
Defense Program which would project "Alliance force goals and 
country plans five years ahead each year.'' During the course of 
1966-67, the DPC emerged as an alternate Council. Following 
French withdrawal from NATO'S military organizations, it became 
"the coordinating body for the defense plans of the 'Fourteen' 
dealing with all matters connected with integrated common 
defense." 2 
To deal with the area of nuclear consultation and planning, 
the Council in 1965 set up a Special Committee of Defense 
Ministers, known as the McNamara Committee after the Amer­
ican Secretary of Defense who originally suggested it. Beneath 
it, this Committee created three temporary working bodies: the 
Nuclear Planning Working Group, the Working Group on 
Intelligence and Other Data Exchange, and the Working Group 
on Communications. These groups were to function under the 
guidance of a steering committee composed of the permanent 
representatives of the participating countries—Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The Council substituted two permanent bodies for this set of 
structures in 1966. The first of these was the Nuclear Defense 
Affairs Committee (NDAC), whose task was "to propose general 
policy on the nuclear defense affairs of the Alliance," which was 
open to all NATO members, and which twelve nations—excepting 
France, Iceland, and Luxembourg—joined. The second body 
was the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) , which was created "to 
carry out the detailed work required for policy proposals.'' Four 
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nations were to have permanent seats on the NPG: the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy; three seats were to 
rotate every eighteen months. During the first term, Canada and 
the Netherlands participated, with Turkey and Greece each 
serving half the time of the third position. Belgium and Den­
mark sat on the NPG during the second eighteen months, with 
Greece and Turkey again dividing the remaining seat.3 
In 1967, the International Staff/Secretariat was reorganized 
and a Division of Defense Planning and Policy was created, 
with subordinate directorates of force planning, nuclear plan­
ning, and civil emergency planning. 
On the more strictly military side, the Military Committee 
which the Council had established in 1949 set up its headquar­
ters in Washington and evolved a schedule in which it met 
approximately twice a year at the level of national chiefs of staff 
and twice a month at the level of permanent representatives.4 
The Military Committee's subordinate agency, the Standing 
Group, was changed in 1964 by the internationalization of its 
planning staff. Under the new arrangement the director was to 
be chosen from a nation not a member of the Standing Group; 
and there were to be four deputy directors, two from the mem­
bers of Standing Group nations and two non-members in rota­
tion. In June, 1966, following the French military withdrawal, 
the Standing Group was abolished and replaced by an interna­
tional military staff directly serving the Military Committee. 
The staff consisted of about forty-five planners from twelve 
nations—not including France, Iceland, and Portugal—organ­
ized into divisions for plans and policy, operations, logistics, 
communications, and intentions. In October, 1967, the Military 
Committee, with staff, moved to Brussels. 
Of the original regional planning groups, only the Canada-
United States Regional Planning Group remained by 1966; the 
other groups had been replaced by Allied Commands. In 1950 
the Council had decided upon the establishment of "an inte­
grated force under centralized command, which shall be ade­
quate to deter aggression and to ensure the defense of Western 
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Europe.' Under the strategic direction of the Standing Group, 
there was to be the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SA­
CEUR) with "the authority to train the national units assigned 
to his command and to organize them in an effective integrated 
defense force." He was to be "supported by an international staff 
drawn from the nations contributing to the force." 5 In April of 
the following year, the first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, ac­
tivated the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) and the Allied Command Europe (ACE), both in 
France. Two months later, the deputies signed a status of forces 
agreement covering the position of military personnel of one 
NATO nation serving on the territory of another. During 1952, 
the first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and 
Commander-in-Chief Channel Command (CINCCHAN) were ap­
pointed. 
In subsequent years, SACEUR emerged as the most important 
military commander. Beneath him at SHAPE were deputies for 
air, naval, and nuclear affairs, a science advisor, and special 
assistants for international and French affairs. There were also 
deputy chiefs of staff for logistics and administration and for 
plans and operations. Major divisions included Personnel and 
Administration, Budget and Finance, Programs, Intelligence, 
Logistics, Communications and Electronics, Operations, Plans 
and Policy, and Public Information. In addition there were 
representatives from SACLANT, national governments, and na­
tional strategic forces (United States Strategic Air Command 
and Atlantic Strike Fleet and the United Kingdom Bomber 
Command); and SACEUR'S Liaison Group with the Joint Stra­
tegic Planning Staff at Omaha. Beneath SACEUR in the Allied 
Command Europe were major geographical commanders in 
chief for Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied 
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), Allied Forces Central Eu­
rope (AFCENT), Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED), as well 
as the United Kingdom Air Defense Region, and an ACE Mobile 
Force, including components from seven nations. 
The French military withdrawal brought some changes. Geo­
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graphically, the Council decided in 1966 to move SHAPE from 
Rocquencourt, in France, to Casteau, Belgium, and AFCENT from 
Fontainebleau to the Brunssum-Maastricht area in the Nether­
lands. Structurally, AFCENT headquarters were reorganized and 
consolidated by eliminating separate establishments which had 
existed for land and air forces (LANDCENT and AIRCENT), and 
AFMED was transformed into a subordinate command under 
AFSOUTH. 
A further addition was prompted by the Arab-Israeli conflict 
during the spring of 1967, together with significant Soviet naval 
activity in the Mediterranean. In December, 1967, the Council 
created a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) con­
sisting of "destroyer-type ships'' that would be continuously oper­
ational and ready to move quickly to any potential trouble spot.6 
The new force replaced a previous training exercise group that 
had operated intermittently during the previous three years; and 
the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Norway pro­
vided an initial contribution of one vessel each. 
In spite of structural differentiation and change, binding insti­
tutional procedures did not appear to grow substantially 
stronger. Basic decisions and plans of the NATO military force 
program were made by the Council, the DPC, and the Military 
Committee, where the unanimity rule prevented decisions 
which individual nations chose strongly to oppose. While some 
procedural developments mitigated the force of this rule—na­
tional concurrence in the Council with formal reservations; 
French non-participation in the DPC; referral of papers upward 
by lower bodies, such as the DPWG, if no agreement was reached; 
SACEUR'S formulation of plans as a basis for decision—nations in 
the last instance retained the right of veto if they chose to use it. 
In the more specialized nuclear institutions—the Nuclear De­
fense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group—pa­
pers were presented by individual representatives for comment 
by others, but initially there was no joint product. Indications of 
some development were contained in a report of October, 1967, 
which stated that the NPG meeting of September had directed 
NATO Military Forces I [ 53 
the NATO military to prepare and present "'a detailed plan for 
possible deployment of border mines, particularly along the 
mountainous border between Turkey and the USSR'' and had 
"also agreed to consider a possible antiballistic missile system for 
Europe." Nevertheless, in May of the following year, the Coun­
cil stated that "present circumstances did not justify the deploy­
ment of an antiballistic missile system in Europe.'' In any event 
national governments could not be bound against their will.7 
Nor was it clear that there were net increases in NATO military 
tasks. On the one hand, there had been certain forms of appar­
ent task expansion. The Annual Review, a yearly NATO study 
that had examined Allied military and economic capabilities 
since 1953, was replaced during 1962 by the Triennial Review, 
and then in 1966-67 by the Five Year Rolling Defense Program. 
A co-ordinated air defense and early warning system for the 
European nations, comprising four air defense regions—North­
ern, Central, Southern Europe, and the United Kingdom—was 
approved in principle in 1955 and finally implemented in 1960. 
The ACE Mobile Force—composed of special units drawn from 
already assigned forces, and designed to serve as a military fire 
brigade in NATO'S border regions—was established in 1961; and 
in 1967 it received funds from the NATO military budget for the 
first time. In December, 1967, the Council extended the prece­
dent by creating the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. The Mili­
tary Budget—which financed the activities of SHAPE, SACLANT, 
approximately two dozen subordinate headquarters of SHAPE and 
SACLANT, assorted communications agencies (e.g., The Allied 
Military Communications Equipment Committee), the NATO 
Defense College, the ACE High Communications System, the 
Latina Electronics School, NATO Early Warning Stations, and a 
few other bodies in the fields of armaments and defense science 
—increased from a total of less than $10 million in 1951 to 
approximately $60 million in 1965, and an estimated $81 million 
for fiscal year 1967.8 
The line of attempted defense was gradually moved forward 
until it reached to or near the Iron Curtain. Allied strategists had 
54 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
begun with plans which aimed at withdrawing behind or de­
fending at the Rhine, but by 1958 they hoped to hold a line 
along the Rivers Weser and Lech; by 1963 they proposed to 
defend all West German territory.9 Greek and Turkish military 
resources had joined the Alliance in 1952, and German strength 
in 1955. Finally an expanded array of nuclear weapons had 
strengthened the NATO arsenal, ranging from systems with coun­
terforce interdiction targets in Eastern Europe—such as major 
troop concentration areas, airfields for strike aircraft, warning 
radars, road and rail communications, command centers—down 
through unsown nuclear landmines. The total number of Ameri­
can nuclear warheads on European soil in 1966, according to 
Secretary McNamara, was approximately seven thousand.10 
Nevertheless, for several years, serious disputes had existed 
over the strategic doctrine governing the use of NATO forces. In 
1956 the Council issued a political directive which stated that 
nuclear weapons might be "used from the onset" of hostilities; 
subsequently the Military Committee presented a plan, MC 
14/2, which endorsed both strategic and tactical use of nuclear 
weapons in case of enemy attack and which authorized SACEUR 
to use the force necessary to carry out his mission. Sponsored by 
the American government at the time when Admiral Radford 
was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MC 14/2 was inter­
preted as the transfer to the NATO arena of the strategy of massive 
retaliation and gave rise to some European opposition, prompted 
by a consideration of the possible costs of nuclear war. The 
conditions of nuclear warfare had been simulated in SHAPE 
Exercise "Carte Blanche" which had been held in West Ger­
many, the Lowlands, and northeastern France in June, 1955. 
The estimates of 1,700,000 dead and 3,500,000 wounded had 
produced substantial public concern, especially in West Ger­
many. Although the Council agreed to MC 14/2 on May 9, 
1957, several nations, including Germany, the Netherlands, 
France, and Norway expressed reservations for the record.11 In 
1959, a new plan, MC 48/2, re-enforced the existing doctrine; 
but, at the Ministerial meeting in Oslo in May, 1961, the 
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Foreign Ministers directed the Military Committee and the 
Standing Group to draft a strategic paper replacing the earlier 
ones and emphasizing limited types of response.12 
In 1963, the Military Committee had ready MC 100, a docu­
ment which included provisions for the use of the whole spec­
trum of military systems, including not only nuclear but also 
conventional armament. The American government had pro­
posed the revision; but the French now opposed MC 100 on the 
grounds that it moved too far backward in the direction of 
flexibility. Other Europeans were also skeptical, though they did 
not publicize their doubts. Over the years, European leaders had, 
to a certain extent, made their peace with nuclear weaponry. 
Moreover, the gradual shift of American military doctrine dur­
ing the Eisenhower years from ''massive retaliation" to "gradu­
ated deterrence" and, during the Kennedy and Johnson Admin­
istrations, to "flexible response" made some Europeans suspect a 
weakening of American resolve to use the United States' most 
powerful weapons in defense of its Allies. 
European doubts had been aggravated by American reversal 
of the traditional NATO roles of shield and sword. General Nor­
stad had once explained the symbolic significance of the shield 
and the sword. "The emblem of SHAPE," he had said, "is a shield 
and a sword. I think of that emblem as representing the dual 
aspect of our forces—the Europe-based forces shielding the air 
and ground, while the retaliatory forces strike back as the aveng­
ing sword." At Nassau, in December, 1962, President Kennedy 
and Prime Minister Macmillan had transposed the terminology, 
agreeing that "in addition to having a nuclear shield, it is impor­
tant to have a non-nuclear sword." The implication of the inver­
sion was that, while nuclear forces might act as a peacetime 
shield to discourage attack, they would not necessarily strike 
back in revenge should deterrence fail.13 
A new document, MC 100/1, was drawn up as an attempted 
compromise. Again the French objected, MC 100/1 failed, and 
NATO remained through mid-1967 without a strategy com­
manding the effective agreement of the Allies. The French 
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military departure opened the way for adoption of a new docu­
ment, MC 14/1, by the Defense Planning Committee. MC 
14/1 represented an updated version of MC 100/1 and set forth 
a common Allied strategy "based upon a flexible and balanced 
range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all 
levels of aggression or threats of aggression." " 
It was not clear whether the new strategy implied the attain­
ment of substantial Allied consensus, or whether, instead, it had 
merely papered over existing differences. The flexibility of the 
new formulation was limited by the fact that it undertook to 
"maintain the security and integrity of the North Atlantic 
Treaty area within the concept of forward defense." 15 German 
Defense Minister von Hassel delineated the boundaries of flexi­
bility in an interview during May, 1966. "Flexibility is limited 
by the geographical conditions prevailing in Central Europe," he 
said. "We too are of the opinion that this flexibility must be 
adequate to prevent a border incident from escalating into a 
nuclear war. On the other hand, we are aware that, considering 
the alarming narrowness of our space, the flexibility could be 
very limited." 16 
There had also been a series of reductions in the total ground 
forces called for by supporting Allied military force plans, NATO'S 
original military force plans had been based on those developed 
under the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO), 
which had functioned under the auspices of the Brussels Treaty. 
In these early days, three plans had been formulated. The 
Short-Term Defense Plan was essentially a program for emer­
gency evacuation, providing assignments of emergency with­
drawal routes and authority to commandeer ships in Allied ports. 
The Medium-Term Defense Plan was a battle plan which 
looked toward withdrawal, behind a screen of mechanized cav­
alry units, to positions behind the Rhine. The Long-Term De­
fense Plan was the requirements plan for major war. Aiming at a 
total of approximately one hundred divisions, it required eighty 
to eighty-five divisions for the old Western Front, plus an addi­
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tional fifteen divisions for defense of the Scandinavian and 
Brenner-Trieste areas.17 
At its Lisbon meeting in February, 1952, the Council ap­
proved force goals which aimed at a total of ninety-six divisions 
by 1954. These included twenty-five to thirty active divisions on 
the central front, seven to nine divisions in the Brenner-Trieste 
area, and two to three divisions in Scandinavia. The remainder 
was to be made up of reservists, capable of mobilization within 
thirty days, thirty to thirty-five divisions of which were ear­
marked for Central Europe.18 
The Ministerial meeting in December, 1953, retreated from 
the force goals which it had set at Lisbon. The target year for 
fulfillment was no longer 1954; the Lisbon goals were stretched 
out to be implemented over the "long haul." By way of compen­
sation, the Council publicly implied for the first time the tactical 
use of nuclear weapons in Atlantic defense, by saying that 
"special attention should be given to the continuing provision of 
modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defense 
system." 19 
Beginning in 1954 a series of plans appeared which substan­
tially cut Allied force requirements and provided for tactical 
nuclear weapons. Under the initial plan, MC 48, the require­
ment for standing forces remained approximately the same, but 
reserves and back-ups were greatly reduced. They were to be 
replaced by low-yield battlefield atomic armaments under Ameri­
can peacetime custody and control. During 1956 the Council 
directed SACEUR to reappraise the forces needed for the defense 
of the NATO area; and SHAPE undertook the Minimum Forces 
Study 1958-63. Two years later, the Council approved MC 70, 
a plan for 1958-63, which set Central European goals of thirty 
combat-ready divisions while again reducing reserves and further 
modernizing armaments. The Council approved MC 26/4, 
which replaced MC 70, in January, 1961, projecting force goals 
through 1966, and cutting the number of active divisions for the 
Central front to twenty-eight and one-third divisions.20 
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In July, 1966, a special meeting of Defense Ministers adopted 
a NATO force plan for the period through 1970; in December, 
1967, and January, 1969, NATO ministers adopted five-year 
NATO force plans, covering first the period 1968-72, and then 
1969-73, in accordance with the procedures of the Five Year 
Rolling Defense Program.21 It is likely that the later plans con­
tinued earlier trends. Thus one account indicated that the plan 
for 1970 was "based on the forces available rather than on the 
requirements previously set by the NATO military authorities but 
never met." 22 
During 1967 there were reports which implied that future 
plans might bring even more drastic reductions. A circulating 
SHAPE document supposedly depicted alternate strategies which 
might become appropriate with diminishing levels of ground 
forces along the borders of the Warsaw Pact nations. 
A forward strategy, similar to the currently approved ap­
proach, putting the bulk of available ground forces forward 
along the eastern frontier of West Germany. 
A theater reserve strategy, involving a thinning out of the 
forward wall of troops with strong, highly mobile, armored 
and helicopter units sitting well back of the border ready to 
move to the point of principal enemy thrust. 
A strategic reserve strategy, envisioning the withdrawal 
of significant United States and other forces to their own 
territory, with modern aircraft and fast ships designed to rush 
them back to the front if intelligence discovers a major enemy 
build-up. 
An air strike concept depending heavily on large numbers of 
fighter-bombers to speed to the point of a border incursion and 
blast the enemy overwhelmingly with non-nuclear weapons 
in hopes of dissuading a big attack by quick action.23 
Although MC 48 and its replacements were based on a possi­
ble tactical use of nuclear weapons, it was difficult to see that this 
completely neutralized manpower reductions. American Gener­
als Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin had viewed the substitutions as 
declines in both the credibility of the American deterrent and in 
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American commitments to the Allies. The later emphasis, espe­
cially by the United States, on flexibility and conventional op­
tions indicated that the use of nuclear weapons on which the 
plans were based might be substantially delayed. Finally, in a 
battlefield situation where both sides were equipped with nu­
clear armament, it was possible that more, rather than fewer, men 
might be required, since heavier casualties could be anticipated 
and there was the chance that the use of nuclear weapons might, 
in many circumstances, work against the defender.24 
AUTHORITY 
Within the context of this ambivalent institutional pattern, 
NATO authority was less direct than indirect and effective only 
insofar as national governments agreed to make it so. As Secre­
tary General Spaak stated, "In spite of the Alliance, our coun­
tries have retained almost complete sovereignty as far as their 
military organization is concerned."26 
Alliance authority—as indicated by SACEUR'S powers over his 
"assigned" forces—remained largely indirect. Of three categories 
of Allied forces, by far the largest were those forces "remaining 
under national command," including national long-range stra­
tegic forces. Second were those "earmarked" for commitment to 
NATO at a future date, comprising both active and reserve compo­
nents of land, air, and naval forces. Finally came forces which 
were committed to NATO under specified conditions. These in­
cluded those standing forces provided for in NATO force plans 
covering the Central European area, NATO'S military authorities 
were informed of the movements of earmarked forces; and as­
signed forces could not, in principal, be withdrawn without 
notifying NATO.26 
The Supreme Commander's authority varied between war 
and peacetime. During wartime, SACEUR would theoretically 
command Allied forces in Europe, though his command would 
probably be limited by competition with national political and 
military leaders.27 Under normal peacetime conditions, however, 
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SACEUR'S authority was more circumscribed. Through his posi­
tion as Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in Europe 
(CINCEUR), he controlled a portion of the Allied forces. He was 
also authorized to declare certain emergency conditions under 
which Allied assigned forces—with national variations—would 
come under his partial command or operational control. Thus 
he could act alone in declaring certain alert stages involving the 
cancellation of Allied leaves, the recall of troops, increases in 
readiness and fueling of aircraft, and aircraft dispersal. Finally, 
he could order some Allied air defense units to open fire in the 
event of specific and clearcut types of Western airspace viola­
tions. 
For the most part, however, SACEUR'S influence over the 
assigned forces was indirect. All assigned forces remained under 
national control for administration, discipline, and logistic sup­
port, SACEUR exercised influence through the planning activities 
of SHAPE. He participated in the formulation of joint military 
plans which laid the groundwork for exercise of direct authority 
in the event of war. He was responsible for the construction of 
NATO exercises. Particularly important were two series: Fallex 
exercises, occurring every other year and involving both com­
mand post and field participation, and Express exercises in var­
ious border regions for the training of the ACE Mobile Force. He 
was also responsible for the inspection of units placed under 
Allied command in peacetime and for recommendations to na­
tional authorities concerning the training, organization, and 
equipment of their units. In communications and air defense, he 
operated the ACE high and early warning networks, linking major 
military headquarters and collating information acquired by sep­
arate national radar stations.28 
In a special category were nuclear forces committed to SA­
CEUR, including several United States Polaris submarines, the 
United Kingdom V-Bomber force, fighter bomber squadrons 
from approximately half the Allies, and various air defense and 
battlefield systems. Here control remained clearly in national 
hands. Although planning for these forces was undertaken both 
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through SACEUR'S Liaison Group to the Joint Strategic Planning 
Staff at Omaha, and at SHAPE through SACEUR'S Deputy for 
Nuclear Affairs, national decision-making—especially American 
—remained decisive, SACEUR'S Liaison Group at Omaha served 
less to influence American planning than to ensure that SACEUR'S 
plans did not run counter to American ones. With the exception 
of Great Britain, the nuclear capabilities of the Allied nations 
depended on American warheads, which were safeguarded by 
physical storage in special ammunition sites controlled by Ameri­
can forces or, when placed in alert positions, by electronic Per­
missive Action Links which could only be released by decision of 
the American President.29 
In practice, the effectiveness of NATO decision-making is un­
certain, due to the strictures of military secrecy. Nevertheless, if 
the implementation of a "forward strategy" for NATO and the 
realization of the force levels called for in NATO plans can be 
taken as two indicators, NATO effectiveness depended on rela­
tively independent policies of national governments. 
Almost since the inception of NATO, its guiding strategic 
concept had been a "forward" one, that ultimately little or no 
European space would be traded for defensive time, should war 
come. However, it was only in the mid-1950's that the imple­
mentation of the forward strategy was decided "in principle' and 
1962-63 before SACEUR attempted to ''opera tionalize'' the con­
cept. At this time the plans of Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer 
called for Allied redeployment. The French, who occupied rear­
ward positions in the South of Germany, were to move East. 
The British, in the North, would also move forward. The 
United States and Germany would be responsible for the for­
ward defense of the middle sector.30 
The proposed troop movements were never completely carried 
out. The French—although they eventually stationed one Hawk 
regiment forward at Dachau, about eighty miles from the Czech­
oslovakian border—maintained the remainder of their German-
based troops in a line which included Koblenz, the Rhine, 
Speyer, Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, Tubingen, Reutlingen, Munsin­
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gen, and Friedrichshafen. French officials gave two major rea­
sons for their non-compliance. First, they felt that France should 
have a reserve role. Germany, not France, had a "natural voca­
tion1' to act as the edge of the military sword because of her 
geographical position. If the Germans would not do so then the 
United States, important as a symbol of deterrence, or Britain, to 
establish her engagement, should fill the gap. Secondly, the 
French pointed out that they could not move forward because 
German and American troops were still occupying barracks in­
tended for the French, and the German government had not 
been able to provide France with alternate troop quarters and 
installations. The British Army on the Rhine complied with 
SACEUR'S plan by establishing supply bases closer to the Iron 
Curtain, but, nevertheless, maintained its actual garrisons to­
wards the rear.31 
NATO'S basic force goals for the years 1958-66 had been estab­
lished by MC 70 and MC 26/4. These plans stipulated that 
Germany would supply twelve divisions, the United States five 
or six, France four, the United Kingdom three or four, Belgium 
two, the Netherlands two, and Canada one-third.32 
In practice, the implementation of these force levels varied 
widely in terms of number of divisions, divisional strength, 
conscription terms, supply levels, and modernization of equip­
ment. The best performance was by the United States which 
fielded its agreed total in a configuration which included high 
manning levels, twenty-four-month conscription terms, a ninety-
day general supply level, and modern equipment—nuclear, con­
ventional, and personal. In intermediate positions came the Ger­
mans and British. By April, 1965, the Federal Republic had 
turned over all twelve of the divisions called for by the plans; but 
these divisions tended to have incomplete active and support 
complements, including shortages of officers and technical spe­
cialists, eighteen-month inductees, supply levels of thirty days or 
less, and equipment standards lower than the Americans. The 
British formally provided three divisions; but the manning level 
of 51,000 lowered their fighting strength to an estimated two 
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and one-third divisions; there was no conscription; and stocks of 
supplies and equipment were reduced. Finally the French in 
later years provided only two of their four planned divisions, 
with conscription terms which eventually declined to 16 
months.33 
More current NATO force plans were projected from available 
forces. By mid-1967 it appeared that the level of availability was 
falling. The United States proposed to redeploy two-thirds of a 
ground division and four aircraft squadrons; the United King­
dom planned to cut the BAOR by 5,000 men and one squadron. 
Germany was preparing for reductions in its active ground 
forces; and France had withdrawn all of its troops from NATO as 
of July 1,1966. 
LEGITIMACY 
The lack of NATO authority was parallelled by constricted 
NATO legitimacy. In the United States, Britain, Germany, and 
France there were variable losses and few significant gains for 
the NATO program.34 
United States 
Developments were mixed in the United States. During the 
course of four Presidential administrations, an initial policy of 
NATO force contributions increasingly appeared as an economic 
burden. Support of the NATO nuclear program and American 
nuclear contributions to NATO increased, but with the under­
standing of strict American control. Domestically, while the 
isolationists had been defeated in 1951, there still remained 
politically significant opposition to American participation in 
NATO programs. 
The initial American policy had provided significant force 
contributions to NATO. American remobilization for the Cold 
War, following the force reductions of the immediate postwar 
years, was foreshadowed by a National Security Council docu­
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ment, NSC 20, which elaborated the policy of containment, and 
put into high gear by NSC 68. NSC 68 called for an immediate and 
large-scale build-up of American and Allied strength, to be com­
pleted by 1954, identified as the year of maximum danger. 
Tangible support for NATO was provided by the dispatch of 
General Eisenhower to Europe, with four additional United 
States divisions, bringing the American divisional total in Eu­
rope almost to six.35 
By 1953 the sense of urgency had diminished, and there was 
increased concern for the long-run soundness of the economy, 
leading to a downgrading of NATO force priorities. A change in 
the American administration had brought the New Look of 
1953, which was formally embodied in NSC 162 and NSC 162/2. 
The policy of containment was to continue, but with reduced 
urgency. The year of maximum danger was de-emphasized and 
replaced by the concept of the "long haul." There was to be a 
phased reduction of American ground strength; in its place the 
military were to base defensive planning on the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons and strategic airpower. These decisions were 
taken with little previous discussion with the NATO Allies, yet 
were the major factor in downgrading NATO'S force goals.36 
By way of compensation the United States, with successive 
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 and 1958, 
moved to place American nuclear weapons in Europe, without, 
however, giving up their control. In October, 1953, the first 
American 280 mm. atomic cannon arrived in Europe; and in 
December, 1954, the Council authorized SHAPE to base military 
planning on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used 
in a future conflict. Following the endorsement of the NATO 
Council in 1957, the United States installed Thor and Jupiter 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ( IRBM) sites in Great Brit­
ain, Italy, and Turkey. Although the missiles in Britain were not 
attached to NATO, those in Italy and Turkey were under SA­
CEUR'S jurisdiction. None of these systems could be fired without 
American agreement; and American reluctance toward further 
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nuclear sharing, perhaps of a more reciprocal nature, was made 
clear by John Foster Dulles, who stated that no "member of the 
NATO community could have a veto, implied or actual, over the 
use of America's retaliatory power." 37 
During the later years of the Eisenhower administration, the 
perceived burden of the American contribution seemed to grow 
with increasing balance of payments problems. It was reported 
that the Department of the Treasury and Bureau of the Budget 
were suggesting the recall of two American divisions and seven 
fighter-bomber squadrons from Europe, and in late 1960, C. 
Douglas Dillon and Robert Anderson undertook a special mis­
sion to Europe—concentrating on Germany and the issue of 
support costs of American troops—to attempt to persuade the 
Allies to contribute a larger share of NATO expenses.38 
Considerations of secrecy combined with the balance of pay­
ments to complicate the area of nuclear sharing. At the meeting 
of NATO defense ministers in April, 1960, American Secretary of 
Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., had "proposed the European 
deployment of hundreds of Polaris missiles on barges and flat­
cars, when they were expected to become available in a year or 
two. At the same time, he suggested a modification of the system 
of dual control which would give NATO'S supreme commander 
the decision to join the missile and activated warhead and send 
them off." 39 By the Ministerial Council of that December the 
American emphasis had been modified. Secretary of State 
Herter endorsed the concept of a NATO Medium Range Ballistic 
Missile (MRBM) force and offered to assign five Polaris subma­
rines, armed with 80 missiles, to NATO, if the Allies could agree on 
a multilateral system of control. In return the Allies were re­
quested to buy from the United States another 100 Polaris 
missiles—without warheads—at an estimated cost of $100 mil­
lion.40 
With the advent of the Kennedy and Johnson administra­
tions, the United States continued generally to support NATO 
military force programs, but in the context of calls for additional 
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Allied contributions and some actual reduction in American 
ones, and a basic policy of non-proliferation which retained 
control of nuclear weapons in American hands. 
Secretary of Defense McNamara supported such NATO activi­
ties as the Force Planning Exercise and the Five Year Rolling 
Defense Program: 
For many years I have urged my NATO colleagues to establish 
the procedures needed to deal with this problem [the balance 
between strategy, force goals, and resources] on a systematic, 
regular basis. As you know, since 1961 the Department of 
Defense has operated a programming system which directly 
relates strategies and war plans to forces, and forces to re­
sources and their costs, all projected at least five years into 
the future. A number of other NATO countries have been mov­
ing in the same direction. Now we have a real hope that the 
entire NATO organization will adopt these procedures.41 
He emphasized the importance of building Western conven­
tional forces, especially on the central front, of providing stock­
piles at a general 90-day level, and of correcting deficiencies in 
equipment and modernization.42 
McNamara's focal point, however, was a plea for additional 
European, not American, contributions. In 1963, he stated: 
The presently programmed United States forces, together with 
the present forces of other NATO countries, would not be able 
to contain an all-out conventional Soviet attack without in­
volving the use of nuclear weapons. . We must do every­
thing in our power to persuade our Allies to meet their NATO 
force goals [to provide] alternate possibilities.43 
There were continuing reductions of American expenses and 
substantial troop withdrawals. In March, 1966, McNamara told 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the military aid pro­
gram would provide only 3.5 per cent of its funds to Europe— 
this in contrast to its distribution of more than half its total 
investment since 1950 in the NATO build-up.44 American force 
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reductions occurred not only to meet mounting commitments in 
South Viet-Nam, but also to reduce balance of payments deficits. 
A series of offset agreements had provided for German payments 
of between $600 and $650 million annually for military equip­
ment and services through Fiscal Year 1967. Even with these 
agreements the net adverse balance of payments resulting from 
United States defense expenditures in Western Europe for fiscal 
years 1964-67 averaged approximately $500 million per year.45 
In May, 1967, a new accord terminated German offset payments 
at the previous level, and permitted the United States to rede­
ploy approximately 35,000 ground troops and airmen. 
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations supported a num­
ber of measures for NATO nuclear co-operation, with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm and without intending to relinquish con­
trol of American nuclear weapons. In one category were several 
attempts at "hardware'' sharing, or actual transfer of nuclear 
systems. During the period 1961-67 the number of tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe was increased by almost 100 per 
cent. Although Thor and Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from 
Europe by 1963, the United States committed several Polaris 
submarines to NATO in 1962 and 1963.46 
The most publicized American hardware initiative was the 
multilateral force ( M L F ) project. The MLF reportedly originated 
in the recommendations of a 1960 study directed by Robert R. 
Bowie of the Harvard Center of International Affairs and re­
ceived its major impetus from partisans connected with the 
Department of State. Among the recommendations of the Bowie 
study was the suggestion that the United States might make 
available to NATO a fleet of Polaris submarines to be manned by 
international crews.47 
The idea of a seabound MRBM force for NATO was reflected in 
Secretary of State Herter's offer of December, 1960, and was 
endorsed with qualifications by President Kennedy at Ottawa in 
May, 1961. It was repeated by Secretary of State Rusk at the 
NATO Ministerial Councils in December, 1961, and May, 1962. 
In October, 1962, and again in December, a team headed by 
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Gerard C. Smith, former Assistant Secretary of State, and Rear 
Admiral John M. Lee discussed the proposals with America's 
allies in Europe. In December, 1962, Kennedy and British 
Prime Minister Macmillan met at Nassau and gave further 
support to the idea of a NATO "multilateral force,'' which would 
include Polaris submarines as one of its elements.48 
The administration's emphasis had been on an American 
Polaris submarine contribution to a force which would be multi­
national, in the sense of being composed of diverse national 
components rather than internationally manned elements. Fol­
lowing the Nassau conference, the MLF proper gathered momen­
tum. As the plan took final shape, the United States proposed to 
its European allies that some targets of longer range, which had 
been covered by IRBM'S in Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and 
manned bombers—both now obsolescent—be covered by a fleet 
of twenty-five merchant-type surface ships, each carrying eight 
Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of approximately 2,500 miles. 
The fleet would be assigned to SACEUR, individual ships com­
manded by Allied officers of different nationalities, and the 
crews composed of mixed complements from several Allied na­
tions. The United States would provide the missiles and war­
heads, while most of the ships would be built in foreign yards.49 
During 1963, the United States moved to withdraw its Jupiter 
and Thor missiles from Britain, Italy, and Turkey, and Ambassa­
dor Livingston T. Merchant, Gerard Smith, and Rear Admiral 
Lee, accompanied by a group of technical experts, made two 
trips to Europe to discuss the multilateral force. In addition, a 
naval group, headed by Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, Vice-Chief 
of Naval Operations, visited naval establishments in several 
European capitals. These missions seemed to have limited suc­
cess. Nevertheless, in October an MLF Working Group was 
formed, consisting of Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. In October, 1964, an American guided missile destroyer, 
originally the "USS Biddle," renamed the "USS Claude V. 
Ricketts," was officially launched as a test ship for the MLF and 
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began a training voyage with a mixed crew of Americans, Brit­
ish, Dutch, Germans, Greeks, Italians, and Turks (Table 2).50 
The European nations demonstrated little enthusiasm for the 
MLF. By December, 1964, a treaty was ready, but only Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands appeared ready to join the United 
States as initial signatories. This low European response did not 
TABLE 2 
NATIONAL COMPLEMENTS ASSIGNED TO 
"USS CLAUDE V. RICKETTS" * 
Country Officers Men Duties Performed 
United States. 10 155 Commander, communications, 
gunnery, administration 
Germany 2 47 Engineering, missile handling 
Italy 2 30 Assistant combat information, 
weapons handling 
Greece. 2 24 Damage control, fire control 
Britain. 2 24 Combat information, First 
Lieutenant 
Turkey 1 19 Navigator 
Netherlands. 1 17 Anti-submarine officer 
* Assembly of Western European Union Doc. 320, State of European Security: Aspects of Western 
Strategy (Paris: WEU, 1964), p. 51. 
inspire American decision-makers to make nuclear concessions 
but rather implicitly to abandon the project. As early as 1963, 
President Kennedy was reported to have said, "If the Europeans 
don't want it, then the hell with it";51 and in December, 1964, 
President Johnson approved a National Security Council Memo­
randum which formally slowed the MLF campaign. Among the 
provisions of the Memorandum were stipulations that no new 
nuclear arrangements for the Alliance would be approved which 
did not have the approval of Britain and Germany, and which 
had not been at least discussed with France; that "pressure 
tactics" were to cease; and that the United States would not 
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impose arbitrary "deadlines" for the acceptance of any of its 
proposals.62 
In the area of "consultative"' sharing, the United States, at the 
Council of May, 1962, agreed to the "Athens guidelines." Secre­
tary General Stikker recalled that: 
For the first time, the United States assured NATO of the 
availability of certain weapons, and the United States and 
the United Kingdom both declared their willingness to fur­
nish full information on the organization and control of NATO 
nuclear defenses held in their hands. We agreed on certain 
guidelines to apply in case nuclear weapons had to be used, 
and on consultation in the Council on the use of nuclear weap­
ons anywhere in the world.53 
In May, 1963, the United States supported the decisions taken 
at Ottawa, establishing on SACEUR'S staff a deputy responsible for 
nuclear affairs and a SACEUR Liaison Group to the Joint Strategic 
Planning Staff at Omaha. In May, 1965, Secretary McNamara 
proposed to the Allies the formation of the Select Committee of 
Defense Ministers to study ways to provide more Allied partici­
pation in nuclear planning and decision-making. 
None of these projects represented an inclination by the 
United States to give up ultimate control of its nuclear weapons. 
In the consultative projects, Allied inputs would have to be 
cleared through American decision-makers. In the projects of 
hardware sharing, the United States maintained possession of its 
nuclear arsenal even though it bore a NATO label, through the 
right of veto and physical and electronic controls. 
This restrictive policy included the MLF. Although the mis­
siles and nuclear warheads might be under joint ownership and 
custody, the decision to fire would be taken "by unanimous vote 
of a control group representing the major participants."M 
McNamara stressed the importance of retaining the American 
veto, within the context of a "basic policy of non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The consent of the United States," he said, 
"would have to be obtained prior to the firing of any one of the 
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nuclear weapons jointly owned and controlled by the participat­
ing nations." 55 
Over the years, domestic opposition to NATO programs, though 
fragmented, remained significant. Resistance to the initial policy 
of force contributions had been dispersed with the passage in 
April, 1951, of the Senate Resolution which approved the ap­
pointment of General Eisenhower as SACEUR, the stationing of 
American forces in Europe, and greater use of the military 
resources of Germany, Italy, and Spain. The efforts of such 
figures as former President Hoover, Joseph Kennedy, and Sena­
tors Taft and Wherry had been insufficient to bring about 
American withdrawal from Europe and the establishment of an 
American Gibralter. 
The platforms adopted by the national conventions of both 
parties during the 1968 presidential campaign generally en­
dorsed NATO. The Republicans stated that "NATO must be revital­
ized and strengthened," while the Democrats believed that to 
keep the North Atlantic Community 'strong and free, we must 
further strengthen our ties and be constantly alert to new chal­
lenges and opportunities." In spite of such high level approval, 
however, the major specific proposal, put forward by the Demo­
crats, was not for increased American effort but rather for "'a 
substantially larger European contribution to NATO." 5<J 
Nevertheless, American contributions to NATO continued to 
draw important fire. Force reductions were urged and the eco­
nomic burdens of NATO deplored in the Senate by figures center­
ing around the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee—Senators Fulbright, Hum­
phrey, Maclntyre, Mansfield, Morse, Russell and Symington. 
During early 1967, almost half the Senate, including all thirteen 
members of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, joined 
Senator Mansfield as co-sponsors of a resolution calling for sub­
stantial reduction of American troops stationed in Europe." 
In the House the same criticisms were propounded by Repre­
sentative Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee and 
Representative Ford, Chairman of the House Republican Con­
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ference. The House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended 
in February, 1967, that there be "a substantial reduction in U.S. 
Armed Forces in Europe." 6S 
A Republican Co-ordinating Committee—including Eisen­
hower, Goldwater, Nixon, Dewey, Landon, Senate and House 
Republican leaders, five Governors, and six national committee­
men published a report in September, 1965, which advocated 
that the United States cut its troops in Western Europe in order 
to protect the balance of payments. They suggested that the 
Europeans supply the bulk of the conventional forces, with 
the United States providing only a small detachment, and that 
the American commitment be backed mainly by strategic air­
lift.59 
Restrictions on nuclear sharing, in the context of NATO or 
elsewhere, were upheld particularly by the Joint Congressional 
Committee on Atomic Energy. The JCAE had strongly endorsed 
the policy of non-proliferation, and had been influential in ac­
complishing the removal of the Thor and Jupiter missiles in 
1963 and in changing the MLF proposal to include surface strips 
rather than nuclear submarines as launching platforms for the 
joint Polaris force.60 
United Kingdom 
In Great Britain there were some losses and few gains in NATO 
legitimacy. Successive governments—Conservative and Labour 
—either withdrew or talked of withdrawing British NATO force 
contingents; and British participation in NATO nuclear programs 
went only so far as the intersection of the price for American 
nuclear assistance and the desire to maintain ultimate control of 
a British nuclear force. Nevertheless, major domestic opposition 
to NATO, subsumed by the Labour left wing and its supporters, 
seemed to lose much of its impetus. 
The British government following the war had maintained 
occupation forces in Germany. As part of the London and Paris 
Agreements of 1954 under which Germany entered NATO, Great 
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Britain agreed to leave on the Continent the effective strength of 
the forces assigned to SACEUR, except in case of acute overseas 
emergency or of excessive financial burden. 
As early as 1951-52, however, the British had thought of 
force reductions. Under the supervision of Prime Minister 
Churchill's military assistant, Sir Ian Jacob, the three British 
Service Chiefs had drafted a global strategy paper which empha­
sized the importance of tactical nuclear weapons and which 
looked forward to a British force contribution which might be as 
low as 50,000 men. This paper was approved by Churchill and 
the Cabinet "in virtually the same form in which it had been 
submitted." 61 
In 1957 Defense Minister Duncan Sandys, without consult­
ing the Allies, promulgated a White Paper on defense policy 
which announced a cut in the British Army on the Rhine from 
77,000 to 64,000 men within the succeeding twelve months, and 
ultimately to 45,000 men to be armed with atomic artillery. In 
addition conscription was to be abolished by 1962. Although 
Britain finally limited these cuts to 22,000 men, further reduc­
tions in 1964 left only approximately 51,000 in the BAOR.62 
British participation in NATO nuclear programs compensated 
the United States for its nuclear aid without relinquishing final 
national control of British nuclear capabilities. During 1958, the 
British government implemented the decision of the Council in 
December, 1957, which called for the deployment of IRBM'S in 
Europe, by accepting the emplacement of four American missile 
complexes, including sixty Thor missiles. While the vulnerabil­
ity of these above-ground, liquid-fueled missiles carried the dis­
advantage of making them a prime target, the British were 
rewarded by passage of the 1958 amendment to the Atomic 
Energy Act which allowed the American government to make 
available nuclear weapons designs and materials to nations 
which had already made "substantial progress'' in nuclear tech­
nology. 
In spite of their advanced nuclear capabilities, which had 
produced nuclear and thermo-nuclear warheads, the British had 
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found it difficult to modernize their long-range delivery systems. 
In 1957 they had begun development of the Blue Streak missile, 
similar to first-generation American vehicles like the Thor and 
Jupiter; but had abandoned it in February, 1960, in favor of the 
American Skybolt Air-to-Surface Missile which was to be carried 
by the British V-Bomber force. In December, 1962, the Ameri­
can government decided to cancel the development of the Sky-
bolt missile for technical reasons; and at a meeting between 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau, 
the British received Polaris. The United States agreed to "make 
available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles [less warheads] 
for British submarines" and to "study the feasibility of making 
available certain support facilities for such submarines.' The 
United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, was to 'con­
struct the submarines in which these weapons will be placed" 
and to "provide the nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles."63 
At the Athens Council in May, 1962, the British had joined 
the United States in agreeing to provide the Allies with certain 
types of information and in subscribing to a set of NATO guide­
lines for the use of nuclear weapons. Through the Nassau 
agreement and the decisions at the Council meeting of May, 
1963, it was decided that the new British Polaris force, the 
British V-Bomber forces, three American Polaris submarines, 
and tactical nuclear forces in Europe would "be assigned as part 
of a NATO nuclear force and targetted in accordance with NATO 
plans." At Nassau, however, "the Prime Minister had made it 
clear" that, while the British forces were to be "used for the 
purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all 
circumstances,1 this was not to be the case "where Her Majesty's 
Government may decide that supreme national interests are at 
stake." 6i 
Although the Nassau communique had used the term 'multi­
lateral force," the reference was to a combined force of the type 
decided at Ottawa and not to the American proposal for a 
mixed-manned fleet which was later labelled the MLF. The 
British had agreed to the first of these but were unenthusiastic 
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about the second. The joint communique which followed the 
meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan at Birch Grove at the 
end of June, 1963, "noted with satisfaction the decisions reached 
at the recent NATO meeting in Ottawa." With regard to the MLF, 
they agreed that further discussions should proceed, but "without 
prejudice to the question of British participation in such a 
force." 65 
Immediately prior and subsequent to coming to power in 
1964, Labour leaders had promised to strengthen or at least 
maintain the existing strength of the BAOR. In March, 1962, 
Harold Wilson told the House of Commons that "Britain had 
gravely defaulted on the commitment to NATO, and the main 
reason was inadequate manpower." Near the end of 1964, Denis 
Healey promised to raise the BAOR from 51,000 to 55,000 men.66 
Once in office, however, the drain in foreign exchange caused 
by BAOR expenditures in Germany came to represent an increas­
ing problem. As a result of the earlier Sandys withdrawals the 
outflow had been temporarily reduced, but had then gradually 
remounted to a 1966 high of £94 million.67 In March, 1965, 
Wilson told Commons that, until the preceding twelve months, 
BAOR foreign exchange expenditures had been substantially met 
by German purchases of British equipment, but that in the past 
year, the situation had seriously changed—with foreign ex­
change expenditure rates increasing and German offset pur­
chases declining. He implicitly threatened BAOR reductions by 
expressing his hope that Britain's "European allies, and may I 
say I hope our creditors, those who lend to us over the years, will 
recognize how much of our continuing balance of payments 
deficit is due to this onesided military financial commitment to 
the common defense."68 In May he returned to "the heavy cost 
of military expenditures overseas. I have made clear a number of 
times," he said "that this must be brought down. Part of it is, of 
course, a question we are looking at in connection with the wider 
defense review, but a start must be made in relation to our heavy 
costs in Germany."69 On July 20, the British and German 
governments signed a protocol which extended the existing 
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offset agreement until March, 1967, with the Germans agreeing 
to spend £150 million during the new period. But again the 
same pattern of rising foreign exchange expenses and insufficient 
German purchases caused new British anxieties, leading to re­
ports that the British government had decided on cuts of 
15,000-20,000 men unless the German contribution were sub­
stantially increased.™ 
Although the British government never emphasized the point, 
most of the foreign exchange drain represented by the BAOR in 
Germany had actually been offset by the presence of American 
and Canadian forces in Great Britain. In the face of the acute 
problems of the Pound Sterling, the American government "ap­
parently agreed to spend $35 million more than planned on arms 
and services in Britain in 1967 while United States-United 
Kingdom-West German talks on troop deployment, strategy, 
and offset agreements" continued; and the British agreed tempo­
rarily to postpone the cuts. Nevertheless, in May, 1967, the 
British government concluded an agreement under which it 
would reduce the BAOR by a brigade group of 5,000 men and 
withdraw one air squadron from Europe.71 
During the course of 1968, the British Government an­
nounced the details of a new defense policy that involved the 
movement of British forces "from their stations overseas'' and 
their concentration in Europe. Within this context, land, sea, and 
air commitments to NATO were to be heavily increased; but such 
commitments consisted mostly of additional "'earmarked" forces, 
which were not to be an integral part of the BAOR and which 
would be stationed in Britain." 72 
In the election campaign of 1964, Wilson had supported NATO 
command and control of strategic nuclear forces, while opposing 
the MLF and that part of the Nassau agreement that called for 
the replacement of Skybolt with Polaris submarines.73 In No­
vember, once in power, he reiterated his views. "Throughout the 
discussions of the last two years," he said, ''we have expressed 
our full support of the clause in the Nassau Agreement which 
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envisages the collective principle. We have expressed our opposi­
tion to the proposal put forward under that clause which envis­
ages a mixed-manned surface fleet." Finally he blamed the Pola­
ris provisions of the Nassau agreement for a "costly proliferation 
of efforts and energies." 74 
The proposal which he put forward in December for an 
Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) , however, seemed to add little 
new to NATO and subtracted no British nuclear control. The 
components of the ANF were to be the British V-Bomber force 
except those airfcraft needed for commitments outside the NATO 
areas; the British fleet of Polaris submarines; at least an equal 
number of American Polaris submarines; and some mixed-
manned element in which non-nuclear powers could take part. 
These elements would be committed for the life of the Alliance 
and would operate under a single authority in which all partici­
pating countries would be represented. Britain, the United 
States, and France, if she decided to participate, would, however, 
retain a veto over the elements of the force and the control 
system.75 
Some gain for NATO legitimacy occurred in the defeat of the 
major British domestic opposition to NATO—the Labour left 
wing—by Labour leadership and by the apparent failure of the 
Left to wield significant influence once Labour acceded to power. 
It was under a Labour government that Britain had, in 1949, 
become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and had first 
become involved in NATO defense planning, but this was not 
accomplished without intra-party dissidence. In an attack on the 
North Atlantic Treaty, Konni Zilliacus, M.P., had stated that 
action under Article 5 "would not only affect the authority of the 
Security Council, but would destroy that body, shatter the 
United Nations, split the world, and plunge humanity into 
war.'' Not only was the Atlantic Treaty "inconsistent with the 
purposes, principles, and obligations of the Charter," it was also 
"contrary to Labour Party policy and the Labour Party's man­
date to make peace." 7" Aneurin Bevan and two of his followers 
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had resigned in opposition to the Government's rearmament 
policy, arguing that the economic costs were far too great for the 
limited defensive gains. 
In the following years, defense issues remained in dispute 
between two Labour factions—the Morrison-Gaitskell faction 
that supported NATO, rearmament, and the production of the 
H-bomb, and the Bevanite faction that opposed them. This 
breach appeared to be healed at the Labour Party Conference of 
1957, when Bevan was appointed Shadow Foreign Secretary and 
spoke in support of the British national deterrent within the 
framework of the Western Alliance." 
The co-operation of Bevan, however, seemed to liberate the 
Labour left wing and ushered in a period of increased interparty 
warfare on defense issues. In 1958 the Committee for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) was formed. Including intellectual figures 
such as Bertrand Russell, E. M. Forster, J. B. Priestley, and 
A. J. P. Taylor, the Committee expounded a program that cen­
tered upon unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and with­
drawal from alliances envisaging the use of nuclear weapons— 
i.e., NATO. Within the Labour party, these views were pressed by 
the Victory for Socialism group and a core of leaders who 
included Michael Foot, Barbara Castle, Tom Driberg, Ian Mi­
kardo, and Frank Cousins.78 By 1959 the movement had suffi­
cient strength so that a total of eighty-nine back-bench Labour 
members of parliament signed a motion opposing the transfer to 
Britain from France of NATO-assigned American fighter bombers 
and nuclear warheads.79 In September, 1960, the Trades Union 
Congress passed a unilateralist motion; and in October the 
Labour party Conference, meeting at Scarborough, passed two 
resolutions calling for unilateral British nuclear disarmamant. 
Gaitskell had opposed the Left, and his defeat at Scarborough 
by small majorities on both resolutions led to an organized 
counterattack through an intraparty movement called the Cam­
paign for Democratic Socialism. At the Blackpool Conference in 
1961, he reasserted leadership control of the party, achieving the 
reversal of the previous year's decisions and the endorsement of 
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the National Executive Committee's Policy for Peace supporting 
British co-operation with American deterrent forces within the 
NATO framework.80 
Although the CND continued to exist and to call for British 
withdrawal from NATO, both it and the Labour Left had, for the 
time being at least, lost their bid for significant political influ­
ence. 
Germany 
The German pattern of legitimacy for NATO again was one in 
which the losses and gains merged. The German government 
was the only government which had committed all of its forces 
to NATO, and Germany supplied the largest single complement of 
Allied forces. Nonetheless Germany did not attain its agreed 
force level, resisted possible increases in its quota, and grew 
increasingly reluctant to reimburse Allied governments for for­
eign exchange losses suffered from the expenditures of their 
troops stationed in Germany. The government of the Federal 
Republic supported the NATO program of nuclear co-operation, 
but it did so in the context of its own nuclear abstinence. While 
some gain in legitimacy might be indicated by the decline and 
dispersal of domestic opposition to NATO and its military pro­
gram, it was equally reasonable to interpret this in terms of 
apathy. 
At the Council session of September 26, 1950, Allied Foreign 
Ministers agreed that "Germany should be enabled to contribute 
to the buildup of the defense of Western Europe."81 Two years 
later, on May 27, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic 
of Germany signed a treaty through which the German contri­
bution would be incorporated within the structures of a Euro­
pean Defense Community. On the same day, representatives of 
the NATO governments signed a Protocol extending guarantees to 
the members of the EDC. 
The French government was not eager to approve rearma­
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ment within the framework of EDC, and on August 29, 1954, the 
French National Assembly, by a procedural motion, refused to 
approve the ratification of the EDC Treaty. Conferences were 
immediately held in London and Paris to seek alternative means 
of bringing Germany into the framework of Western defense. 
On October 23, the Council endorsed the decisions of these 
Conferences, whose accomplishments were summarized in the 
Paris Agreements of the same date. Under these Agreements 
Germany attained full sovereignty, and the occupation regime in 
the Federal Republic of Germany was terminated, though the 
occupying powers retained certain rights, among the most impor­
tant being to station troops there at prevailing strengths. Ger­
many was to have a national army, fully integrated into the NATO 
military structure; possible dangers were to be offset by British 
pledges to maintain on the Continent, except in extreme cases, 
the effective level of forces presently assigned to SACEUR. Ger­
many and Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty, which 
changed its name to Western European Union ( W E U )  . Within 
WEU was established an Agency for the Control of Armaments, 
one function of which was the policing of a German undertak­
ing not to manufacture atomic, biological, chemical, and certain 
other categories of weapons on its territory. The new WEU was 
to work within the NATO framework, without duplicating NATO'S 
military staffs. 
In May, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany officially 
became a member of NATO. Under the London and Paris Agree­
ments the German government had agreed to raise and contrib­
ute to NATO armed forces of twelve ground divisions, including 
about 500,000 men. While the twelfth division was finally pro­
duced in April, 1965, Germany never completely fulfilled its 
force quota. In 1956 the German Government reduced the 
target for the Bundeswehr to 350,000 men and only restored the 
cut under the pressure of the Berlin crisis of 1961. Subsequently 
Defense Ministers Strauss and von Hassel both publicly stated 
their opposition to further increases, in response to rumors that 
the United States was pressing Germany to increase its contribu­
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tion to over 700,000 men. By 1967 the manning level was still 
only approximately 460,000, and during the second half of the 
year press reports indicated that the German government had 
decided to diminish even this number.82 
Although German governments welcomed the presence of 
Allied troops in Germany, expressing anxiety about possible 
withdrawals, and although they had paid occupation and sup­
port costs to certain Allies since the war, the Germans became 
increasingly reluctant to reimburse their Allies for foreign ex­
change losses caused by the presence of their troops on German 
soil. Since the late 195O's the Germans had not reimbursed the 
French; and in negotiations with the British and Americans their 
emphasis had been on limiting payments. In September, 1966, 
Chancellor Erhard travelled to Washington and pleaded that, 
after the existing agreement for offset payments terminated in 
mid-1967, Germany would be unable to extend it at the current 
rate. His failure to obtain more immediate relief contributed to 
the collapse of his government. In May, 1967, provisions for 
German offset payments were substantially softened.83 
The German government supported NATO programs of nu­
clear sharing in the context of its own national nuclear depriva­
tion. At the time of the Paris Agreements, Chancellor Adenauer 
had agreed that Germany would not manufacture atomic weap­
ons on its territory; and he initially had opposed NATO'S substitu­
tion of nuclear for conventional forces. Nevertheless, the govern­
ment's position changed as it experienced increasing difficulties 
in meeting its obligation of raising 500,000 troops, NATO plan 
MC 70 provided the framework within which Defense Minister 
Strauss and Foreign Minister Schroeder defended, and on 
March 25, 1959, the Bundestag approved, the arming of the 
Bundeswehr with tactical atomic weapons—a possibility which 
had been admitted in September, 1956, by Chancellor Ade­
nauer.84 The stationing of MRBM'S in Europe, under the aegis of 
NATO, was subsequently supported by public officials including 
Adenauer, von Hassel, and Generals Heusinger and Speidel. In 
line with the concept of "atomic co-responsibility," the MLF 
82 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
proposal and the Special Committee of Defense Ministers also 
received the backing of successive German governments.85 In 
June, 1967, Schroeder, who had assumed the post of Defense 
Minister under the Kiesinger government, told the Federal 
Armed Forces League that German renunciation of a nuclear 
delivery capability "would contradict" both "the strategic con­
cept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and "German 
security interests.1' He emphasized that "the Federal armed 
forces must have the same mission of deterrence and defense as 
the forces of their neighbors and allies. They must have the 
same armament at their disposal." 86 
Within Germany, major domestic concern with NATO had 
come in the form of opposition in the mid-1950's from the SPD— 
drawing on support from trade unions, the radical wing of the 
Evangelical Church, and some professors, writers, and scientists. 
In the NATO context, the SPD opposed German rearmament, con­
scription, and the stationing of atomic weapons on German soil. 
Opposition waned, however, after July, 1958 when the SPD 
grassroots campaign "Kampf dem Atomtod" resulted in its clear 
defeat in the North-Rhine Westphalien election. A year later 
the Bad Godesberg SPD Congress issued a revised foreign policy 
platform which accepted the principle of national defense; and 
on June 30, 1960, Herbert Wehner spoke in the Bundestag 
supporting German rearmament and full participation in NATO.87 
By 1966 opposition to NATO'S military program was frag­
mented. What remained existed mainly in splinter parties of the 
far left and far rights—the Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU) and 
the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) . The 
DFU represented a remainder of the SPD opposition coalition of 
the mid-fifties. Supporting a pacifist anti-NATO program, the DFU 
drew most of its following from left-wing elements of such 
groups as writers, journalists, university professors, and students. 
Opposite and complementary to the DFU, the NPD emphasized a 
nationalist anti-NATO outlook. Part of its following also came 
from universities, for example, the University of Erlangen; but 
in addition it called on the memories and aspirations of such 
groups as war veterans and Eastern European refugees.88 
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The decline and fragmentation of opposition to NATO in Ger­
many, as in Britain, did not necessarily imply great gains in NATO 
legitimacy. It could equally well be interpreted in terms of 
apathy toward an issue which seemed to have become frozen in 
the Cold War and offered little opportunity for immediate politi­
cal gains. 
trance 
Losses in legitimacy were most marked in France. The gov­
ernments of the Fourth Republic had initially supported NATO as 
a framework for the American defense guarantee. Subsequently, 
German rearmament within NATO and the possibility of a new 
"peripheral" American strategy weakened this attachment and 
contributed to French initiation of its own atomic military pro­
gram. In addition, the Algerian war brought withdrawals of 
NATO-committed forces. 
These separatist tendencies were accelerated under the Fifth 
Republic by the policies and style of General de Gaulle. In the 
face of American refusal to institute a tripartite global political-
security organization, the French government publicly withdrew 
from NATO military activities and privately opposed their devel­
opment. In nuclear affairs, it rejected both consultative and 
hardware types of sharing, stressing instead the importance of 
national control and independence. Domestically there was little 
opposition to Gaullist policy. Diplomats and military officers 
remained silent; opposition parties in the Assembly were weak 
and divided; and local communities economically damaged by 
Allied departure from French soil considered the NATO policy 
beyond the purview of petition. 
Initial French government support for NATO—as a device to 
bind the United States to the defense of Western Europe—was 
expressed in a famous statement by Premier Henri Queuille, in 
which he said that "Western Europe must be able to count on 
the United States/' If American forces were not present in 
Europe to prevent the old cycle of occupation and liberation, 
then "the consequences would be terrible. The next time you 
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would probably liberate a corpse, and civilization would proba­
bly be dead. If we can count on sufficient force to prevent 
the Russian army from crossing the Elbe," he concluded, "then 
European civilization can breathe again." 89 
American Secretary of State Acheson later recalled that "it 
was the French, under Robert Schuman who came to the 
meeting in London in May, 1950, with an extensive proposal 
which went a good deal further than the NATO setup later went. 
This was for a common budget, a common command, an army 
setup almost like that of the European army of some years later 
and almost complete integration of the military forces of all of 
the European forces (sic^) and the United States, and a financial 
unity through budget and taxation systems." 90 
French enthusiasm did not extend so far as to include the 
rearmament of Germany. Under pressure from the Allies, and 
especially the United States, to accept German rearmament 
within NATO, Foreign Minister Schuman at a series of NATO 
Council meetings in September, 1950, "pointed out privately to 
Acheson, his own agreement on German rearmament would 
have been meaningless because he could not have obtained the 
consent of the Deputies. Three more months of delicate 
negotiations, skillfully conducted within the Council of Depu­
ties by Spofford, were required to gain French consent to the 
principle of allowing Germany to raise an armed force." 91 
The French government's alternative, presented to the depu­
ties on October 24, 1950, was the Pleven Plan which called for a 
European Army in a European Defense Community. It met a 
united front of French domestic opposition. "The left-wing So­
cialists were hostile to the rearmament of Germany, the Na­
tionalists to the dissolution of the French army, and the Commu­
nists to the entire Atlantic policy."92 In August, 1954, the 
French Assembly finally voted down the EDC; but in December 
it agreed to German entry to NATO under the Paris Agreements. 
Originally the government had introduced EDC as a substitute 
for German membership in NATO; now four years later the 
Assembly was induced to accept German membership in NATO as 
a substitute for EDC. 
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In the light of German rearmament and the American New 
Look in defense, which implied a possible reduction of Ameri­
can forces in Europe, the French government took steps to 
promote French security through its own atomic military pro­
gram. Although the first French atomic five-year plan had been 
instituted in 1952 under the Pinay government, it was the 
Mendes-France government, in 1954, which undertook prelimi­
nary studies and development decisions concerning a French 
atomic bomb. These decisions were substantially reinforced, be­
ginning in 1956, by the governments of Guy Mollet, Maurice 
Bourges-Manoury, and Felix Gaillard. They moved to construct 
the French atomic bomb, the isotope separation plant at Pierre-
latte, and the aircraft of the first atomic generation.93 
With the beginning of the war in Algeria in November, 1954, 
the French force commitment to NATO was reduced. In its efforts 
against the NLF, by 1956 the government had withdrawn the 
equivalent of four divisions from Europe leaving only two divi­
sions for NATO.94 
The advent of General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic 
augmented French fissiparous tendencies. As early as February, 
1952, General de Gaulle—still in retirement—had been skepti­
cal about NATO. He struck one of the few notes disturbing the 
harmony of the Lisbon Council when he publicly stated: 
It seems elementary that, in assuming the risk of eventually 
being the battlefield of the West, in placing henceforth our 
bases, our ports, our communications at the service of the 
grand enterprise, we receive from the Americans and the 
British precise commitments concerning the places, dates, and 
dimensions of their cooperation in case of aggression. No? 
Then no commitments!95 
In his letter of September 17, 1958 to President Eisenhower, 
De Gaulle suggested that the establishment of a tripartite global 
security organization including the United States, Great Britain, 
and France was his price for continuing support of NATO. This 
body would ''establish and put into effect strategic plans of 
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action, notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weap­
ons. He thought it would also be possible to foresee and organize, 
among the three governments, eventual theaters of operation 
and subordinate theaters." De Gaulle "declared that France 
would henceforth subordinate to its achievement any develop­
ment of French participation in NATO, and would if necessary 
propose a revision of the North Atlantic Treaty." 9S 
It became clear, through Eisenhower's reply of October 20 
and a series of discussions and exchanges of letters, that the 
American government rejected the bargain.97 On September 5, 
1960, De Gaulle responded in a press conference with the 
statement that the North Atlantic Treaty should be revised on at 
least two points. The first was "the limitation of the Alliance to 
the single area of Europe." Here De Gaulle repeated his demand 
for a tripartite strategic and political organization for global 
affairs. The second point involved a shift from "integration in 
the defense of Europe/' i.e. NATO, toward greater national 
independence.98 
Beginning in 1959 De Gaulle had begun to make good his 
threat by a series of specific military withdrawals. In March the 
French government informed the Council that those French 
naval forces in the Western Mediterranean which had pre­
viously been earmarked for NATO—about one-third of the 
French fleet in that area—would remain under national com­
mand in time of war as well as peace. In June, General de 
Gaulle prohibited American nuclear stockpiles on French terri­
tory; and nine squadrons of American fighter bombers were 
transferred to bases in Britain and Germany. In 1962, the 
French Naval Deputy to SACEUR, Admiral Barjot, died, and the 
French government appointed no successor. In June, 1963, 
France informed NATO'S Secretary General that she would with­
draw the naval units earmarked for the Atlantic and Channel 
Commands; in 1964, French officers who had previously been 
assigned to NATO naval commands were redesignated as French 
liaison officers; and in May and July of 1965, the French govern­
ment announced that neither its national forces nor its officers in 
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Allied headquarters would actively participate in the SHAPE 
exercise Fallex for 1966." 
Over the years the French government undertook less publi­
cized acts of opposition to NATO institutions and programs. In 
1962, it used the Annual Review Questionnaire to announce 
that it did not intend to return to NATO the divisions transferred 
to Algeria. On July 25, 1963, French Ambassador Frangois 
Seydoux told the NATO Council that France rejected Secretary 
General Stikker's plan for the conduct of the Force Planning 
Exercise by the NATO Secretariat and insisted that the Exercise 
take place under the direct supervision of the Council. Begin­
ning in November the French government refused to agree to 
successive drafts of the Military Committee strategic plan—MC 
100 and MC 100/1—which attempted to bring together the 
doctrines of massive retaliation and flexible response, even 
though the later version had been specially altered to provide a 
compromise with French strategic views. In October, 1965, it 
was reported that De Gaulle had refused approval for the con­
struction of a permanent NATO military headquarters in the 
western suburbs of Paris, an $8 million project designed by 
French army engineers under Brigadier General Michel Laffe­
rerie, the head of the SHAPE logistics division, whose blueprints 
had been approved in May by General Lemnitzer. During this 
period the French seemed little inclined to participate in the 
Five Year Rolling Defense Program, and France refused to 
earmark a batallion or air squadron for the ACE Mobile Force and 
vetoed NATO-wide financing of its exercises.100 
The French government supported neither consultative nor 
hardware types of nuclear sharing. France did not subscribe to 
the Athens guidelines and French decision-makers claimed that 
consultation with the United States was largely ineffectual. Al­
though the French had been members of the Standing Group 
and of the SACEUR Liaison Group at Omaha, high officers felt 
that they had received little information about American or 
British targetting and no voice in target designation. When the 
Special Committee of Defense Ministers was proposed, Ambas­
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sador de Leusse informed the NATO Council that the French 
were not interested in participating; and Foreign Minister 
Couve de Murville resisted the idea of making it a permanent 
NATO Committee.101 
Nor was France eager for sharing of nuclear hardware within 
the NATO framework. When, in the context of the Nassau con­
versations with Macmillan, Kennedy proposed to give France 
Polaris missiles if the French would endorse the proposed NATO 
nuclear force, De Gaulle rejected both parts of the package. On 
the one hand, De Gaulle explained that France had neither the 
warheads nor the submarines to go with the Polaris missiles. On 
the other hand, the NATO nuclear force seemed to De Gaulle to 
go against the very raison d'etre of the French nuclear effort, the 
desire to dispose "in our own right of our deterrent force." "It is 
true,' he stated "that France might theoretically retain the abil­
ity to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our 
atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how 
could we do it in practice during the unheard of moments of the 
atomic apocalypse?" 102 
Subsequently the French government opposed both the 
American MLF and the British ANF proposals. National control 
and independence in French nuclear policy also were necessary 
not only to guard against presently perceived enemies, but also 
against possibly unfaithful Allies. One could "very well imag­
ine," De Gaulle had stated in 1959, that "Western Europe might 
be destroyed from Moscow and Central Europe from Washing­
ton." 
Returning to this theme four years later he said, 
no one, nowhere, can know in advance whether in the event 
of a conflict, the atomic bombs would or would not be used at 
the start by the two principal champions; whether, if they did 
use them, they would use them in Central and Western 
Europe only, without striking each other directly and im­
mediately. In light of this enormous and inevitable 
uncertainty, France must herself have the means of directly 
reaching any State that would be her aggressor.103 
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As early as November, 1964, there had been rumors that De 
Gaulle had ordered studies of the effect of a general French 
withdrawal from NATO and had informed American Ambassador 
Bohlen of his intention to leave NATO by 1969. At the Minis­
terial meeting in the spring of 1965 the Allies were reported to 
have put planners to work on the construction of a European 
defense system without France.104 On September 9, De Gaulle 
publicly declared: 
So long as we consider the solidarity of the Western peoples 
necessary for the possible defense of Europe, we will remain 
the allies of our allies. But at the expiration of our present 
commitments—that is, at the latest in 1969—we shall end the 
subordination which is described as integration, which is pro­
vided for by NATO and which puts our destiny in the hands of 
foreigners.105 
At a press conference on February 21, 1966, he stated: 
Without reneging on her membership in the Atlantic Alliance, 
between now and the ultimate date laid down for her obliga­
tions, which is 4 April, 1969, France will continue progressively 
to modify the arrangements at present in force so far as they 
concern her. What she did yesterday in this respect in a number 
of fields she will do tomorrow in others.106 
On March 7, President de Gaulle sent a letter to President 
Johnson in which he said that "France is determined to regain 
on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, pres­
ently diminished by the permanent presence of allied military 
elements or by the utilization of her airspace, to cease her partici­
pation in the integrated Commands and no longer to place her 
forces at the disposal of NATO." More specific implications of 
French military withdrawal were spelled out in the ensuing 
exchange of notes between France and her Allies.107 
The French government on July 1 withdrew all French land 
and air forces assigned to NATO, a total of approximately 88,000 
men, as well as the five submarines which represented the entire 
90 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
remaining French naval contribution to the Alliance. Most of 
the French forces deployed in Germany remained there follow­
ing the negotiation of a bilateral agreement between the French 
and German governments, but certain aircraft and surface-to-air 
missile units, as well as selected ground forces, returned to 
France. The French Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central 
Europe, General Jean Crepin, was withdrawn; AFCENT was con­
solidated; and Crepin was succeeded by German General Graf 
von Kielmansegg. French personnel assigned to Allied head­
quarters, mainly SHAPE and AFCENT, were replaced by liaison 
missions. French students and staff left the NATO Defense Col­
lege. Allied bases, installations, and units not under direct French 
authority—including SHAPE, AFCENT, the NATO Defense College, 
and individual national facilities—were transferred from France, 
generally by April 1, 1967. In addition, France required authori­
zations for Allied flights over French territory, which previously 
had been granted on an annual basis, to be renewed monthly 
through 1967. In September, 1966, France announced its inten­
tion to withdraw from NATO'S Annual Review Committee and on 
October 1, the French government reduced its participation in 
the Alliance's Military Committee to a liaison group. Although 
France retained the right to sit on the Defense Planning Com­
mittee, it no longer participated. On January 1, 1967, it ceased to 
contribute to "most" military budget expenses, though it con­
tinued to pay its full share of 17.1 per cent for NATO'S early 
warning system.108 
Within France there was little evidence of strong attachment 
to NATO in the face of De Gaulle's military disengagement. 
Resistance at the Quai d'Orsay, if it existed at all, consisted of 
private footdragging. For the military, the withdrawal from NATO 
was a much lighter blow than had been the retreat from Algeria; 
and there was compensation in the growing French nuclear 
capability. Conflicts between the military services centered more 
on the implications of nuclear weapons for service roles than on 
NATO. Thus the French Chief of Staff, General Ailleret replied 
to a public dispute between Generals Andre Martin, Air Force 
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Chief of Staff, and Louis le Puloch, Army Chief of Staff, by 
stating that national strategy was a combined "strategie aeroter­
restre" but, in any case, anterior to and independent of alliance 
strategy. Subsequently Ailleret declared the adoption of "la de­
fense 'tous azimuts.'" According to the new strategic doctrine 
France aimed to have a long-range missile force capable of 
deterring aggression originating in any point of the compass. 
Obviously NATO Allies were not excluded.109 
TABLE 3 
VOTE FOR ADOPTION OF THE MOTION OF CENSURE 
BY FRENCH ASSEMBLY GROUPS, APRIL 20, 1966 * 
Group
French Assembly Groups Group Vote Membership 
Groupe Socialiste 62 66 
Groupe du Rassemblement Democratique 35 39 
Groupe du Centre Democratique 33 55 
Not inscribed 3 15 
Unknown 3 
Groupe d'Union pour la Nouvelle Republique-
Union Democratique du Travail 1 231 
Groupe des Republicans Independants 35 
Groupe Communiste 41 
Total 137 482 
* Journal Officiil de la Republique Fransaise, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblii Nationale, No. 19 AN 
(April 21, 1966), p. 821; Assemblee Nationale, Deuxieme Legislature, Listt (April 19, 1965). 
Among French political groups, there was only weak opposi­
tion to De Gaulle's NATO policies. In April, 1966, a motion of 
censure against the government's NATO policies received 137 
votes in the Assembly, 242 being required for passage. The roll 
call division, presented in Table 3, indicates that these votes 
came mainly from the Socialists, who had originally sponsored 
the motion, and from the Groupe du Rassemblement Democra­
tique and the Groupe du Centre Democratique, legislative 
groups centered around the Radical, UDSR, and MRP parties. The 
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government's majority, on the other hand, which rested on UNR­
UDT forces was swelled by support from the Communists, who 
had always been hostile to NATO. 
Those groups most obviously damaged by De Gaulle's policy 
were the local communities from which the Allies were with­
drawing. It was estimated that 18,000 French workers would 
have to find new employment; and the American departures 
alone would affect regional economies by the loss of 65,000 
American servicemen and their families. Local mayors and mu­
nicipal councils, however, did not appeal to the government to 
reconsider its NATO decision, but rather to reconvert the bases to 
French military use. When a Comite National de Defense du 
Personnel des Bases Alliees organized demonstrations in Paris by 
displaced workers from the Allied bases in October, 1966, the 
main objective was not a return to NATO, but pressure on the 
French government to provide compensatory socio-economic 
measures. In the Assembly elections of March, 1967, areas like 
Toul and Orleans, which were losing American bases, elected 
Gaullist candidates.110 
NATO Military Forces: 
Leadership, Functionalism, and Spill-over 
3 
The failure of integration in military forces described in the 
preceding section could not be laid at the leadership's doorstep. 
NATO leaders supported the military force program with an ideol­
ogy which covered a wide range between general aims and 
specific, concrete proposals. This ideology defined its broad goals 
in terms of Allied peace and security. At a slightly lower level of 
generality was a strategy which moved from almost exclusive 
emphasis on the deterrent threat to a mixture which included 
the possibility of defense. Finally the leadership promoted a 
series of specific NATO structures and tasks beginning with rela­
tively traditional military areas, moving to include the realm of 
nuclear co-ordination, and ending with an attempt to preserve 
what had already been built. This ideology, at the more general 
levels, could be expected to appeal to all the Allies—peace and 
security were common goods, a developing mixture of deterrence 
and defense could take to midstream and hopefully avoid all but 
the most extreme currents in the shifting strategic debate. Ulti­
mately, however, the ideology implied important specific sacri­
fices from, first, the Europeans, and then the United States; and 
here it promoted opposition. 
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LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
Successive SACEURS took precedence over the Secretaries Gen­
eral in promulgating the ideology, though the latter also lent 
support. In December, 1950, the Council had appointed United 
States General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Eisenhower had served as 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Eu­
rope (1944-1945), supervising the long-awaited Allied landings 
in Normandy which had begun the liberation of Europe; had 
been Chief of Staff of the United States Army between 1945 
and 1948; and was presently serving as President of Columbia 
University. The impetus which he brought to his task is indi­
cated by a memorandum which he wrote before assuming the 
new position. 
I shall reluctantly accept command responsibility if: 
1) German agreement secured, 
2) All countries make fixed commitments, 
3) Maximum authority and opportunity to SHAPE (no limi­
tation as to area except in most general way—same as to 
functions.) * 
During 1952, General Eisenhower was succeeded as SACEUR by 
General Matthew B. Ridgway, who came directly from his posi­
tion as head of the United Nations forces in Korea. 
Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Lord Ismay laid the early ideologi­
cal groundwork. At the most general level were the paramount 
goods of peace and security. In the face of "an aggressive imperi­
alism that has more than once announced its implacable hostility 
to free government,1' General Eisenhower stated, "we strive to 
erect a wall of security for the free world behind which free 
institutions can live." General Ridgway stressed the broad goal 
of NATO as the "preservation of peace and security" against the 
Communist threat.2 
Slightly less general was the delineation of NATO strategy, 
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emphasizing deterrence without immediately providing defense 
and implying substantial distance from the ultimate goals. Theo­
retically Eisenhower's defense was to be provided by a "shield" of 
air and ground strength, the bulk of which would be located in 
central Europe. On the flanks—in Italy, Denmark, and Norway 
—there would be smaller air, ground, and naval forces. Never­
theless, Eisenhower admitted that "as of today, our forces could 
not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier."3 In 
such a situation the deterrent sword provided by American re­
serves and air power was crucial. Eisenhower told Congress that 
the United States could not "concentrate all our forces in any 
one sector, even one as important as Western Europe." Rather 
''we must largely sit here with our great mobile, powerful re­
serves, ready to support our policies, our right, our interests, 
wherever they may be in danger in the world." * For Ridgway, 
defense also seemed less immediately feasible than deterrence. 
He defined his objectives: 
First, to deter aggression by building up our military forces 
to such a degree that potential breakers of the peace will con­
sider their chance of successful attack doubtful. 
Second, to insure, insofar as possible, that in the event we 
are attacked, we defend the people and the lands of the NATO 
nations. 
He noted that "a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future 
would find the Allied Command Europe critically weak to ac­
complish its present mission." 6 
At the level of specific NATO structures, the Annual Review 
was singled out for special attention. Eisenhower felt that an 
"annual review of the full nature and composition of our mili­
tary programs should be accomplished." Lord Ismay stated that 
"the Annual Review is one of the most important tasks per­
formed by NATO. It is indeed the main instrument for co-ordinat­
ing the defense effort of the Alliance." s 
As for particular tasks, which called for concrete Allied contri­
butions, Eisenhower and Ridgway asked for land force im­
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provement in terms of active divisional strengths and combat 
readiness, redeployment, better training and proper backing by 
support troops, proper ammunition and supply levels, and reserve 
training and mobilization. They requested that the number of 
modern aircraft be increased and that naval forces be 
strengthened. Recalling the decisions reached by the Ministers 
in February, Eisenhower stated that the Allied governments 
"must convert the Lisbon program into actuality." 7 
Eisenhower believed that the energy to achieve these tasks 
could come from a dialectical interplay of the "enlightened 
self-interest" of all participants. "There was, in the long-term 
sense, hope for none," without "joint and vigorous defense ac­
tion." 
For the continental nations, there was only the specter of a 
godless tyranny that would stamp out freedom with machine­
like efficiency. . For Britain, there was the prospect of a 
new enemy across the Dover Cliffs, an enemy who could bring 
back the rockets, submarines, and bombardment on an inten­
sive scale. For the United States and Canada, the future could 
promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless 
sacrifices and defense costs which would ultimately break 
their economies.8 
Lord Ismay made the same point when he said that "aggression 
in Europe and the danger to Europe is nearer in terms of 
distance and time than it is to the Americas, but for them it is 
just as mortal in the long run." 9 
The upward co-operative spiral was to be initiated by the 
United States and to spark increasing efforts by the European 
Allies. "What we are trying to do," Eisenhower said "is to start a 
sort of reciprocal action across the Atlantic. We do one thing 
which inspires our friends to do something, and that gives us 
greater confidence in their thoroughness, their readiness for 
sacrifice. We do something more and we establish an upward-
going spiral which meets this problem of strength and morale."10 
Nevertheless, the ideology seemed to aim at co-opting the 
United States at the expense of the Europeans. A strategy which 
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emphasized deterrence, without providing an immediately credi­
ble defense, neglected European fears that the Continent might 
once again be liberated only after being overrun. Furthermore, 
the Europeans were ultimately to be called upon to supply most 
of the manpower. Britain and France were the major European 
targets; but force gains were important factors in leadership 
support for the entry of Greece and Turkey and the rearmament 
of Germany first within the context of the European Defense 
Community, and then under NATO.11 The United States would 
initially supply troops, but Eisenhower made it clear that this 
was to be mainly an "'emergency measure." "While it was 
agreed, unanimously, that some American ground forces should 
remain indefinitely in Europe, each government was informed 
that as soon as Europe could raise, train, and deploy an adequate 
ground force, the major portion of the American contingent 
would be returned to the United States." 12 Testifying before 
Congress in 1951, Eisenhower doubted whether the American 
force contribution would ever completely "get to zero," but he 
assured Senator Smith that this "would be the objective in any 
planning in which I took part."13 "Fundamentally and on a 
long-term basis," he believed, "each important geographical area 
must be defended primarily by the people of that region." 14 
General Ridgway left SHAPE in 1953 to take up a new position 
as United States Army Chief of Staff and was replaced as 
SACEUR by General Alfred M. Gruenther, who had been Chief 
of Staff at SHAPE under both previous incumbents. Gruenther, 
in turn, was relieved in 1956 by General Lauris Norstad. Nor­
stad was an officer of the United States Air Force and had served 
in Europe since the establishment of the Allied Command in 
1951, first as Commander-in-Chief of United States and Allied 
Air Forces in Central Europe and then as Air Deputy at SHAPE. 
His succession to command promised to carry on the Eisenhower 
tradition, mixing with it a new emphasis on airpower and mod­
ern technology. On January 2, 1963, Norstad handed over com­
mand to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then Chairman of the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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During these later years, the leadership shifted ideological 
ground. Peace and security continued to be the broad goals, but 
the strategic mixture now included not only deterrence but also 
the possibility of defense, and structures and tasks were not only 
conventional but nuclear. 
The general goals of peace and security remained the ultimate 
appeal, "NATO has checked Soviet aggression,'' General Norstad 
said, "because it has made the preservation of peace and security 
of its members a matter of common interest and common respon­
sibility." General Lemnitzer repeated the theme: "Peace in the 
NATO area has been maintained," he noted "and the military 
security provided by our collective efforts—the security so neces­
sary to stability—certainly ranks high among the factors that 
have brought about the growing economic prosperity and well­
being of so many nations of NATO." 15 
Less generally, the early strategic imbalance between deter­
rence and defense was gradually redressed by an increasing de­
fensive emphasis. General Gruenther appealed for European 
support when he estimated that the shield, consisting of "highly 
trained covering land forces," should provide a "cushion of time" 
following the failure of deterrence, allowing the mobilization of 
reserves who would be "brought into action immediately after 
the outbreak of hostilities/' "Hard-hitting air forces" would pro­
vide tactical support and Allied long-range air forces would 
conduct powerful retaliatory attacks deep into enemy territory 
against industrial and other vital targets." General Norstad re­
jected the notion of a "trip-wire" or "plate-glass window" shield 
in favor of "a 'shield' force of size and strength, charged with the 
vital mission of defending all NATO territory and all NATO 
peoples. A defense that failed to protect our European 
allies from invasion," he said "would be no defense at all." 16 At 
the minimum Norstad's shield would "force a pause" which 
would clearly establish the incidence of aggression, would em­
phasize its cost and consequences, and thus establish the credibil­
ity of strategic retaliatory forces by bridging the "gap between all 
or nothing." " 
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By the time of General Lemnitzer, deterrent credibility was to 
be based not only on "an invulnerable means to retaliate, in 
kind, against a nuclear attack.'' It also implied "an evident capa­
bility to meet and defeat Communist forces." 18 
As part of their sharpened defensive perspective, later leaders 
gave increasing emphasis to forward defense. General Eisen­
hower had first spoken of a forward strategy, but could only hope 
to hold the west bank of the Rhine. General Gruenther moved 
across the Rhine in 1954-55; and by 1961 General Norstad 
could say, "I believe we are now approaching the position where 
we can move to a true forward strategy. I do not think it is 
acceptable to any one of our countries that part of its territory 
should be given up." 19 Secretary General Spaak stated that, "for 
political and moral as well as military reasons, there was only one 
strategy which the Alliance could adopt: the member countries 
must be protected along their frontiers and right up to the iron 
curtain." General Lemnitzer restated that the forward strategy 
was "the only kind of strategy that is acceptable to the nations of 
NATO,'' though he also qualified his statement by pointing out 
that "this does not mean that we deploy our forces right along 
the iron curtain, but it does mean that we will be in contact with 
the forces immediately upon crossing into NATO territory."20 
The leadership buttressed its emphasis on forward defense by 
supporting the expansion of specific structures and tasks which 
were both conventional and nuclear. The structural emphases of 
the earlier period were carried over and developed. Thus in 1963 
Dirk Stikker justified an extension of the Annual Review, the 
NATO Force Planning Exercise, by arguing that it would help to 
provide ''precise and vigorously considered forecasts based on 
realistic planning assumptions." Moreover it would be instru­
mental in making NATO'S five year force goals "visibly compatible 
with the resources expected to be available and vice versa." 
General Lemnitzer believed that the Force Planning Exercise 
had "the particular advantage of enabling the Allied nations and 
the major NATO Commanders to work out, jointly, our force goals 
for future years. It is hoped that the final result will be the 
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adoption of goals which provide forces of the types and numbers 
considered necessary by the military authorities, and which can 
also be accepted as politically and economically feasible by the 
national political authorities." Manlio Brosio agreed that "strat­
egy, resources, and forces have to be examined and reconciled 
collectively among the allies, through agreed force planning 
procedures." 21 
Although insufficient data exist to be certain, it is likely that 
Stikker strongly backed a program of structural reform and 
consolidation. To the NATO Parliamentarians he suggested that 
the Allies "should think very hard" about whether it was "still 
right that the main nucleus of civil affairs should be on one side 
of the Atlantic and the main nucleus of military affairs on the 
other." Following his retirement he became more specific, recom­
mending reapportionment of command positions to give the 
Europeans greater voice, abolition of the Standing Group, ex­
pansion of the authority of major commanders, building "into 
the International Secretariat a military organization which 
would take over a large part of the tasks now performed by the 
Standing Group," and the transfer of the Military Committee to 
Europe, where it should "meet in permanent session in the NATO 
headquarters." 22 
In different combinations, NATO leaders maintained and ex­
tended ideological stress on traditional tasks. General Gruenther 
requested more active and reserve forces, extension of conscrip­
tion, and improvement of air defense. Norstad urged increases in 
the number of active-duty combat-ready divisions; strengthening 
the personnel and equipment levels of existing and deployed 
combat units; correction of shortages in support units; and im­
proving the status of reserves and reinforcements, both combat 
and support, and integrated air defense. Lemnitzer accented the 
importance of maintaining adequate force strengths and man­
ning levels; conscription periods over twelve months; increases in 
weapons and equipment; and improvements in command and 
control and air defense capabilities. Stikker joined the military 
commanders in pointing to the necessity for integrated air de­
fense.23 
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New programs were also important. The leadership empha­
sized forward deployment of troops and the creation of a special 
ACE Mobile Force, which could be quickly moved to trouble 
spots in forward areas. General Norstad referred to the AMF as a 
"fire brigade" which could get to trouble spots along the Cold 
War border "firstest with the mostest.' "Although in the mobile 
force the mostest' may be relatively small in numbers,' Norstad 
admitted "in terms of timely application, in terms of potential 
fire power, it could be more than the most which has ever been 
employed in this manner up to this time."2i 
During March, 1960, Norstad proposed three battalions as the 
AMP'S original strength—with complements from the United 
States, Britain, and France. Later the force could be expanded 
with contributions from other nations. By December, 1961, Nor­
stad indicated that he was ready to move to a more ambitious 
mobile force in terms of national representation and manpower, 
hoping to have by April, 1962 "representation from four or five 
countries and to have, for instance, in terms of the ground forces 
involved, as many as 3,000 men in four, five or six reinforced 
battalions. We would hope also to have corresponding air force 
units," he said. Furthermore, he strongly emphasized the AMF'S 
need for logistic standardization. "We cannot have five different 
commands. We cannot have five different kinds of troops with 
support equipment. We cannot have five different kinds of 
ammunition," he said. "We must have true standardization of 
equipment." 25 
Norstad made it clear that he was reorganizing those forces 
which already existed, rather than requesting new ones. He told 
WEU that the ACE Mobile Force "will add materially to our 
strength, without adding to the cost, because it is being made up 
of forces that are in existence." Elsewhere he had noted that "it's 
nothing we pull off and put on a shelf. These units will be 
part of other operating units, where they belong, but they will be 
so trained and equipped, as a second-hat function for them, that 
they can be used promptly and effectively for this." Neverthe­
less, some additional military expenditure would be required, 
and Norstad stressed the desirability of common NATO financing. 
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He believed that, "those nations which contribute forces should 
not, because of the increased effectiveness of their contribution, 
be expected to shoulder the additional burden of paying what 
are clearly common expenses." 26 
General Lemnitzer continued support for the Mobile Force. 
"I consider," he said, "that the AMF is making a very valuable 
contribution to the deterrent effectiveness of Allied Command 
Europe. Moreover, it represents a guarantee that no NATO coun­
try, however remote its location, stands alone against the com­
mon threat." He hoped that the units assigned to the AMF might 
in the future serve on a relatively "permanent basis/' Finally, 
like his predecessor, General Lemnitzer pressed for NATO fund­
ing. "The most troublesome question," he said, "arises in connec­
tion with the special financial problems resulting from the AMF'S 
international character. This is especially marked with regard to 
the costs of maneuvers and exercises—especially the expenses 
of transportation to the area of operations and return A 
solution on an inter-allied basis is obviously called for."27 
The leadership was ambivalent toward the exchange of con­
ventional forces for nuclear weapons which was embodied in the 
succession of NATO force plans. On the one hand, it was unen­
thusiastic about the conventional losses; on the other, it wel­
comed the nuclear gains. General Ridgway had publicly opposed 
the abandonment of the Lisbon force goals; and important plan­
ning officers under his successor, General Gruenther, would 
have preferred to maintain the Lisbon reserves had it been 
feasible. By 1954, however, it had become clear that the Allies 
were unlikely to fulfil the Lisbon targets; and NATO'S new force 
plan, MC 48, was based on an assessment of the forces which 
nations appeared willing to supply. General Gruenther's direc­
tive to the study group preceding the formulation of MC 48 
emphasized the necessity to formulate a plan which would not 
"shake the economies of the participating nations."28 
In 1957, SHAPE completed the Allied Command Europe, 
Minimum Forces Study, 1958-1963, which was to be the basis 
for MC 70. General Norstad used the analogy of a sand castle 
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to make it clear that he vigorously opposed further force re­
ductions. 
The talk about paring down the deterrent strategy reminds 
me of a game I used to play as a child, a game called "Castle 
of Sand." We put a penny in a tumbler, packed the tumbler 
with damp sand, and turned it upside down over a plate. Lift 
the tumbler, and there was the "castle," with the penny on top. 
Now we took a knife, and each of us in turn had to pare away 
some sand, without bringing down the penny. It was easy at 
first. You could make bold slashes at almost no risk at all. But 
it soon became dangerous to pare even a few grains. And 
eventually, of course, somebody made the fatal cut. Down fell 
the castle, penny and all, and the loser paid a forfeit.29 
Nevertheless, toward the end of Norstad's term, MC 26/4 
endorsed further cuts. After his retirement, Norstad told Con­
gress, "I fought for forces, and I fought to maintain forces that 
were over there (in Europe) on the basis of the military require­
ment." When he was asked if "the over-all allied ground forces 
in Europe are adequate at the present time," Norstad replied, "I 
am speaking from a distance of three years but I would say that 
they are inadequate they have less now than when I was 
there and I did not have enough." so 
General Lemnitzer was equally outspoken. "I can see no 
military justification for the reduction of forces in Europe,1' he 
said. When asked if reduction of ground forces, and the military 
strategy which this implied, had been recommended by him, 
General Lemnitzer replied, "Absolutely not.' Furthermore, Gen­
eral Lemnitzer made it clear that the program of dual basing, 
under which the United States had redeployed troops from 
Europe to the United States with the idea of flying them back to 
Europe in an emergency, was no substitute for troops on the 
ground. "While dual basing does not reduce the troop commit­
ment to NATO," he said, "it does degrade our in-theatre capability 
and therefore reduces our readiness to meet an attack with little 
or no warning." In view of the "Soviet invasion of Czechoslo­
vakia" during 1968, he hoped that the NATO nations would 
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reverse "a dangerous trend within the organization that had 
weakened the conventional forces under his command." 31 
SACEUR'S opposition to conventional contraction went together 
with support for increases in nuclear capabilities. To be sure 
there was a feeling that the losses in the first area were not 
completely offset by the gains in the second. General Ridgway 
maintained that "the new tactical nuclear weapons would not 
only demand more manpower but would also increase the cost of 
defense to the taxpayer.'' General Gruenther cautioned that 
"new weapons frequently have the effect of adding new prob­
lems and new tasks without eliminating those that previously 
confronted us." 32 
Nevertheless, the SHAPE study which preceded the adoption 
of M  C 48 in 1954, had concluded that future warfare would 
inevitably be atomic. General Gruenther publicly said "we have 
determined that our strategy in the center requires the use of 
atomic weapons whether the enemy uses them or not, and we 
must use atomic bombs to redress the imbalance between their 
forces and ours and to achieve victory.'' When General Norstad 
was asked, "If you were prohibited from using atomic weapons, 
could you defend Europe?" His reply was, "In the event of a 
general war, the answer is 'No!' The answer is 'No!'" Thus, a 
new defensive concept was devised which incorporated the 
change in anticipated available resources. Under the earlier out­
look, defense was to have been accomplished by "waves'' of 
forces from the Lisbon reservoir. The new perspective viewed 
the military situation in terms of "structures." "Engaged" nu­
clear weapons would link the lowest and highest levels of vio­
lence and reinforce the credibility of the Western deterrent.33 
From the start SACEUR had been concerned that the United 
States provide nuclear information to its Allies. Eisenhower had 
chafed under American legal restrictions. "The matter of nuclear 
strength and possible deployment was troublesome from the be­
ginning,'' he said. The McMahon Act of 1946, controlling the 
production of fissionable materials, the manufacture and storage 
of nuclear weapons, and the transfer of such weapons to other 
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nations, "prevented us from making any workable agreements 
with our partners in NATO respecting nuclear weapons—indeed 
it was difficult and embarrassing, because of the restrictions 
imposed upon us, even to discuss the matter intelligently and 
thoroughly." In spite of these hindrances, discussion took place 
at SHAPE, during General Eisenhower's tenure, concerning the 
implications of battlefield nuclear weapons for European de­
fense; and Eisenhower noted that "the effect of the nuclear 
deterrent was taken in account in all our joint planning." 34 
Subsequently, General Norstad praised the advance of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, "which permitted the use on an 
allied basis of more atomic information than had been allowed 
previously." At the same time he noted that "the restrictions 
imposed by that act still prevent NATO forces from training on a 
fully realistic basis or developing the operational capability and 
readiness status required, particularly in view of the many types 
of modern atomic-weapons system which are now becoming 
available." To further improve the situation, he endorsed 
changes in the Act which would "provide greater latitude for the 
dissemination of essential information within this Allied 
Command." 35 
SACEUR also showed a growing concern for an adequately 
stocked nuclear armory. Generals Gruenther and Norstad lob­
bied in Washington during the mid-1950's for the creation of a 
"NATO atomic stockpile'' through which the United States would 
retain control of atomic warheads, but would distribute to its 
Allies nuclear capable delivery vehicles, train Allied military 
personnel in the use of these vehicles, and help to develop a 
supply system for them. These efforts were relatively successful. 
Commenting on the Allied Command Europe, Minimum Forces 
Study, 1958-1963, which preceded MC 70, Norstad stated that 
"we plan to introduce just as rapidly as possible, the new types of 
weapons such as the rockets and missiles of various kinds. We, of 
course, are primarily interested in what might be called the 
tactical or battlefield type of weapon. I think I did say recently 
that we propose to go from about 30 battalions at the present 
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time to say about 100 battalions by 1963." 36 As for higher 
levels of violence, following the December, 1957 Heads of Gov­
ernment Council, SHAPE carried out studies which presented a 
military requirement for MRBM'S stationed in Europe, in addi­
tion to the Thor and Jupiter bases in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. 
Publicly, Norstad advocated that 'mid-range ballistic missiles, 
land and sea based, and with great mobility, should be made 
available to NATO as a part of the weapons modernization pro­
gram, to meet the presently assigned functions of this 
command." 37 
On December 6, 1959, in a speech at the University of 
Southern California, Norstad proposed making NATO the "fourth 
nuclear power" through the creation of a multi-national atomic 
authority. He developed this idea further on March 2, 1960, at a 
press conference at SHAPE; on October 12 in Coventry, England; 
and on November 21 to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. 
To the Parliamentarians Norstad said that 'consideration should 
be given to guaranteeing to the Alliance the availability of a 
basic pool of atomic weapons, those essential to the direct de­
fense of Europe, and to giving all nations of the Alliance an 
essentially equal voice in the control of these particular weap­
ons.1' Subsequently he made public the proposal that a NATO 
Executive Committee might be assigned nuclear responsibility. 
Such a committee would be presided over by the Secretary 
General and might include the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, and perhaps one or two additional participants.38 
Norstad clarified several aspects of his plan to the Senate 
Subcommittee on National Security and International Opera­
tions after his retirement. In the first place, he noted that "the 
weapons I am talking about should be basically tactical," and 
that the purpose of his proposal was to provide "for the proper 
political decision for the use of what actually exists." "The 
critical and immediate problem" for Norstad was 'not with some 
new longer-range strategic force of yet undetermined purpose 
and pattern, not with the deployment of weapons which do not 
bear directly on the NATO task, not with an MLF, for 
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instance. " Rather the problem was, "how do we answer the 
European questions as to the availability and the control of 
weapons already deployed and, in a way, engaged." 39 
Replying to a question from Senator Mundt, Norstad asked if 
he might "respectfully disagree that we have a satisfactory proce­
dure at the present time, because at the present time we do not." 
NATO'S atomic stockpile represented ''a satisfactory procedure for 
making present weapons available—for supplying them. That is 
clean," said Norstad. Still lacking, however, was "a satisfactory 
procedure in terms of the alliance exercising its authority, and 
this is something which the United States does not dictate.'' To 
augment NATO'S authority, Norstad believed that machinery 
should be established which could authorize the use of Ameri­
can nuclear weapons, even though custody of bombs or war­
heads might remain under American control. "Let's keep our 
own custody," he said, "but let's let them collectively participate 
in the decision by which a limited number of weapons would be 
used in the NATO context, and, if possible, when they would be 
used." The decision-making procedure should be such that there 
would "be a certain minimum number of weapons which will be 
available even if the United States, which is most unlikely, 
would positively dissent from the decision and not commit its 
own forces." 40 
The primary decision-making body, the Executive Committee, 
would consist of heads of government, who would establish a 
permanent subordinate group of "people who would live with 
the subject, actually live with the subject, in whom the Prime 
Minister or President or Chancellor had great confidence and to 
whom he had direct access." Norstad asserted that the creation 
of this group would only formalize existing custom. "This pro­
posal for a Heads of State group was not pulled out of the air,'' 
he said. "This is confirming practice, at least practice during my 
time. These are the people with whom I maintained the contact. 
These are the people whom, when I got into difficulty, I called 
on the telephone or I went to see, or they called me on the 
telephone."41 
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Proposals for making NATO a fourth nuclear power were dis­
cussed at a number of meetings by Norstad, Spaak, Stikker, and 
Konrad Adenauer at Stikker's villa in Menaggio-Loveno,42 and 
Norstad's collaborators backed him up. Spaak called for a "com­
mon nuclear policy'' and an Atlantic "nuclear force." Stikker 
supported a system of NATO nuclear control in which, "without 
prejudicing the rights of the producing countries, the political 
decision on the use of nuclear weapons could be taken, after an 
appreciation of the necessity for it by supreme allied command­
ers, by a majority of weighted votes." 43 
The idea of NATO as a nuclear power could be expected to 
appeal to the European allies. In particular, Norstad's proposals 
aimed to forestall the development of a German drive to attain 
an independent nuclear capability by presenting an indirect road 
on which Germany might keep pace with nuclear developments. 
Norstad and Adenauer had discussed the issues as early as 1957, 
and these conversations provided an impetus for Norstad's think­
ing. Norstad recalled that: 
The Chancellor was the first to raise with me, in 1957, two 
questions which he said had been raised in the Federal Re­
public as well as in other countries in Europe. One was: If all 
these countries organized their defense on a foundation of 
nuclear weapons, was it not reasonable for the European coun­
tries to ask that a certain number of weapons be firmly com­
mitted, on the basis that they would not be withdrawn by 
unilateral decision of the United States? The other was: should 
not NATO have some degree of influence, perhaps even control, 
over the conditions under which the weapons would be used. 
No one said at the time that they wanted control, they just 
said due influence. . 
I sought to provide a specific answer to the questions. My 
proposal was that we establish an Executive Committee within 
NATO consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and 
France. The Secretary General could be chairman and Ger­
many would have a special relationship to this group which 
would have some control over any nuclear weapons deployed 
in Europe.44 
The subsequent development of an independent French nuclear 
capability added fuel to the German fire. At one of the Menag­
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gio meetings Adenauer said that if a solid system of nuclear 
co-operation were not developed "nobody would be able to pre­
vent Germany in the future from creating such a system for 
itself. And Germany could do that better and sooner than 
France!"45 
France was the leadership's second major target. Norstad spec­
ulated that the French 'sense of grievance" over exclusion from 
American nuclear secrets might have created a situation in 
which "the nuclear responsibilities on NATO authority will have 
to be broadened." He noted that "the French desire for a 
stronger voice in the strategy of the West is a broad one, and 
includes a particular interest in her exercising a major influence 
in any decision involving the use of atomic weapons.'' Norstad's 
Executive Committee would hopefully satisfy French ambitions. 
Before Congress in 1966 he recollected that "a few years ago 
when first presenting this idea I thought it might go some way 
toward meeting the requirements of certain countries, France for 
instance, since it recognizes the special position of the three 
Standing Group nations. I am frank to admit that this was one of 
its purposes when it was first developed." 46 
Spaak summed up the appeal—both specific and general— 
which the plan might have. The possibility that NATO might 
become "the fourth atomic Power in the world/' said Spaak, 
would be "a new milestone for the Alliance.'' 
It constitutes a valid and lasting answer to the problem of the 
atomic armament of Germany. 
It is also an answer to the queries and the anxieties of France. 
It may put an end to the dangerous controversies now de­
veloping in the United Kingdom. 
It constitutes for the Alliance as a whole, and more particularly 
for Europe, a tremendous increase in its power.47 
Nevertheless, the leadership's proposals ultimately ran into 
American opposition. During the 1950's the United States had 
co-operated by liberalizing its nuclear security policy to allow 
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first the dissemination of certain types of information, and later 
the deployment of tactical nuclear delivery systems with the 
forces of its Allies. This policy had been capped by the an­
nouncement in the Heads of Government communique of De­
cember, 1957, that "'NATO has decided to establish stocks of 
nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense 
of the Alliance in case of need," and "that intermediate range 
ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe."48 
President Eisenhower on February 3, 1960, had seemed to 
indicate further advances in American policy when he suggested 
that American laws still restricting nuclear co-operation should 
be liberalized. But after Senator Anderson and Representative 
Holifield warned that they continued to support the 1958 
Atomic Energy Act, the White House promptly denied that any 
policy change which would further loosen American nuclear 
control was contemplated.49 In April, 1960, Secretary of Defense 
Gates' proposals for establishing a European land-based Polaris 
force and for increasing SACEUR'S nuclear discretion also implied 
concessions to the NATO leadership. At the ministerial meeting in 
December, however, Secretary Herter appeared more cautious 
when he proposed that the Polaris force be submarine based and 
suggested that it depended on prior Allied agreement on an 
indeterminable multilateral system of political control. 
With the change of administration in Washington, a direct 
clash occurred between the NATO leadership and the United 
States government. The Kennedy administration felt that its 
policy of non-proliferation and centralized control ruled out a 
NATO nuclear force which was not ultimately subject to Ameri­
can veto.60 Administration reluctance to make NATO a nuclear 
power according to Norstad's vision was clearly stated by Secre­
tary of Defense McNamara, who said that he "would not favor" 
Norstad's plan. "I think it would be unwise," he said, "to divide 
the nuclear force of NATO into two categories without a proper 
linkage between them, granting to one group of nations author­
ity to use one category and another group of nations or a 
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single nation authority to use the other category. Nuclear war is 
indivisible.' He continued, "I know of no single member of 
NATO who would recommend that the authority to utilize nu­
clear weapons be granted to three to five other nations of 
NATO. Nor do I know of any member of NATO that would 
wish to see the United States delegate its veto power to any 
other member of NATO or to any grouping of NATO nations." 61 
Norstad's attitude towards NATO'S nuclear capability probably 
led Washington to press for his retirement. On the other side, 
Norstad, after he left SHAPE, publicly opposed the American and 
British counter-proposals—MLF and ANF—on the grounds that 
they neither added to SACEUR'S immediate nuclear capability nor 
met a 'Very legitimate" European desire for greater control of the 
use of nuclear weapons. Norstad said, "I have never been favora­
bly inclined toward an MLF." When asked about the ANF, he 
replied, "The same thing—it is a strategic force. We 
should not for almost a thousand reasons think of creating a new 
strategic force, because you just cause more trouble than it is 
worth." 62 He was also highly skeptical about NATO'S Special 
Committee of Defense Ministers. To be useful, he believed that 
the Committee could not "be just an exchange of ideas or 
exchange of information or participation in broad, general plan­
ning.1' "I am not suggesting that the McNamara Committee is 
kidding itself," he stated, "but unless it comes to some conclusion 
which would permit the Europeans to participate actively in a 
decision, I do not think it could be successful." Finally, he said, 
"I wish them well. I hope they will come to something. I am not 
complaining or criticizing the McNamara Committee." " 
Following the departures of Spaak, Norstad, and Stikker, the 
NATO leadership continued to support Atlantic nuclear co-opera­
tion and the idea of an Atlantic nuclear force, but with less 
vigor. General Lemnitzer suggested that he "would of course 
welcome any augmentation of ACE nuclear capabilities," indicat­
ing that a mix of surface ships, submarines, and land vehicles 
might, eventually, be most appropriate. Manlio Brosio called for 
Atlantic nuclear co-operation and decreasing emphasis on multi­
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pie nuclear vetoes, while nevertheless recognizing American nu­
clear independence.54 
During these later years, the leadership's ideology implied 
sacrifices—and resistance—from both Europeans and the 
United States. The increased emphasis on defense and a forward 
posture aimed to meet important European fears of being over­
run; but, at the same time, it implied force contributions mainly 
from European nations which had not filled their agreed quotas. 
The series of nuclear force proposals aimed at increasing Euro­
pean access to the most modern military technology, but also 
required the United States and Britain partially to relinquish 
their monopoly of the West's deterrent force. 
By 1966, the leadership shifted the major specific focus away 
from areas of conflict, such as the nuclear issue, and toward the 
task of preserving the military organization which had been 
painfully built by those who had come before. Here, following 
the French withdrawal, NATO leaders appealed to the Fourteen 
who remained, asserting that there could be neither peace nor 
security, neither deterrence nor defense, without "some kind of 
organization in peacetime." "We cannot afford in any future war 
to buy time by selling space," said Brosio. "If we do not prepare 
for the moment of danger, there can be no effective defense 
when and if it comes. Not only this, but since our defenses must 
not only be effective, but be seen to be so, there can be no 
credible deterrent, to provide which is the Alliance's essential 
function in time of peace." 65 
DECISION-MAKING 
In spite of the insistence with which the leadership pressed 
these appeals, it was resisted by national governments, whose 
instructed delegates dominated NATO'S decision-making councils. 
One of the most balanced and most effective leadership mech­
anisms was the Temporary Council Committee which was ap­
pointed late in 1951 to reconcile NATO'S military requirements 
with the political and economic capabilities of the Allies. The 
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TCC quickly delegated its work to an Executive Board of three, 
the members of which combined the roles of instructed delegates 
and independent experts. The participants were Averell Harri­
man of the United States, Sir Edwin Plowden of the United 
Kingdom, and Jean Monnet of France. While delegates of the 
larger nations thus controlled decision-making, the status of 
independent expertise enjoyed by the Board was indicated by its 
informal title of the Three Wise Men. 
On the basis of questionnaires distributed to Allied govern­
ments concerning defense programs and economic resources, the 
TCC arrived at recommendations for increased national contribu­
tions to the defense effort. According to Lord Ismay, "specific 
proposals" were made for "force targets and military standards, 
which are to be considered as firm goals for the coming year and 
as provisional goals and guidance for the years thereafter." Nev­
ertheless, Lord Ismay admitted that, "'not all member countries 
were happy about the TCC conclusions and there was a 
feeling, among some governments, that the defense capabilities 
of the larger members of the Alliance had not been explored 
with sufficient thoroughness." In particular the Belgian govern­
ment believed that a recommended 8 per cent of Belgian GNP for 
defense in 1952 was inequitable and the Italians thought they 
had been unfairly treated. Even in France, where additional 
defense spending had been accepted by Monnet, the increase 
was later rejected by the French Cabinet.56 
In spite of its limitations, the TCC study led to the Lisbon force 
goals of 1952 and to the establishment of more permanent force 
planning institutions—first the Annual Review Committee and 
then the Defense Planning Committee and the Defense Plan­
ning Working Group. All of these later bodies were dominated 
by instructed delegates. The Defense Planning Committee in­
cluded the national permanent representatives, the other two 
bodies were comprised of lesser-ranking members of national 
delegations, with representatives from the International Staff, 
the Standing Group, Military Committee and the Major NATO 
Commanders. 
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Little is known about the actual effectiveness of the Annual 
Review procedure, even though Lord Ismay has described and 
praised it in some detail. According to Lord Ismay, the Annual 
Review Committee established NATO definitions in terms of force 
categories, expenditures, and costs, submitted questionnaires to 
nations, analyzed their replies, and attempted to reconcile them 
with NATO military recommendations. By way of evaluation, 
Ismay stated: 
The Annual Review is one of the most important tasks per­
formed by NATO. It is indeed the main instrument for coordi­
nating the defense effort of the Alliance. It has proved an 
efficient means for collecting precise information, sifting it, 
drawing conclusions from it, and then acting. Through the 
Annual Review, deficiencies in equipment, units below the re­
quired standard, bottlenecks in production and other weak­
nesses can be quickly identified; the cost and economic impact 
of proposed remedies can be estimated, and a means provided 
for reaching agreement on what is both desirable and prac­
ticable. 
Furthermore, he noted that "in the final report on the 1953 
Annual Review there were 84 separate recommendations ad­
dressed to the various governments; nearly half of these had 
been accepted before the end of the Ministerial session which 
adopted the new force goals." Unfortunately Ismay did not 
indicate the scope of these recommendations relative either to 
national capabilities or to those recommendations which were 
not accepted.67 
It is more than likely that the Annual Reviews between 1953 
and 1961 and the Triennial Review of 1962 were not as effective 
as the leadership might have hoped. First, in spite of traditional 
leadership pleas for increased defense efforts, the force goals 
embodied in NATO'S military plans were consistently reduced. 
Second, the movement which began in 1961 to change NATO 
strategy away from the doctrine of massive retaliation led Dirk 
Stikker to propose on August 27, 1962, that a special study be 
undertaken which would relate strategy to the defense needs 
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and the defense capabilities of the Alliance—a job which one 
might have thought would have been performed by the Reviews 
of the preceding decade.58 
On May, 1963, Stikker followed up his earlier proposal by 
presenting a detailed plan for the implementation of the new 
study. Directly under the authority of the Secretary General 
there would be a mixed planning group including representa­
tives of the Staff/Secretariat and the military authorities. This 
group would have extended powers of investigation to assemble 
facts on the state of national defense forces. The members would 
submit questions to Allied governments, circulate in national 
capitols, and get the views of political and military leaders. 
Before the end of 1963 NATO military authorities would furnish 
a resume of (1) the effects of the military situation on NATO 
until 1970, and (2) suggested eventual modifications of NATO 
strategic concepts and force levels. By the spring of 1964 the 
mixed planning group would have completed a critical analysis 
of the resources and budgetary provisions of each NATO country, 
studied the estimates of NATO military authorities, and submitted 
a suggested NATO strategic doctrine and force plan to the Council 
for adoption.69 
The Ottawa Council of Ministers on May 24 "directed the 
Council in Permanent Session to undertake, with the advice of 
the NATO military authorities, further studies of the interrelated 
questions of strategy, force requirements, and the resources avail­
able to meet them." 60 This statement left ambiguous both the 
detailed subjects of study and the instrumentalities for conduct­
ing it. 
On July 25, in the Permanent Council, French Ambassador 
Seydoux vetoed the Stikker plan for two basic reasons—first, 
Stikker proposed to undertake a technical study of force levels 
when agreement had not been reached in the area of strategy, 
reversing natural priorities; second, such a study should be con­
ducted not by the Secretariat's experts but rather by national 
delegates. In greater detail, he argued that it was abnormal that 
the same group should decide both the strategic concept and the 
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level of forces required; the Ottawa communique had recognized 
their interdependence but had not authorized their simultaneous 
study. The object of the exercise was to establish the equilibrium 
of nuclear weapons and conventional armament; but the pro­
posed study assumed that the strategic problem had been solved. 
One should instead begin with the strategic study. Parallel to it 
could be a study of existing resources as long as it was conducted 
by a group with political responsibility. To confide to a group of 
international experts the right to inquire into national services 
and weigh financial and defense policies of national govern­
ments was unthinkable. Not only was it bound to be ineffectual 
because no government would co-operate, but it would substitute 
for and downgrade the fundamental organs of NATO, the Perma­
nent Council and the Military Committee.61 
The American position on the plan is not entirely clear. 
Secretary of Defense McNamara had privately supported Stik­
ker at the early stages of the proposal; and had backed Stikker's 
plan at Ottawa; in July, 1963, American Ambassador Finletter, 
along with British Ambassador Shuckburgh, was reported to 
favor it. Nevertheless, in the face of strong French resistance, 
the United States government, and McNamara in particular, 
were said to have gone back on the original agreement for a 
leading role by the Secretariat.62 
In any event, the Council decided that the Force Planning 
Exercise would emphasize not strategy but defense capabilities 
and that it would take place, not under the international aegis of 
the Secretary General and his experts, but under the Permanent 
Council's national delegates. The Permanent Council was con­
stituted as the Defense Planning Committee and beneath it 
would work the Defense Planning Working Group, composed 
essentially of the same personnel who sat on the Annual Review 
Committee. Eventually Secretary General Brosio was appointed 
Chairman of the DPC, and the Assistant Secretary General for 
Economics and Finance (later renamed the Assistant Secretary 
General for Defense Planning and Policy) was made Chairman 
of the DPWG. An important infusion of technical expertise came 
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from the RAND Corporation, which developed a NATO force plan­
ning cost model in the fall of 1964 as an analytical tool to 
support the Force Planning Exercise; but its independence was 
open to question in view of RAND'S long-standing relationship 
with the United States Department of Defense.63 
The results of the Force Planning Exercise do not appear to 
have been significantly better than those of the preceding Re­
views. One possible benefit was the extension of the Review 
procedure to cover a five-year period. In December, 1965, the 
Council of Ministers approved in principle the establishment of 
a Five Year Rolling Defense Program. In January, 1967, the 
new procedure went into effect, aiming at 'projecting Alliance 
force goals and country plans five years ahead each year,' and 
using compilations of national defense data which were sup­
posed to be broader and deeper than preceding ones, including 
special entries for contract maintenance and research and devel­
opment. A second possible gain was a new emphasis on cost 
effectiveness injected by the United States Defense Department 
and RAND.64 
Nevertheless, NATO'S five year plans remained dependent on 
national procedures. Although the American Defense Depart­
ment drew up plans on a five-year basis, Congressional authori­
zations and allocations were for one year; in Germany the Minis­
try of Defense had begun to plan five years ahead, but budgetary 
authorities and Parliament remained behind; in France the 
effective defense lot de •programme ran for six years, 1965 
through 1970. 
More seriously, the Force Planning Exercise failed to produce 
observable substantive benefits. It did not resolve the strategic 
debate between the proponents of massive retaliation and those 
of flexible response, though a strategic document to replace the 
ill-fated MC 100/1 was adopted after the French military with­
drawal. Even in the area in which it had eventually concen­
trated, the Force Planning Exercise could not be seen to have 
exercised appreciable influence on national policies. 
As approved at Ottawa in 1963, the Force Planning Exercise 
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had aimed at formulating Alliance force goals for the period 
1966—70. Between June and July of 1964, SACEUR, SACLANT, and 
CINCCHAN had submitted recommended force goals for this pe­
riod, consisting of "A" and "B" levels. The major emphasis in 
both plans concerned modernization (missiles, motorization, 
armor) and degree of readiness. While the A levels represented 
what the military commanders felt were their minimum military 
requirements—given their assigned mission and enemy capabili­
ties—the B levels were more nearly based on immediately availa­
ble capabilities. In December, 1965, the Council of Ministers 
agreed to accept a revised set of B goals as the planning basis for 
the new Five Year Rolling Defense Program. By mid-1967 even 
these levels appeared unrealistic.65 
Similar to the decision-making pattern in force planning was 
that in nuclear affairs. The Special Committee of Defense Min­
isters and its Working Groups, which were formed in 1965, and 
the more permanent structures which superseded them in De­
cember, 1966—the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the 
Nuclear Planning Group—were all composed of national repre­
sentatives, though extremely important ones. The NDAC and the 
NPG convened under the Chairmanship of Secretary General 
Brosio at the level of either Defense Ministers or Ambassadors, 
but the policy impact of these meetings remained unclear, in 
spite of the fact that discussion occurred on various subjects— 
for example, strategic nuclear forces, antiballistic missile defense, 
tactical nuclear weapons, atomic demolition munitions, the role 
of host nations in Allied arrangements for the planning and use 
of nuclear weapons.66 
As for NATO'S military institutions, one analyst incisively ob­
served that "the Military Committee and the Standing Group 
are negotiating agencies made up of instructed delegates."67 The 
Military Committee met twice a year at the level of Chiefs of 
Staff; and in permanent session nations were represented by 
high officers with national staffs. The Standing Group, "in spite 
of its apparent unity is a 'trinity,'" said French General 
Valluy. "Whatever their intelligence, their competence, their 
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personal authority, their sense of the present, their will to suc­
ceed, the delegations are unable to defend anything else, in the 
last resort, than the official doctrine which comes to them from 
Paris, Washington, or London, which, in professional jargon, 
one calls 'national guidance.' " 6S Neither the internationalization 
of the Standing Group's planning staff, nor the subsequent 
replacement of the Standing Group by an international plan­
ning staff under the Military Committee changed the situation; 
agreement still ultimately depended on the decisions of the 
national delegates for whom the staffs worked. 
Within the Military Committee and the Standing Group, 
leadership by SACEUR and the Secretary General existed but was 
circumscribed. Through formal plans, through more informal 
contacts with individual national chiefs of staff, and through 
international horsetrading, SACEUR exercised influence within 
the military institutions. Thus Vandevanter states that "a basic 
proposal from SACEUR, modified and approved by the Standing 
Group and the Military Committee, has become the most com­
mon method of formulating plans and policy for the Alliance." 69 
The Secretary General also exercised some influence through 
contacts with SACEUR and the Chairman of the Military Com­
mittee, especially when questions of political feasibility were 
involved. 
The leadership's influence, however, was sharply hedged by 
the requirement for unanimous decision. "The normal pattern of 
dispute in the upper chambers is for the majority group to accept 
SACEUR'S position against a small, sometimes partisan minority." 
This cleavage was aggravated by the fact that "delegates know 
they can hardly go wrong by holding to the country positions, 
but they can damage their reputation by accepting a compromise 
solution." 70 
The difficulties involved are illustrated, perhaps in exagger­
ated form, by the behavior of French delegates. During the 
period of the Fourth Republic, French representatives were only 
moderately instructed. Subsequent to De Gaulle's accession, 
however, the situation changed, both through increasingly de­
120 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
tailed guidance and through governmental repudiation of com­
promise solutions agreed to by its representatives. Thus, in No­
vember, 1963, the Military Committee had ready MC 100, to 
which all the representatives had agreed. At this time Admiral 
Max Douguet, the French representative, told the Military 
Committee that he had received instructions from his aovern­
ment to withdraw his approval. The Chairman of the Military 
Committee, German General Adolf Heusinger, persuaded him 
to fly home and to attempt to get an alteration in his directive; 
when this failed, the Military Committee produced MC 100/1, 
which aimed at a compromise with the French. Again Admiral 
Douguet flew home and again the French government refused 
to approve. When the paper was presented to the Council, the 
French interjected a formal veto. 
Potentially, the greatest opportunity for international leader­
ship existed in the NATO military headquarters, especially SHAPE 
with its central position, where military personnel from the 
different allied nations theoretically worked as a NATO interna­
tional staff; but even here the leadership's goals were weakened 
by the clash of nationalities and the limited impact of technical 
experts. 
The fault did not lie in a lack of distinction on the part of 
incumbent SACEUR'S. All of the Supreme Commanders were 
eminent American military officers. On the other hand, different 
Supreme Commanders brought with them personal liabilities. 
Eisenhower, though Americans praised his "international frame 
of mind," appeared too old to some European officers. Some also 
felt that Ridgway was insufficiently political," and he was 
known to have had serious differences with British Field Mar­
shal Montgomery. Gruenther was reputed to have made friends 
wherever he went, but Norstad was criticized for his "cold 
personality." 71 Lemnitzer was a relative newcomer. With the 
brief exception of Ridgway, the post of SACEUR had been held 
for a decade by men associated from the beginning with the 
establishment of SHAPE and the whole military structure. Lem­
nitzer could duplicate neither Eisenhower's charisma nor the ties 
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of Gruenther and Norstad with a man who was the original 
SACEUR and, subsequently, President of the United States. 
Perhaps more important was an undercurrent of feeling that 
SHAPE was essentially an American headquarters in which Euro­
peans had little voice, and no avenue of objection except with­
drawal. On the one hand, the United States' allies might be 
pleased by SACEUR'S reported tendency "to become a kind of 
spokesman for dissatisfied Europeans in Washington." 72 On the 
other hand, they might also be discontented with the United 
States' extraordinary influence in the common headquarters. 
Such influence sprang from a number of sources. First, it was 
estimated that the United States supplied 30 to 35 per cent of 
the personnel for the SHAPE staff, and a considerably larger 
proportion for SHAPE support units. Second, English was the 
dominant language, putting Continentals at a disadvantage. 
Third, American dominance was fostered when, to 'get the job 
done," the formal international organization was bypassed and 
American contact points were used. Partly this resulted from the 
rigidity of a structure where positions were allocated on a na­
tional basis and reorganization was almost impossible. Partly it 
resulted from situations of stress which led to by-passing the 
relatively cumbersome international staffs. Fourth, separate com­
munications channels and cryptographic systems, together with 
"U.S. only'' documents, established an atmosphere of national 
separateness. 
With the passage of time, such American dominance grew 
increasingly unpalatable to the European Allies. During earlier 
years the United States had provided substantial military and 
economic assistance, as well as high military analytic skills. 
Later, American assistance dwindled, and it seemed that the 
"bright young men" in the Pentagon, rather than the officers at 
SHAPE, represented the cream of American military thought." 
Within SHAPE, there were indications of national instruction 
in the form of explicit "National Military Representatives" for 
each NATO nation except Iceland. The office of the NMR was 
generally responsible for administrative support of its own na­
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tionals stationed at SHAPE and such matters as the requisition of 
replacement personnel, the processing of efficiency reports, disci­
plinary matters, and the arrangements for visits of SACEUR to its 
home nation or the visit of its nationals to SHAPE. The NMR 
served as a repository for particular classified materials which 
had not been released to the other Allies and also as a means of 
entry into national communications systems. Most significantly, 
the NMR represented a direct and authoritative national policy-
making input into the Allied headquarters, especially for smaller 
nations badly represented on the SHAPE staff. For some nations, 
the NMR was the ranking national officer.74 
Instruction even seemed to carry over to the officers serving 
directly on the SHAPE staff, particularly but not exclusively in the 
case of France. During the years of the Fourth Republic, French 
military officers under SACEUR consulted with national govern­
ment officials, but mainly on an "information" basis. Frequently 
the Supreme Commander himself would request that they do so, 
in order that he might know the government's position on a 
particular project. In later years, however, the French military 
were forced to comply closely with the more negative line of 
national policy. 
Occasionally SACEUR called in outside experts in the attempt 
to advance his ideological goals, with variable results depending 
on the prestige of the expert and the scope of the goals. General 
Gruenther's emphasis on air defense was undoubtedly important 
in the formation of a planning committee to investigate the 
feasibility of establishing an 'electronics center'' in Europe to 
assist SHAPE. The committee was headed by Dr. Carl F. J. 
Overhage, Director of the Lincoln Laboratory at the Massachu­
setts Institute of Technology; "and composed of civilian scien­
tists who, at Lincoln or elsewhere, had been closely involved in 
United States air defense planning." It reported to the American 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, 
Donald A. Quarks, on September 1, 1954, and the Overhage 
report was crucial in obtaining American government support 
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for and ultimately the creation of, the SHAPE Air Defense Tech­
nical Center.75 
The results were less impressive when, in 1958, SHAPE com­
missioned a study by Dennis McMahon, Senior Lecturer in 
Psychology at Edinburgh University, on the relationship be­
tween length of service and military efficiency. As a result of 
field interviews of American, Belgian, Canadian, British, Dutch, 
French, and German forces, McMahon concluded that twelve 
months were necessary for adequate training of privates, and 
eighteen months for non-commissioned officers and detachment 
commanders. Additional training of up to four months was 
essential for full combat readiness. From these findings SACEUR 
argued that an eighteen-month period of national service was 
required for an 'acceptable state of combat effectiveness," but 
there was no evident national response.76 
COALITIONS 
The barriers which were built into NATO'S decision-making 
mechanism not only hampered attempts at strong international 
leadership but also reflected the fact that NATO leaders depended 
for support on a coalition whose membership was limited and 
held serious reservations about the implications of the military 
force program. The bulk of the Alliance's tangible military 
strength was supplied by a few governments. The United States 
and Germany furnished over half of the forces for the vital 
central front; the United States and Britain provided the entire 
nuclear capability assigned to NATO. Through time, supporting 
governments became increasingly uneasy about the economic 
burdens of maintaining their forces and unwilling to expand 
existing levels. While they might agree to various additional 
forms of nuclear co-operation, they were no more eager than 
before to relinquish ultimate control of their nuclear weapons. 
Finally, domestic support of international leadership was uncer­
tain and contradictory, SACEUR might occasionally use generals 
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and admirals against recalcitrant civilian administrations or civil­
ians against parochial military establishments, but such backing 
tended to be neither strong nor positive enough for leadership 
reliance.77 
Nevertheless, the leadership was able to rely on this coalition 
to weather immediate crisis. In the wake of the 1966 French 
withdrawals, the other fourteen members banded together, with 
key roles played by the Secretary General and by the United 
States, Britain, and Germany. Following the French govern­
ment's notes in March, 1966, there was established a caucus of 
the Fourteen to discuss all aspects of the problem—including 
the implications for American nuclear warheads committed to 
French troops under SACEUR, the status of French troops in 
Germany, air defense, and communications. On March 18 the 
Fourteen issued a common declaration reaffirming their con­
tinued support for the Alliance's military structures and tasks: 
The North Atlantic Treaty and the organization established 
under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries. 
The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instru­
ment of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peace­
time of an integrated and interdependent military organization, 
in which, as in no previous alliance in history, the efforts and 
resources of each are combined for the common security of all. 
We are convinced that this organization is essential and will 
continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a sub­
stitute.78 
The French withdrawal from the Defense Planning Commit­
tee provided the opportunity to transfer the activities of the 
caucus into a more formal setting. Beginning in the latter part of 
1966, the reduced DPC assumed responsibility for broad oversight 
of NATO'S military affairs, supplanting the caucus of the Four­
teen, and to some extent the Council itself, as the Alliance's 
focal decision-making body. Symbolic of the DPC'S new impor­
tance was its first meeting in December, 1966, at the level of 
Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers, prior to the traditional 
Ministerial Council. The Council itself continued to be con­
Military Forces 11 [ J25 
cerned with matters of relatively pure political consultation, 
those military areas in which France continued to participate, 
the administrative oversight of non-military programs, and nego­
tiations between France and the Fourteen.79 
International leadership was important in the formation of the 
original caucus. Secretary General Brosio decided not to assume 
the Chairmanship of the Fourteen in order that he might be able 
to maintain his role as the impartial Chairman of the whole 
Council; nevertheless, he attended its meetings, almost in the 
capacity of a fifteenth member. In response to an early request 
from the Fourteen, who had originally met in the confined 
quarters of Belgian Ambassador de Staercke's office, Brosio pro­
vided them with meeting rooms, microphones, simultaneous 
translation, and other secretarial services. There were no French 
members of Brosio's office whom it might have been embarrass­
ing to exclude, and Brosio supplied a few of his people to provide 
Secretariat co-ordination. Brosio was also instrumental in up­
grading the DPC, arguing that—in order to avoid an impending 
constitutional crisis over continued French participation in the 
Council—the DPC should act as the Council in military matters. 
The core of the Fourteen comprised the governments of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.80 Consulta­
tions took place in Bonn, centering around the continued station­
ing of French troops in Germany—including for the United 
States, Ambassador George McGhee and John J. McCloy; for 
Britain, Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts; and for Germany, Min­
isters Schroeder and von Hassel. The German reply to France 
on May 3 stated that the retreat of French forces stationed in the 
Federal Republic from SACEUR affected their rights to be sta­
tioned in Germany, and that they no longer had such rights 
under the agreement of October 23, 1954. The Federal Republic 
wished to conclude with France new agreements permitting the 
maintenance of French forces on German territory if satisfactory 
arrangements could be found concerning military tasks and 
functions in the common defense.81 
The United States played a crucial role. American Ambassa­
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dor Cleveland had originally suggested the meetings of the 
Fourteen, although he emphasized the importance of leaving a 
"door open for France."82 President Johnson gave top-level 
American backing to the Fourteen and the maintenance of an 
empty seat. In his reply of March 23 to General de Gaulle, 
Johnson stated that the United States was determined to join 
with "the other 14 member nations of NATO in preserving 
the deterrent system of NATO—indeed in strengthening it in 
support of the vital common purposes of the West.' At the same 
time Johnson found it "difficult to believe that France, which 
has made a unique contribution to Western security and devel­
opment, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs 
and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally," 
Johnson said, "her place will await France whenever she decides 
to resume her leading role." 83 
The American government subsequently applied limited sanc­
tions. In its reply of April 12 to the second French aide-memoire, 
the United States informed the French that upon their with­
drawal from the jurisdiction of SACEUR, they would cease to have 
access to American stockpiles of atomic weapons in Germany. 
This was expected to affect the nuclear capabilities of the F 100 
aircraft and Nike and Honest John missiles under the two-key 
system.84 
In spite of such initial cohesion, the coalitional core seemed to 
have limited vigor over the long run. On December 21, 1966, 
French and German Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville and 
Brandt exchanged letters which confirmed the Franco-German 
agreement on the stationing of French military forces in Ger­
many, but there was no explicit mention of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.85 
Moreover, notwithstanding resistance from SACEUR, by mid­
1967 two of the core members had decided to reduce their 
Europe-based troop commitments to NATO. Beginning in Octo­
ber, 1966, representatives of the United States, United King­
dom, and Germany had been engaged in discussions centering 
around the implications of the forces stationed in Germany for 
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national balances of payments. In May, 1967, the results of the 
discussions were announced. The United States proposed to 
'redeploy'' to the United States 'up to 35,000 military person­
nel." Under a complicated scheme, two brigades of the Twenty-
fourth Infantry Division and an appropriate share of support 
units, "totalling approximately two-thirds of a United States 
division force'' would be repatriated, while at least one brigade of 
the division would remain in Germany at all times. The three 
brigades were to succeed each other in rotation for temporary 
duty in Germany and would be united there once a year for 
exercises. A similar plan provided for the rotational redeploy­
ment and annual exercise of four out of nine squadrons of the 
three tactical fighter wings based in Germany. The British gov­
ernment intended to withdraw a brigade group of 5,000 men 
from the BAOR and one air squadron. Subsequently it was re­
ported that the Belgian and Canadian governments intended to 
follow the Anglo-British example by reducing their own Ger­
man-based contingents.86 
Continuing balance of payments deficits were to be partially 
offset by a complex series of arrangements. The German govern­
ment intended "to continue procurement of military goods and 
services in the United States on a scale significant in relation to 
the German defense effort,' but did not intend to "match the 
United States foreign exchange expenditures in Germany for 
military purposes.' The Bundesbank undertook to invest $500 
million in special medium term United States Government se­
curities during the period from July, 1967, to June, 1968, and 
declared its intention ''to continue its practice of not converting 
dollars into gold." In addition the Federal Republic agreed to 
make offsetting purchases in the defense and civil sectors which 
are expected to amount in all to nearly $150 million." The 
United States Government proposed to make "an additional 
$19.6 million of military purchases in Britain between April 1, 
1967, and March 31, 1968," in order to help the British meet 
their foreign exchange costs in Germany.87 
In the following months, there were signs that even these 
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arrangements might not hold, Germany seemed to be preparing 
substantially to reduce its standing forces; and the New York 
Times issued a report, which the Department of Defense subse­
quently denied, that the United States was deploying to Viet-
Nam one American-based division, previously "earmarked" for 
NATO in case of emergency.88 
Not even the personnel complement at SHAPE was secure. 
Consolidations undertaken in 1963 and 1964 had attempted to 
trim the headquarters into firm military condition. The reloca­
tion of 1967 and French withdrawal from the command in­
volved further, undesired, losses. As for the major subordinate 
commands, General Lemnitzer announced in November, 1967 
that "organizational changes at the headquarters of Allied Forces 
Central Europe have been completed with a realization of over 
1,000 personnel economies, while at the same time increasing 
the efficiency of the structure." 89 
FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER 
In the area of military forces, interests seemed to converge 
under the conditions of the perceived Soviet threat of the late 
1940's and early 195O's: Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, 
Communist pressures on Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union's 
refusal to participate in the European recovery program, the 
formation of the Cominform, the French and Italian strikes, the 
Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin blockade, the Soviet explosion 
of an atomic device, and the North Korean attack on South 
Korea. Subsequent crises assisted in the maintenance and expan­
sion of NATO'S military structures and tasks.90 
Some apparent crisis gains, however, were wiped out during 
more routine periods when interests increasingly conflicted. 
Thus tension over access to Berlin seemed to have mainly transi­
tory effects. In 1962 British Prime Minister Wilson pointed out 
that, "when we had the (Berlin) crisis last year, there was an 
intense diplomatic activity. But once the deadline was removed, 
Western statesmen seemed to heave a sigh of relief and lose any 
sense of urgency." 91 
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General Norstad reported that, since the start of the Berlin 
crisis, the Alliance's conventional forces had grown by approxi­
mately 25 per cent.92 A large part of this gain came from the 
United States, which increased its troops in Europe from 
226,000 in 1959 to approximately 270,000 at the height of the 
Berlin build-up; but by summer 1966, the number had dropped 
to 211,000. Another part of the total Allied expansion resulted 
from German progress in filling the quota to which it had agreed 
upon entering NATO. The German government, however, did not 
feel that the Berlin situation required it to expand that 
obligation.93 As for the French, De Gaulle remained intransi­
gent. Norstad stated that during 1959 and 1960, "only nine 
squadrons of the American Air Force were trained and equipped 
to deliver atomic weapons to their targets. They represented 
NATO'S actual nuclear power at that time. They were located at 
six air fields in eastern France," Norstad continued. "We asked 
the French for permission to supply those bases with atom 
bombs. The answer was no." 9i 
Integration of military forces was ultimately blocked by the 
highly political nature of the issues involved. National military 
establishments had important implications for international pres­
tige and were the ultimate means for the defense of national 
territory and regimes. Other centrifugal tendencies that increas­
ingly effected the military force program were (1 ) the varying 
diplomatic commitments of the United States in Asia and Latin 
America, of the British east of Suez, and of the French in North 
Africa, (2) the differential vulnerability of various nations to 
specific forms of military attack according to their proximity to 
the Soviet Union, and (3) different stages of nuclear develop­
ment, in which nuclear "haves' were differentiated from nuclear 
"have-nots.1' 
Even at the economic level, which might have provided a 
technical impetus for spill-over into the diplomatic-military 
arena, the issues remained highly political. As Table 4 indicates, 
national defense expenditures represented significant shares of 
Gross National Product, ranging from 14.7 to 3.2 per cent in 
1953 and from 9.8 to 1.2 per cent in 1967. Interests diverged 
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both in terms of the expenses of providing military forces and in 
terms of foreign exchange gains and losses implied in the station­
ing of troops on foreign soil. 
TABLE 4 * 
COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN NATO COUNTRIES f 
DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
1953 1958 1962 1965 1966 1967 
United States 14.7 10.9 10.1 8.0 9.2 9.8 
Portugal 4.6 4.5 7.8 5.8 6.3 6.7 
United Kingdom 11.3 7.8 7.1 6.3 6.0 5.7 
France 11.0 7.9 7.3 5.6 5.4 5.3 
Turkey 5.4 4.5 5.9 4.3 4.4 4.6 
Federal Republic of Germany. 4.9 3.4 5.6 4.9 5.4 4.8 
Netherlands 6.2 5.0 5.0 4.3 4.1 4.0 
Greece 6.1 5.8 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.5 
Norway 
Canada 
5.6 
9.0 
4.0 
6.0 
4.1 
5.1 
3.9 
3.2 
3.7 
2.8 
3.7 
2.7 
Italy 
Belgium 
Denmark 
4.6 
5.2 
3.7 
4.3 
3.9 
3.3 
4.0 
3.7 
3.4 
2.9 
2.9 
2.6 
2.9 
2.9 
2.5 
2.9 
2.8 
2.6 
Luxembourg 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 
• This table is based on a standard definition of defense expenditure that does not necessarily cover 
the same items as national defense budgets. For example, such items as military pensions, military 
research and development, and costs of establishing strategic stockpiles are included in the above 
figures. 
t The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1966-1967 and The Military Balanci: 
1968-1969 (London, 1966, 1968). These figures include financial assistance to West Berlin. 
Any attempt to arrive at a "technical" formula for equitable 
contribution by strictly economic standards was misdirected. 
Even in the area of national capability there existed problems in 
definition and measurement involving such issues as convertibil­
ity, foreign exchange rates, internal distribution of income, ex­
emptions and allowances. Ultimately the only sanctions in such 
procedures as the Annual Review and the Force Planning Exer­
cise were normative—moral pressure and mutual criticism, and 
these failed to exercise significant influence on national 
policies.95 
NATO Armaments
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Armaments collaboration was vaguely implied by Articles 2 and 
3 of the North Adantic Treaty. Article 2 stated that the Parties 
'will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic 
policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any 
or all of them;'' Article 3 declared that the parties "separately 
and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and 
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack." 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
In November, 1949, the first NATO institution was established 
in the field of defense production, the Military Production and 
Supply Board, consisting of national delegates meeting in com­
mittee at frequent intervals. In December, 1950, the MPSB was 
replaced by a Defense Production Board, which strengthened 
the earlier committee system in two ways. First, the heads of 
national delegations were to be continuously present in London. 
Second, Mr. W. R. Herod, of the United States, was appointed 
Co-ordinator of Defense Production and placed at the head of an 
international staff.1 
Under the successive auspices of the MPSB and the DPB, a 
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series of "Task Force" studies were undertaken. Nine teams of 
senior production specialists visited NATO arms-producing coun­
tries in late 1950, conferred with national government officials, 
examined national facilities, and drew up reports recommending 
means of increasing production. The DPB recommendations 
which emerged from these studies covered ''artillery and infantry 
support weapons, tanks, transport vehicles, engineering equip­
ment, escort vessels and minesweepers, and advocated produc­
tion additional to that already planned by the countries 
themselves." 2 In early 1951 a Military Agency for Standardiza­
tion was established in London, under the Standing Group, to 
promote the standardization of operational and administrative 
practices and war material. 
With the creation of the NATO International Staff/Secretariat 
in 1952, the activities of the DPB were assumed by a Production 
Division, headed by an Assistant Secretary General. The aim 
was "'to use available resources to the best possible advantage by 
correlating the production programs of the member countries 
multilaterally at the planning stage." Production activities fell 
into three main categories: 
1. long-term production planning; 
2.	 acting as expert broker for the exchange of information, 
and guiding technical studies; 
3.	 participating in the Annual Review, which involved analy­
sis of equipment requirements and resources for current 
and future years. 
During the spring of 1954, the Council established a Defense 
Production Committee, which "was composed of production 
counsellors from each national Delegation and was attended by a 
representative of the NATO military authorities.'' Its task was to 
supervise NATO production activities and the work of the Interna­
tional Staff in this area." 
Following the Suez and Sputnik crises, the Council, meeting 
at the level of the Heads of Government in December, 1957, 
decided to undertake new and intensified efforts in the field of 
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production and logistics. The final communique emphasized the 
importance of "standardization and integration" of logistic sup­
port and defense equipment. It noted the scheduling of a minis­
terial armaments conference in 1958; called for increasing coor­
dination of Allied "research, development, and manufacture of 
modern weapons; including intermediate range ballistic mis­
siles;1' and recorded the offer of the United States to undertake 
significant sharing.4 
At the Defense Ministers' meeting the following spring, "Eu­
ropean member countries'' submitted proposals for concrete co­
operative action, which were sent to the Defense Production 
Committee for consideration. The Council then extended the 
Defense Production Committee's terms of reference to include 
problems of research and development; and the DPC'S name was 
changed to the Armaments Committee. The Council also cre­
ated a group of civilian and military representatives "from both 
national and international sources' to recommend a future 
course of action. The report of this Group resulted in the adop­
tion by the Council, in November, 1959, of a standing set of 
procedures for "the implementation of future projects for re­
search, development, and production of modern weapons and 
equipment." 5 
In 1960 the name of the relevant branch of the International 
Staff/Secretariat was changed to the Production, Logistics, and 
Infrastructure Division. Within this Division, the Armaments 
Directorate came to include a Co-ordinator for Production and 
Logistics, and sections for General Studies and Co-ordination, 
Aircraft, Equipment and Ammunition, Electronics, Missiles, and 
Naval Affairs. 
In May the Twenty Projects Exercise began. The NATO De­
fense Ministers, at their spring meeting, directed the Armaments 
Committee to draw up a select list of projects which would be 
suitable for closer co-operation in research, development, and 
production. Subsequently, "the Committee reviewed a number 
of ideas submitted by countries and by the International Staff, 
and drew up a list of projects which showed some signs of being 
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suitable for cooperative effort. . For those enterprises which 
commanded sufficient support for immediate action to be taken, 
bodies known as Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups were set up." 
More than twenty of these groups focused on a "variety of arms 
and equipment, ranging from advanced types of aircraft, missiles 
and armored fighting vehicles, data handling, night vision, 
and combat intelligence equipment." 6 
In those areas where some depth of agreement was possible, 
NATO agencies were created. In December, 1957, the Council 
had established a Panel on the Codification of Equipment; in 
April, 1958, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization 
(NAMSO) for the provision of spare parts; and in 1959 the NATO 
Hawk Production Organization and the NATO Sidewinder Pro­
gram Office. In 1960 the NATO Supply Center (NSC) was set 
up; in 1961 the NATO Starfighter Production Organization and 
a NATO Group of Experts on the Production of the Mark 44 
Torpedo; in 1962 the NATO Bullpup Production Organization 
and a NATO Steering Committee for the Production of the AS 
30 missile. 
In October, 1965, a high level committee, designated AC 253, 
under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General, James 
Roberts, was established for the purpose of reviewing NATO 
activities in arms research, development, and production as well 
as defense science. In June, 1966, the Council of Ministers 
approved the Committee's report, which called for the abolition 
of the Armaments Committee and the establishment of a new 
institutional framework. At the top of the new organizational 
pyramid was a Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD) which was expected to meet about twice a year to 
formulate high-level policy. Between meetings the National Ar­
maments Directors Representatives (NADREPS) would maintain 
continuity. Below the CNAD were three military service Arma­
ments Groups—one each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force— 
to consider military criteria, and a Defense Research Group 
focusing on co-operative research. Working groups were to be 
established in those areas where significant collaboration was 
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expected; by mid-1967 two such bodies had been formed to work 
on ground terminals for tactical satellite communications and on 
army battlefield radar.1 
Toward the end of 1967, as part of a general reorganization of 
the International Staff/Secretariat, the Production, Logistics, 
and Infrastructure Division was renamed the Defense Support 
Division. Finally, in October, 1968, it was announced that a 
NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) would be created to 
provide advice to CNAD and to represent a forum for the ex­
change of ideas and information between NATO officials and 
Allied industrialists.8 This group held its first meeting in Brus­
sels in January, 1969. 
In spite of institutional change, there was no evidence of 
substantial growth in binding procedures by the summer of 
1967. The strictures of unanimity were to some extent bypassed 
by the possibility of likeminded nations joining together in 
non-comprehensive Working Groups or NATO Production and 
Logistics Organizations (NPLO'S); but unanimity was re-enforced 
by procedures which existed both outside and within such bod­
ies. At higher levels were the former Armaments Committee and 
the new Conference of National Armaments Directors, where 
all participants had to agree in order to arrive at a decision. 
Within the NPLO'S, the Regulations for NATO Production and 
Logistics Organizations provided that "the principle of unanimity 
shall aPpty t  0 aU decisions having financial implications, 
regarding questions of general policy or concerning the approval 
of staff selections at the A.5 level and above." 9 
Moreover, NATO tasks showed little evidence of substantial 
and sustained expansion. Most NATO production programs—the 
Fiat G 91, Breguet Atlantique, and the F 104G aircraft; the 
Hawk, Sidewinder, Bullpup, and AS 30 missiles; and the Mark 
44 Torpedo—had been approved in the late 195O's and early 
1960's. In the mid-1960's these projects were approaching 
completion without agreement having been reached on Allied 
co-operation for succeeding generations. While such activities 
represented substantial budgetary outlays, the London Times 
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estimated that they were still less than 5 per cent of national 
arms budgets. Compared with the handful of weapons which 
had come under the NATO star, there remained huge and diverse 
armories which were either nationally produced for national 
procurement, or which were sold abroad under various licensing 
arrangements without formal connection with NATO. These 
ranged all the way from intercontinental ballistic missile sys­
tems to the smallest types of ammunition.10 
AUTHORITY 
Deficiencies in insititutional autonomy were complemented 
by barriers to NATO authority. Although a complicated set of 
NATO procedures grew up around the armaments program, au­
thority remained largely indirect, concentrated in the hands of 
national governments and their representatives. When NATO 
decisions were reached, nations were not enthusiastic about their 
implementation. 
The limitations in direct authority were illustrated by the 
provisions for joint arms production. The heart of the NATO 
procedure had been laid down in a series of documents, the most 
important of which was a paper approved by the Council on 
November 4, 1959, entitled "NATO Co-operation in Research, 
Development and Production of Military Equipment." n Ac­
cording to this procedure, there were nine theoretical stages 
through which a NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) 
should pass. In all of these stages, prominent roles were played 
by national governments or their representatives. 
Stage one involved research prior to the establishment of a 
requirement. Here a nation or agency of NATO was to make a 
proposal, which would be studied by other nations and the 
appropriate NATO commands and agencies to decide whether or 
not it should be accepted as an NBMR. 
In Stage two, an NBMR would be issued. The Standing 
Group, composed of national representatives, would co-ordinate 
the activities of national governments and the main NATO com­
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manders; study draft plans and decide either to reject the pro­
posal or publish it as an NBMR. 
Stages three, four, and five included studies of operational 
characteristics, studies of technical specifications, and the selec­
tion by multi-national agreement of the best solution. Ad Hoc 
Mixed Working Groups of national delegates would make deci­
sions here. The Staff/Secretariat would provide the Chairman 
and Secretarial services, and a major NATO Military Commander 
would be designated as the Project Military Advisor ( P M A )  ; but 
neither the NATO civilian or military bureaucracies would exer­
cise formal authority. 
In Stages six through nine a prototype would be manufac­
tured, there would be military testing and evaluation, production 
would take place, and the weapon would undergo operational 
trials. These would be national activities, although they might 
be carried out under NATO administrative supervision. Here 
again the Standing Group would have special responsibilities. 
The dominance of nations and the lack of direct administra­
tion inherent in this procedure was pointed out by one associated 
observer. Once NATO had approved a proposal as an NBMR, he 
said, then the control or authority of NATO as such was limited to 
the administrator and observer functions of the International 
Staff and the advisory role of the major NATO commander con­
cerned (the Project Military Advisor).12 
The reforms of AC 253 did little to downgrade the role of 
national governments. Neither SHAPE nor the International 
Staff/Secretariat received increased responsibilities. While the 
Military Committee was reduced to an advisory role, and the 
Standing Group was abolished following the French military 
withdrawal, the new armaments structures were composed 
mainly of national representatives. Moreover, nations, not NATO, 
remained the ultimate buyers of armaments. International fund­
ing existed for the salaries and wages of the civilian international 
staff and for infrastructure; in armaments there was neither a 
NATO budget nor a central NATO procurement agency. 
The NBMR procedure, drawn up in such complexity, was 
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never completely utilized. The Breguet Atlantique was the only 
project developed from its earliest stages within NATO. However 
the Atlantique predated the NBMR procedure and was less the 
result of than the inspiration for its adoption. Between 1959 and 
1966, 49 projects advanced through the early stages and were 
promulated as NBMR'S: yet none passed beyond stage five.13 No 
NBMR resulted in joint production under the NATO flag. Rather, 
the major function of the procedure seemed to be as a catalyst 
for further work outside of NATO, where seven NBMR'S were met 
or partially met by equipment built by one or more NATO mem­
bers. Of the remaining 42 NBMR'S, 23 remained under study, 
while 19 achieved no result or were allowed to lapse." 
The very limited effectiveness of NATO authority in the area of 
armaments—both outside and within the scope of the NBMR 
procedure—can be further illustrated by considering in detail 
specific cases of arms co-operation associated with NATO. 
Fiat G 91 
In 1954 a board of officers assigned to SHAPE and AFCENT 
headquarters initiated studies on an aircraft which would be 
"simple, inexpensive, but robust capable of operating in 
ground support and reconnaissance roles and also of undertaking 
certain types of interdiction and counter-air missions." 15 Allied 
aircraft industries were invited to submit aircraft design pro­
posals. Following more detailed development of the military 
requirements for the weapons system, ten designs were received 
from firms in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
In 1957 five prototypes were ready for evaluation; the Chair­
man of the NATO Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and 
Development (AGARD) appointed a committee of test pilots from 
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States to conduct flight tests and to evaluate the planes, AGARD 
specified three of these—one French and two Italian—as "most 
nearly fulfilling SHAPE'S operational requirements." AGARD s 
Chairman, Dr. Theodore Von Karman, in a private opinion, 
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recommended the Italian entry, the Fiat G 91; and SACEUR, in 
November, announced that the G 91, powered by a Bristol 
Orpheus turbojet engine, "had been adopted as the standard 
lightweight tactical strike reconnaissance aircraft for employ­
ment in the European theater of NATO." I6 
In the summer of 1958 an experimental international squad­
ron equipped with the G 91 carried out tactical tests in Italy; and 
it was planned that the trials would be moved to NATO'S Central 
European area where the experimental squadron would train 
with AFCENT forces, and would consist of pilots and ground 
crews from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Turkey. 
Subsequently forty G 91 aircraft were bought by the govern­
ments of Germany and Italy.17 
United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles 
publicly offered aid for European research and production lead­
ing to European aircraft construction; and the United States 
helped to finance the construction of various prototypes, contrib­
uting $4 million for the development of the Bristol Orpheus 
engine and $5 million for the development and construction of 
the entries of the French firms of Breguet and Dassault. In 
December, 1958, NATO announced that "in consideration of the 
orders placed by other countries, the United States will procure 
fifty G 91 Lightweight Strike fighter aircraft for deployment 
with the forces of its Allies,' but there was no public evidence 
that the United States had ever purchased any of the aircraft for 
its own use.18 
In spite of the fact that British firms had submitted designs 
and that the British Orpheus Turbojet engine was included in 
the design of all aircraft proposed for the strike fighter program, 
the United Kingdom ordered no aircraft.19 
Two French aircraft—the Breguet 1001 Taon and the Das­
sault Etendard VI—had been among the final three contenders, 
and French partisans were bitter over the ultimate selection of 
the Fiat. They claimed that the Breguet Taon had been a better 
aircraft; that there had been last-minute changes in competition 
requirements; that, since nobody had met in full the NATO 
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requirements, all three finalists should get the NATO label; and 
that the American government had provided strong pressure for 
the selection of the G 91 for reasons which had less to do with 
the military merit of the aircraft than with the political, eco­
nomic, and social situation in Italy. The French representative 
on the evaluation committee disagreed with the committee's 
report and choice; and the French government procured no G 
91's.20 
Breguet 1150 Atlantique 
Since its entry into service with the United States Navy in 
1944, the American P2V Neptune aircraft had been supplied to 
many European countries for maritime reconnaissance missions 
and anti-submarine warfare. With the postwar obsolescence of 
the P2V, the American, British, and French governments began 
studies looking toward a replacement. 
Beginning in 1956, NATO became involved in the search, and 
early in 1957 the Defense Production Committee set up a Group 
of Experts. Working with the NATO military organization, this 
Group developed technical specifications for a new aircraft. Air­
craft firms in Allied countries were requested to submit designs. 
Fifteen projects were entered in the competition, and on January 
30, 1959, the Armaments Committee declared the French Bre­
guet 1150 Atlantique the winner. Five nations—Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States—as­
sumed responsibility for the financing and supervision of the 
program. Firms from these nations and the United Kingdom 
participated in the production of various parts of the aircraft.21 
At the time the project was approved by the Armaments 
Committee, the Allies had made provisional procurement esti­
mates of between 126 and 144 aircraft—France 70, Netherlands 
20, Germany 18, Portugal 12 to 24, Norway 6, Belgium up to 6. 
Ultimately, however, a total of only sixty aircraft were produced 
for France and Germany.22 
NATO Armaments [ 141 
NBMR's 3 and 4 
In 1958 began the drafting of the military requirements for 
NATO V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) strike 
reconnaissance and tactical transport aircraft which were to be­
come NBMR'S 3 and 4. 
By June, 1961, NBMR 3 was promulgated with the estimate 
that approximately 1000 V/STOL strike reconnaissance aircraft 
would be required. On January 10, 1962, the competition was 
closed with about a dozen projects submitted by firms in France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.23 
At this point the NBMR procedure reached a standstill. "The NATO 
Committee found its task of adjudication virtually impossi­
ble because of the disputes between the various national delega­
tions. The French Government, in fact, let it be known that 
whoever won the competition, it intended to equip the Armee de 
l'Air with the Mirage m-v. According to NATO sources, the 
British Government revealed similar intentions concerning the 
Hawker P-1127." 24 Not only were the French and British reluc­
tant to honor the results of the competition, but the Germans 
hinted that they planned independent development of the VJ­
101 D, tests for which began during the same year.25 
In the case of NBMR 4 there was a similar weeding out, ending 
with a short list of two or three candidates, at which point the 
major participants declared their disinterest. 
Other Aircraft and Missile Programs 
In other programs, the NATO decision-making system was 
largely bypassed. National and sub-national actors created co-op­
erative projects outside NATO'S institutional framework which 
were later placed under the NATO flag. 
In the cases of the Hawk surface-to-air missile, the Sidewinder 
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air-to-air missile, the Mark 44 torpedo, the F 104 G Starfighter 
fighter-bomber, the Bullpup air-to-surface missile, and the M 72 
Light Anti-Tank Weapon, several Allies initially agreed to buy 
an already existing American product. The AS 30 air-to-surface 
missile endorsed by NATO was originally French. 
NATO agencies were created to supervise a variety of joint 
production and licensing arrangements; but these agencies repre­
sented little more than devices of international trade. All nations 
participating in the joint arrangements purchased the items in­
volved—a significant difference from other NATO programs. Nev­
ertheless, this accomplishment was less indicative of the author­
ity of NATO institutions over the different actors than of the fact 
that the desire to purchase had been the basis for the original 
agreements. 
Small Arms 
In 1945 the four major operational rifle calibers were the 
French 7.5 mm., the American 7.62 mm., the British 303 cal., 
and the German 7.92 mm. By September, 1951, following inde­
pendent national studies, the United States, Britain, France, 
Canada, and Belgium had agreed on the main military character­
istics for interchangeable ammunition for a standard infantry 
weapon. In December, 1953, the Council endorsed the choice of 
the five nations, the 7.62 mm. cartridge, as the NATO Common 
Round. At the end of 1954 the five signed an agreement in 
Ottawa standardizing the 7.62 mm. size for machine guns and 
rifles. Subsequently, the Belgian Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de 
Guerre designed a piece to fire 7.62 mm. ammunition, which 
was subsequently designated the standard NATO rifle.26 
The cartridge agreement was not even honored by the initial 
signatories. In June, 1964, the French decided to equip their 
army with an automatic rifle using 7.5 mm. ammunition. The 
new Belgian rifle was purchased by only four Allied govern­
ments, including Belgium, Britain, and Canada.27 Moreover dif­
ferent non-standardized versions of the 7.62 mm. rifle existed. 
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One analyst reported: "none of the standard fastenings or 
threaded parts on the inch version of the 7.62 rifle are inter­
changeable with the meter version. Nor, in fact, are the maga­
zines interchangeable." 28 
Codification 
The NATO Codification System was ''a classification and identi­
fication process (including a standard set of names and a series 
of thirteen digit numbers) that all signatories of the North 
Atlantic Treaty agreed to use in identifying their military 
equipment, particularly that equipment used by two or more 
countries or purchased by one or more countries from one 
another." 29 
Between 1952 and 1956, working groups of the Military 
Agency for Standardization drafted two agreements (STANAG 
3150 and STANAG 3151), which established a uniform system of 
supply classification and item identification for Allied material. 
In addition, they recommended the creation of a NATO Panel on 
the Codification of Equipment for co-ordination and the estab­
lishment of rules for the application of the system. In January, 
1957, the two STANAG'S were promulgated; and in December the 
Council approved the establishment of the Panel, which was to 
be composed of the heads of national codification agencies or 
their representatives. A small secretariat was created in the Pro­
duction and Logistics Division of the Staff/Secretariat to service 
the Panel. In 1960 the first European Symposium on NATO 
Codification was held in The Hague.30 
Under the terms of the STANAG'S, the United States Federal 
Systems of Supply Classification and Item Identification were 
adopted as the bases for the NATO systems. All signatories agreed 
to use the two systems, although the method and rate of applica­
tion were to remain matters for national discretion. 
The agreements were ratified by Germany on June 26, 1957; 
by France on November 19, 1959; by the United States on 
March 18, 1960; and by the United Kingdom on January 9, 
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TABLE S 
PER CENT OF CODIFIED ITEMS AMONG

NATO MEMBERS BY DECEMBER, 1951 *

Per Cent 
United States 100.0 
United Kingdom 70.0 
Canada 67.5 
Italy 45.5 
Germany 43.7 
Netherlands 28.0 
Denmark 19.8 
Belgium 18.2 
Norway 18.0 
France 13.0 
Greece 00.0 
Portugal 00.0 
• North Atlantic rcom­ Treaty Organization Manual of Decisions and Rea
mendations: Panel on Codification of Equipment, Part IV (Paris, 1961). 
1961.31 Nevertheless, by the end of 1961, national implementa­
tion remained highly uneven. Table 5 shows that full implemen­
tation occurred only in the United States, the country whose 
national system was the basis for the NATO arrangement. 
LEGITIMACY 
Such weakness in NATO authority went together with a pat­
tern of legitimacy in which actors increasingly supported NATO 
programs only as they promised expediential benefits. 
United States 
During the early years of NATO, the United States supplied its 
Allies with grant aid in military equipment under the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Acts of 
the early 195O's. By 1958, according to one estimate, over half 
the heavy equipment in use by the Europeans had come from 
the United States or Canada; and one phase of American aid, 
Off-Shore Procurement, had been used to finance the building, 
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in European facilities, of equipment to be distributed to the 
Allies.32 
To co-ordinate this effort, the United States government ini­
tially favored strengthening NATO'S position in the field of arma­
ments. In December, 1950, the London Financial Times re­
ported that "Mr. Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of 
State, envisages the appointment as Chairman of the (Defense 
Production) Board, of a production specialist with powers in the 
economic field parallel to the military powers of General 
Eisenhower." 33 
Table 6 shows, however, that American assistance to the 
Allies declined with the passage of time. Faced with balance of 
payments problems, policy-makers in the Departments of the 
Treasury, Defense, and State came to favor increasing European 
defense contributions. Representatives of the American aircraft 
industry supported the trend by arguing that financial aid should 
be reserved for those nations which bought or produced Ameri­
can aircraft.34 
The Atlantic arms market offered an attractive opportunity for 
American contracts. The military equipment which the United 
States had provided under the original aid program was used and 
approaching obsolescence; German rearmament was in full 
swing. 
Thus the United States switched its position from the 'patron 
saint of the mid-195O's to most-active competitor of the early 
1960's.' One of the earliest indications of the American shift 
was a sudden reversal of American policy in July, 1958, which 
allowed American firms to enter bids in the terminal stages of 
the design competition for a NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft.35 
Although it was initiated under the Eisenhower administra­
tion, the American military sales program took on a special 
intensity with the advent of President Kennedy, the main impe­
tus coming from the Department of Defense. In 1962, Secretary 
of Defense McNamara publicly announced the establishment of 
a formal program to increase military exports, and foresaw that 
approximately three-fourths of the sales market might be found 
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in Europe.36 The foreign sales results, which represented a "600 
per cent increase in annual military sales over the levels of the 
195O's," 37 are presented in Table 7. 
The Defense Department program sought to mix military 
sales with the Alliance in a combination which left some doubt 
as to which was more important. At a meeting of the Committee 
on Military Exports of the Defense Industry Advisory Commit­
tee (a liaison group with private industry sponsored by the DOD), 
the program's director, Henry Kuss, defined the American objec­
tive: "Win the Game in Europe by Managing Problems, Organ­
izing Sales Effort." He called for a collective effort to maximize 
American sales to $60 billion in the next ten years.38 
On May 30, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara hinted at 
a less aggressive posture by proposing the creation of a "NATO 
wide common market in defense products at competitive prices.'' 
This proposal implied that the United States might be willing to 
waive the 50 per cent price differential imposed on offshore 
procurements for American use.39 
Any European hopes for substantial change, however, were 
probably dampened by a news conference in September. Here 
Secretary McNamara justified the sales program and implied its 
continuance by stating that it "provides the United States with 
the opportunity to influence the size and composition of our 
Allies' military forces and the proportionate distribution of their 
manpower and economic resources between defense efforts and 
other high priority programs of social and economic progress." 40 
The continued sales emphasis of the new common market 
perspective was made more explicit in the edition of Military 
Export Guide dated October 30, 1965, which quoted Henry 
Kuss. Looking ahead in the period 1965-75, Kuss predicted that 
American allies would purchase a minimum of $10—15 billion in 
military requirements from the United States, that over $5 bil­
lion in combined American and allied requirements would be 
handled through international production and development pro­
grams, and that all this was to be the result of the "common 
market approach." 41 
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In connection with the American shift from an aid to a sales 
policy, the United States government supported specific NATO 
projects involving joint Allied production of American weapons 
systems: the F 104 G aircraft; the Hawk, Sidewinder, and 
Bullpup missiles; the Mark 44 Torpedo, and the M 72 Light 
Anti-Tank Weapon. 
On the one hand, Table 8 indicates that the United States 
TABLE 
NATO JOINT PRODUCTION PROGRAMS 
U.S.	 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS * 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Value of U.S. Government 
Program Program Contribution 
F 104 G 1,500 40 
Hawk 660 134 
Sidewinder 40 9 
Bullpup 30 8 
Mark 44 20 2 
* Henry J. Kuss, Jr., "A NATO Common Defense Market," Defense Indus­
try Bulletin (November, 1965). For slightly different figures, see Rhodes James, 
pp. 14-19. 
acted in accordance with its earlier policy by providing financial 
assistance for these American projects which came under the 
NATO flag. It also offered other types of benefits, as in the case of 
the Hawk consortium where "Americans supplied technical as­
sistance, testing equipment, and valuable engineering drawings. 
The United States provided funds for equipment, waived reim­
bursement for R & D expenditures, and agreed to pay license 
fees and royalties. The United States also pledged itself to 
purchase some of the product for distribution as military assist­
ance to other European countries." 42 
Nevertheless, the United States government used such bene­
fices as devices to attract buyers from rival products. Although 
exact figures are not available for all projects, it is likely that 
United States industry recouped the original contribution 
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through provision of related goods and services to those Allies 
who purchased particular NATO weapons systems. In the case of 
the F 104 G, one estimate placed total American revenue from 
license fees and sale of parts at approximately $1.15 billion.43 
Even this figure may have been too low, since it possibly ex­
cluded West German payments to the United States for the 
training of F 104 G pilots at Air Force bases in Arizona and 
Texas, at an estimated cost of $46 million for fiscal year 
1964/1965 and $16 million for each subsequent year.44 Ameri­
can support for the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization 
and the NATO Supply Center can be viewed in the same expe­
diential light. In 1959 Brigadier General Charles A. Helm, 
General Manager of NAMSO, announced the signing of a $25 
million loan "in the form of a sales agreement between the 
United States and the Agency.'' Following the formal agreement 
establishing the NSC, the United States and German govern­
ments offered to provide "a spare parts inventory package of an 
approximate value of $40 million." In both cases, the United 
States could reasonably hope for the return of its investment 
through Allied purchases of spare parts for American equip­
ment.45 
On occasion the United States purchased end products of 
pooled production for distribution to its Allies under the Mili­
tary Assistance Program. Nevertheless, the American govern­
ment never bought a product of NATO pooled production for the 
use of its own forces,46 preferring purely American equipment. 
At the domestic level, the two major American groups which 
took an interest in NATO armaments and logistics were industrial­
ists and legislators. In neither case were there apparent gains in 
legitimacy for NATO. 
As part of the new sales drive, the American government 
attempted to strengthen the ties between American industrial 
representatives in Europe and the United States delegation to 
NATO. In August, 1963, a Defense Industry Export Advisory 
Group in Europe (DIEAGE) came into being, including approxi­
mately equal numbers of industrial and government members. 
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Its charter was provided by a directive from the Department of 
Defense and gave priority to export selling. It stated: 
The Mission of the U.S. Defense/Industry Export Advisory 
Group in Europe is to provide: 
A. U.S. Defense	 representatives in Europe a forum for con­
sulting with representatives of American industry in Europe 
for the purpose of promoting 1) military export sales of 
U.S. produced material, and 2) cooperative logistics in 
Europe (including defense research, development, and 
production). 
B.	 U.S. defense industry representatives in Europe with a 
forum for discussing directly with U.S. Defense representa­
tives their problems, suggestions for mutual improvement 
of objectives, and any criticism attendant to prescribed 
logistics management policies and practices as they affect 
U.S. defense industry. 
C.	 The Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants with 
a medium for assessing I) mutual progress in the develop­
ment of military export sales in Europe, and 2) recommen­
dations for expanding and improving this effort.47 
A directive from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 
April 9, 1966, removed the word "Export'' from the group's title, 
and deleted references to sales from its charter. Nevertheless, 
participants believed that the fundamental character of the new 
DIAGE would remain the same. With the basic interest of in­
dustrial representatives in sales, no group which sought to pro­
vide liaison between them and the Department of Defense could 
avoid focusing on exports. 
In any case, American manufacturers were not enchanted 
with NATO'S approach to business. The Military Export Guide 
for 1965 stated that "most United States contractors do not 
hold 'NATO business' in high esteem. The red tape, cumbersome 
budget processes, security problems, and resulting low profit 
yields are multiplied several times over those of doing business 
with the United States Government. In addition, jockeying by 
NATO governments to favor their country industries have 'soured' 
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some contractors and made them reluctant to make large expend­
itures in money and effort processing 'NATO contracts.' " 48 
Interest by legislators was shown through occasional reports 
by Congressional committees dealing with NATO armaments and 
logistics. In May, 1963, the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
released a report on the activities of NAMSO criticizing the fact 
that SHAPE lacked the authority to see that its recommendations 
were carried out. In June, 1965, a Republican Congressional 
Fact Finding Commission recommended that there be closer 
co-ordination of effort in establishing common criteria of military 
procurement, in cost sharing, and in joint utilization of scientific 
and technological resources. In January, 1967, a staff study of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that, "in 
Europe, American arms salesmanship has often been zealous to 
the point of irritation." 49 
Nevertheless, such interest did not lead to effective support 
for concrete innovations in NATO armaments and logistics. 
United Kingdom 
British collaboration in NATO armaments programs was ex­
tremely limited. The United Kingdom was a full member only 
in the Bullpup and AS 30 programs. In the case of the Breguet 
Atlantique, the British participated in the group which formu­
lated the military requirement; Rolls Royce supplied the engine 
and De Havilland the propellers. Nevertheless, the British gov­
ernment did not purchase any of the aircraft. The Mark 44 
torpedo was produced in and purchased by the United King­
dom, but under separate arrangements with the United States. 
In other cases such as the Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance 
aircraft and NBMR'S 3 and 4, Britain refused to purchase other 
nations' designs following the failure of British firms to win 
NATO competitions.50 
Britain's inability to use NATO armaments, as the U.S. had 
done, to combat balance of payments problems, led to a decline 
in support for the program as a whole. British leaders in the late 
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195O's had been relatively enthusiastic supporters of NATO arms 
co-operation. In April, 1958, Duncan Sandys presented a meet­
ing of the NATO Defense Ministers with a long list of projects for 
common production—including light submarines, antisubma­
rine warfare devices, mines and torpedoes, surface-to-air and sur­
face-to-surface missiles, light and medium tanks, antitank mis­
siles, supersonic jet aircraft, electronic equipment for radar, and 
a new machine gun capable of sustained fire. Two years later 
Defense Minister Watkinson suggested to the Defense Minis­
ters that a renewed attempt at arms co-operation be focused on a 
more limited number of areas. While not all of these projects 
were to be produced by the United Kingdom, the Times esti­
mated that Sandys' proposals were in part a response to a move­
ment during this period toward Franco-German-Italian co-opera­
tion on armaments; and the Guardian assessed Watkinson's pol­
icy as an attempt "to limit the coming American drive to have a 
new series of American weapons adopted by NATO." 51 
The Labour Government which took power in 1964 was 
increasingly critical of American salesmanship in the NATO 
arena. Prime Minister Wilson, addressing the Ministerial Meet­
ing in May, 1965, stated that the closest Allied co-operation and 
partnership in defense production were required. At the same 
time he said that trust and interdependence were not compatible 
with high pressure salesmanship nor "subordination to individ­
ual national industries." 52 
In December, 1965, the government published the Plowden 
Report on the condition of the British aircraft industry. The 
conclusions and recommendations of this Report pointed to an 
emphasis on European at the expense of Atlantic collaboration. 
While there might be instances of ad hoc British-American 
co-operation, particularly on large and complex projects, the 
Plowden Committee did not feel that there was "real prospect of 
a comprehensive program on aircraft development with the 
United States.' The same was true for missiles. The United 
States did not need Britain and was less interested in co-opera­
tion than in competition. Present and immediate priority should 
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be given to the creation of a European aircraft industry in a 
European common market, centered around British-French col­
laboration, with strong German links. At a later stage there 
might possibly be "partnership'' between European and Ameri­
can industry in an Atlantic market. Finally, to match the strong 
arms sales program focused around the American Departments 
of Defense and State, powerful British and European sales ma­
chinery was required.53 
The Government's Defense White Paper of 1966 generally 
supported these conclusions of the Plowden Committee. It regis­
tered disillusionment with NATO, noting that "progress in multi­
lateral development has so far been disappointing." It stated that 
"the immense resources of the United States make it difficult for 
us to find projects of mutual benefit," and that the advantages of 
collaboration with Allies whose resources are more comparable to 
our own are obvious." Finally it pointed to specific instances of 
bilateral European (Anglo-French and Anglo-Dutch) co-opera­
tion—on an air-to-surface missile (AJ 168), a light strike trainer 
(the Jaguar), a variable geometry aircraft, and a three-dimen­
sional surveillance radar—as models for the future.54 
The previous July, Prime Minister Wilson had told Commons 
that the Government intended to imitate the American office of 
International Logistics Negotiations, headed by Henry Kuss, 
and to establish its own office of Defense Sales, under Raymond 
Brown. Wilson presented this action as a response to the aggres­
sive American policy. "There is a strong desire," he explained, 
"that we should make more effective arrangements in placing 
British arms, particularly with our allies, because, as I said in my 
speech to the NATO conference, one of the things that have 
unbalanced the situation in the alliance was the high-pressure 
salesmanship of the Americans—as we found when trying to sell 
arms to France and Italy.55 
The major British domestic group concerned with the NATO 
armaments program was the aerospace industry. From the Bre­
guet Atlantique, Rolls Royce had received an estimated £10 
million in orders, while £2 million went to De Havilland.56 In 
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spite of these gains, the failure of NBMR'S 3 and 4 to progress 
beyond the stage of preliminary evaluation had a negative effect 
on the aerospace perspective. In order to enter the competition 
firms had undertaken substantial expenses estimated as high as 
£100,000 in some cases. When there was no authoritative out­
come, airframe and engine companies lost interest in the NATO 
arena. While representatives would periodically visit such focal 
points as the British delegation and SHAPE, they were less hope­
ful of selling their product than they were interested in getting 
wind of developing consensus in the European arms market. In 
any case the major industrial sales effort, intelligence, and plan­
ning continued to center around the British government. 
The Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC), opposed 
the recommendations of the Plowden Report. Nevertheless, it 
seemed to maintain the anti-Atlantic focus of the Plowden Com­
mittee, while preferring national efforts to European co-opera­
tion where possible. The SBAC criticized the Plowden Commit­
tee's implication that Britain should buy the largest and most 
complex aircraft from the United States under license, suggest­
ing that, instead, such items could form the basis for joint 
European programs. Collaboration with Europe in other areas, 
however, should be tempered with sustained national research 
and development programs and Commonwealth collaboration.57 
Although the SBAC proposed that a European purchasing 
agency be established for NATO, the first element of the equation 
was substantially more important than the second. This became 
clear a few months later when W. T. Gill, SBAC President, 
pointed to the very limited success of NATO armaments programs 
because of American domination, and called for European aero­
space co-operation in the frame of a European defense organiza-
Gei
'many 
German purchases, as Table 9 demonstrates, provided the 
backbone of the NATO armaments program. The government of 
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the Federal Republic bought over 200 Fiat G 91's and 600 F 104 
G's. It accounted for more than half the orders for the Breguet 
Atlantique, at an estimated cost of approximately 400 million 
DM. It participated in the NATO Hawk, Sidewinder, and AS 30 
programs, and conducted portions of its spare parts procurement 
through NAMSO and the NSC.59 
Nevertheless, there were signs of decreasing German support 
for NATO armaments and logistics. During the 1960's large-scale 
TABLE 9 
NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON NATO PROCUREMENT OF BREGUET

ATLANTIQUE, HAWK, SIDEWINDER, F 104 G, BULLPUP *

(In Millions of Dollars)

Country 1960 t 1961 t 1962 t 19631 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
Netherlands 
175.52 
20 t 
70.87 
35.60 
397.07 
38.30 
575.00 
86.90 
Italy 
Belgium 
France 
United Kingdom 
20.00 
7.4 
in 
36.00 
14.94 
17 | 
42.40 
38.94 
26 J 
1.87 
57.60 
50.22 
39 t 
5.65 
United States 
• Joint Production of Armaments, Doc. No. 304 (Paris: Western European Union, February 26, 
1964), p. 13.
t Fiscal years 1960, etc., signify 1960/61, etc., for countries whose fiscal years do not correspond to
calendar years.
X Secretariat estimate. 
German rearmament seemed to be drawing to a close, and Ger­
man policy became less oriented toward the continuance of 
large-scale procurement efforts than to the maintenance of exist­
ing equipment. If there was to be procurement, then the Ger­
mans wished it to be in areas of the most advanced technology 
—such as computers and space.60 In part German participation 
had been the result of American pressures for payments offset­
ting the foreign exchange costs of American troops in Germany. 
Purchases of American equipment, even under the NATO label, 
helped to fulfil German offset obligations. Increasing German 
resistance to these American demands represented the with­
NATO Armaments [ 157 
drawal of a powerful program support. Furthermore, it appeared 
that German purchase of American equipment in the NATO 
context might bring with it unwelcome military pressures. 
When American Secretary of Defense McNamara reportedly 
suggested that German F 104 G Starfighters gradually phase 
their nuclear role into a more conventional one, German De­
fense minister von Hassel replied that "there are reasons of 
weight that cause us to assign only nuclear missions to the 
Starfighter fighter-bombers." 61 
Although little evidence on national positions in particular 
negotiations is available, it is probable that NATO'S failure to 
initiate new armaments programs in the mid-1960's was partly 
the result of mounting German reluctance. During the course of 
1961 the West German government decided to issue its own 
military aircraft requirements, independently of NATO, for the 
first time since the end of the war.62 An increasingly cynical 
attitude toward Germany's Allies was indicated by such remarks 
as that of Dr. Benecke, President of the Federal Office for 
Military Technology and Procurement who stated that the Al­
lies all wanted Germany's best—they wanted her money ("Sie 
wollen alle unser Bestes—sie wollen unser Geld").63 
At the domestic level, the NATO armaments program seemed to 
produce little tangible German support for NATO; rather it pro­
vided a useful stick with which various forms of opposition could 
strike at their political opponents. 
The early NATO projects presented the opportunity for the 
German aircraft industry to rebuild and to catch up with its 
more advanced Allies in modern military technology.64 Hans-
Georg Schulze, Press Officer for the Federal Association of Ger­
man Aerospace Industries, stated in 1961 that the Fiat G 91 and 
the F 104 G were "sufficient to occupy all the rebuilt larger plane 
factories." In the case of the F 104 G the German government 
accepted some financial losses in its ratio of contracts to contribu­
tions in order to entice Belgium and the Netherlands to partici­
pate, because Germany had insufficient domestic capacity to 
undertake a larger share of the project itself.65 
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However, the German aerospace industry, once rebuilt, 
tended to be less enthusiastic about the type of co-operation 
which NATO represented. In the first place, the later NATO pro­
jects involved production under license of American products, 
while German firms were more interested in co-operative re­
search and development which would provide them with infor­
mation and training in the latest technology and the opportunity 
for a more competitive position in the international market. 
Second, some industrial representatives felt that their access to 
such NATO centers as SHAPE was limited by the fact that German 
military officers, sensitive to the legacy of the war, made special 
efforts to appear "integrated." 
Although the NATO armaments program did not appear to 
have a significant impact on the German political community at 
large, the misfortunes of one of its products—the F 104 G—pro­
vided the opportunity for opposition attacks upon the German 
political establishment. Between 1961 and March 1966, the F 
104 G had been involved in 51 crashes involving 27 dead. On 
March 24, 1966, Karl Wienand (SPD) criticized the Defense 
Ministry for failures in planning and management; and SPD 
members called for von Hassel's resignation during the Bundes­
tag debate. In the autumn the Inspector General of the Luft­
waffe, Lieutenant General Werner Panitzki accused von Hassel 
of radically changing Panitzki's report on the F 104 G crashes 
before passing it on to the Bundestag Armed Services Commit­
tee. These events were part of the pattern of forces which led to 
Kiesinger's replacement of Erhard as Chancellor and von Has­
sel's loss of his position as Defense Minister.66 
France 
French policy toward the NATO armaments program reflected 
an increasing disillusionment with and skepticism about the 
value of the program to French interests. In the case of the 
competition for the lightweight reconnaissance strike aircraft, 
France placed Breguet and Dassault aircraft in the final round of 
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competition, only to see the award go to the Italian Fiat G 91. 
When the Breguet 1150 Atlantique was later chosen as the 
NATO Maritime Patrol aircraft, Germany and the Netherlands 
were the only buyers. Defense Minister Messmer expressed 
French frustration on the occasion of the delivery of the first 
Atlantique to Germany. The French had been disappointed, he 
said by the "scarcity of orders, forty by France and twenty by 
Germany." The Atlantique "has not fulfilled all our hopes," he 
continued. "We shall in the future remember the results of this 
experience." 6T The pattern was the same in other aircraft pro­
grams. The F 104 G was purchased by the Allies instead of the 
Mirage III, resulting in bitter French memories. In spite of 
reaching the final rounds of the competition for NBMR'S 3 and 4, 
French aircraft did not ultimately receive the NATO label.68 
In two other programs where France participated the results 
were mixed. The Hawk program appeared to be relatively suc­
cessful. Here the French military received a product which it 
considered to be superior; moreover, there were substantial in­
dustrial savings in addition to the educational advantages gained 
from participation in the program. The Mark 44, on the other 
hand, was less satisfactory, since the French were unhappy not 
only about delays in delivery, but also ultimately about the 
performance of the torpedo itself. 
As for domestic support, the aerospace industry was perhaps 
more heavily dependent on the national government in France 
than in the other major Allied nations. A large number of firms 
—including Nord-Aviation, Sud-Aviation, SNECMA, SEREB— 
were nationally owned.69 Other firms, like Breguet and Dassault, 
were heavily dependent on government financing and contracts. 
The experience of Dassault in the competition for the NATO 
Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft, the F 104 G, and 
NBMR'S 3 and 4—and that of Breguet, especially with regard to 
the Atlantique—could have done little to increase the legitimacy 
of NATO in their eyes. 
Rather than increased NATO activities, officials like General 
Louis Bonte, chairman of the French National Committee for 
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the Expansion of the Aeronautical Industry called for aerospace 
industry mergers or "concentration' to compete with the Ameri­
can invasion of European markets and for "international collabo­
ration" on a European level, especially with the United King­
dom.™ 
LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
The low level of integration in NATO armaments occurred in 
spite of ideological advocacy by NATO leaders, SACEUR provided 
the greater share of leadership for arms co-operation, but NATO'S 
Secretaries General also contributed strongly in the promulga­
tion of an ideology which blended general abstract goals and 
specific concrete suggestions. The leadership endorsed arms col­
laboration for political, military, economic, and social reasons; 
and it particularly supported standardization and joint produc­
tion programs. The appeal of this ideology, however, seemed to 
diminish as the quest for national competitive advantage re­
placed a mood of sacrifice for shared objectives. 
At the highest level, General Eisenhower set the tone for the 
ensuing argument by defining the rearmament task in terms of 
''an integrated military, economic, and financial effort." General 
Gruenther called on the NATO countries "to establish on a long 
term basis that balance between military, economic, and social 
factors which will make us reasonably secure both from external 
attack by an aggressor and from internal disintegration resulting 
from poverty and discouragement.'' General Lemnitzer praised 
NATO'S armaments programs for their utility "both in reducing 
cost to the nations and the Alliance, and in promoting military 
effectiveness." The broadest and most eloquent appeal was made 
by Secretary General Spaak. In the face of the challenge of 
peaceful coexistence, Spaak called on the Allies to develop a 
"true Atlantic Community" with political, military, and eco­
nomic elements.71 
More specifically, successive SACEUR'S gave the greatest weight 
to military arguments for arms co-operation. Here they used the 
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same kinds of terms which had supported the military force 
program to justify their demands for additional military equip­
ment. General Eisenhower's first annual report as SACEUR in 
1952 pointed to the task of "forging the weapons" as part of the 
solution to the military problem posed by the Soviet Union and 
called on the North Atlantic Treaty nations to contribute the 
necessary equipment to the common defense. A year later Gen­
eral Ridgway was still concerned about the military implications 
of "major deficiencies in arms and equipment, logistical 
establishments, stacks of ammunition, and above all, in planes." 
In November, 1953, General Gruenther emphasized that 'we 
still do not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out Russian 
attack,'' and called for a top priority program of air force develop­
ment.72 General Norstad told a press conference in 1959 that the 
most important aspect of the minimum force plan, MC 70, was 
its call for new weapons. 
I am asking for a great deal in the field of weapons. We have 
worked out what we call a minimum force concept, and it is 
truly a minimum force from the standpoint of the number of 
units. But the cost of that, price of that, is new weapons. New 
weapons. So we may have a program, and it's our new plan 
which has been approved by the NATO countries, being worked 
on now, (which) carries us up to 1963. It can be called a new 
weapons plan.73 
General Lemnitzer subsequently pointed to the need to bolster 
military security through "increases in weapons and equipment 
and more modernization." 74 
A major recurring theme in these declarations was the need 
for improved weapons, and one of the chief obstacles to this goal 
was the lack of standardization. The WEU'S Committee on De­
fense Questions and Armaments noted that "Generals 
Gruenther, Norstad, and Lemnitzer have continually drawn the 
attention of our Committee to the impossibility of taking effec­
tive action on the central front with troops from seven different 
countries with different weapons systems and logistics." 75 If 
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identical equipment could not be obtained, then SACEUR at least 
wished to have inter-operability. General Lemnitzer explained 
that "the effects of standardization can be obtained to a consider­
able extent without resorting to uniformity of weapons and 
equipment if we do everything possible to achieve compatibility 
in the supplies they require." 76 
Finally, later SACEUR'S supported the institutions and projects 
which came to comprise the NATO joint production program. As 
Air Deputy to the first three SACEUR'S, General Norstad pushed 
hard for a light jet fighter to provide close support of ground 
troops; and it was during his own term of office that the competi­
tion for the Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft and the 
selection of the Fiat G 91 took place. He called the joint produc­
tion of the Hawk and Sidewinder missiles a very constructive 
and forward step." Norstad was also a strong proponent of 
V/STOL aircraft such as were embodied in the abortive NBMR'S 3 
and 4, ''and he pressed for an aircraft that would take off in 
three, five, six hundred feet, or something like that; so that if you 
don't go straight up, you will go something like this (gestures 
with hand).'' His successor General Lemnitzer cited NAMSO, the 
F 104 G Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Hawk programs as examples 
of useful arms co-operation." 
Successive Secretaries General gave greater emphasis to the 
economic necessity for collaboration, especially in the area of 
joint arms production. Lord Ismay noted in his autobiography 
that when he took office, NATO'S military arrangements were 
usually all right, but that there was a "lack of direction'' in the 
fields of economics and production, which he tried to improve. 
Spaak underlined the exhorbitant costs of independent national 
efforts, warning that if each nation was forced to reinvest and 
reproduce what already existed in other Western countries, then 
the West would "be compelled one day to choose between the 
washing machine and the Sputnik; as it is intrinsically impossi­
ble in our democracy to sacrifice the washing machine, we shall 
be compelled to sacrifice our economic research and scientific 
progress and we shall all gradually dwindle to the status of 
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secondary powers.'' Stikker pointed to the 'widely accepted view 
that integrated production of arms within the Western Alliance 
could effect notable economies while improving the capabilities 
and efficiency of Western defense, NATO has achieved something 
in this field," he said, "but far less than I believe is possible or 
wise.'' Manlio Brosio called for a 'more balanced distribution of 
armaments production between the United States and Europe." 
"On such action," he said, "not only the fate of the European 
armaments industry but also, and above all, the progress of 
science, research, and European industry in general is 
dependent." 78 
The specific pattern of sacrifice implied by this ideology was 
one in which—initially—the greatest arms benefits seemed to go 
to the Europeans and the greatest burdens to the United States. 
During 1951, General Eisenhower justified this distribution in 
terms of a trade-off through which the United States would 
supply munitions and equipment while the Europeans would 
provide the bulk of the military forces. He told Congress that, 
"while the transfer to Europe of American military units is 
essential, our major and special contribution should be in the 
field of munitions and equipment.' Comparing the situation 
with the dark days of World War II, he stated that, "it took a 
rifle and a man to go out and advance the cause of the Allies 
against the enemies we had. If the United States could provide 
merely the rifle and get someone else to carry it in order to do 
the work that was necessary, I was perfectly content. I believe in 
this thinking," he added, 'particularly today.'' Even if the trade-
off did not proceed evenly at once, the United States was still 
required to do its duty. "Each of us must do his part," Eisen­
hower said "We cannot delay, nationally or individually, while 
we suspiciously scrutinize the sacrifices made by our neighbor, 
and, through a weaseling logic, seek someway to avoid our own 
duties." 79 
By 1952, however, Eisenhower recognized that this distribu­
tion of labor could not last forever. He supported the recommen­
dations of the Temporary Council Commiteee "for a more 
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efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable 
sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program.1' In 
strong language, he said that "Europe must become self-sustain­
ing in military manufactures at the earliest possible 
date. America cannot continue to be the primary source of 
munitions for the entire free world!" 80 
Later Supreme Commanders continued to call for American 
donations. General Norstad told the House Appropriations Com­
mittee in 1961 that "the need for the Military Assistance Pro­
gram remains very real. By the new weapons it supplies, by 
providing equipment and training where they are most needed, 
by the various cost-sharing projects in which it participates, the 
Military Assistance Program, in this crucial year, is making its 
own vital contribution to NATO security." General Lemnitzer 
brought the Committee the same message in 1967. "I continue 
to be a strong supporter of the military assistance program," he 
said. "With regard to Europe in particular, it has helped to 
create deterrent forces among our allies—deterrent forces that 
have played a key part in maintaining peace and security, and in 
preventing any Communist military 'adventures' in that part of 
the world."81 
Nevertheless, by 1967, the Supreme Commander admitted 
the legitimacy of the United States "major sales programs' in 
more developed European countries such as the United King­
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Only in cases like 
those of Greece and Turkey, relatively less economically devel­
oped and strategically vital "on the critical southeast flank of 
NATO," was there still a plea for "major grant aid programs." m 
NATO armaments programs implied contributions and ulti­
mately resistance not only from the United States, but increas­
ingly from those European clients who were developing their 
own advanced armaments establishments. "Replying to a ques­
tion once put to him, General Norstad stated that the three 
insurmountable obstacles to the joint production of armaments 
were first the United States, second the United Kingdom, and 
finally France. On a later occasion, he added that if the same 
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question were put to him today he would reply that the obstacles 
had since multiplied." 83 
DECISION MAKING 
The leadership's efforts to promote Allied armaments activities 
relied to some extent on decision-making structures that in­
cluded independent technical experts. Nevertheless, such at­
tempts remained frustrated by the delegates of national govern­
ments, who followed instructions from their home capitals. 
Over the years, NATO leaders sponsored the work of agencies 
which combined expertise and independence in differing degree. 
Thus in his first annual report, General Eisenhower praised the 
work of the Defense Production Board Task Forces and the 
Temporary Council Committee for revealing the "true dimen­
sions of the rearmament task" and providing an impetus for a 
"more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense pro­
gram." Under SACEUR'S leadership AGARD contributed to the 
selection of the Fiat G 91, and the SHAPE Air Defense Technical 
Center helped to integrate jointly produced aircraft and missiles 
into an effective military force.84 
Yet such bodies had limited effect. Even the most important 
of them, the International Staff/Secretariat, seemed peripheral. 
There were indications that, under the tenure of Assistant Secre­
tary General for Production and Logistics Ernest H. Meili 
(U.S.), between November, 1957, and June, 1959, the Interna­
tional Staff exercised more influence than during other periods. 
In particular the initiation of the Hawk project was laid to 
Meili's efforts by European officials who claimed that he had 
visited European capitols and convinced originally skeptical de­
fense personnel. During this period members of the Staff were 
particularly conscious of their catalytic role in producing agree­
ment among the national delegates. Thus the Assistant for Mis­
sile Production in the Production and Logistics Division stated 
that "the Missile Section acts as a focal point and a catalyst "in 
166 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
getting agreement on a given program through negotiation and 
compromise.' At the same time he was careful to note that the 
International Staff had "only the power of persuasion" and that 
its members required "infinite patience." 85 
By 1967 individuals on the International Staff no longer 
seemed to feel that persuasion and patience tended to pay the 
same kind of dividends, but rather that the Staff had relatively 
little influence on nations. The Staff's intermediary role also 
appeared quite limited. It provided Chairmen for the meetings 
of the Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups, the most active ele­
ments of the old NATO armaments structure, only when specifi­
cally requested; normally these bodies were chaired by national 
representatives. The Staff made no formal recommendations, but 
rather exercised such influence as possible through informal 
communication and secretarial types of services. Staff members 
had no official contact with representatives of private industry, 
and the NATO Production and Logistic Organizations were quite 
independent of them. 
Other institutions represented countervailing tendenies. 
Some of them—the Military Committee, the Standing Group, 
SHAPE, NATO military commands—carried over into the field of 
armaments the same forces of national instruction which existed 
in the area of military forces. The more specialized and civilian 
institutions were no better. Vandevanter describes how decision-
making control had begun and ended with the dominance of 
national delegates. 
By the mid-1950's NATO nations were greatly disillusioned 
about the future of coordinated defense production. The organi­
zational structure had progressed through the following stages: 
1) a very loose collection of individual, uncoordinated, national 
representatives (the Military Production and Supply Board); 
2) a presumably powerful, but actually relatively impotent, 
Coordinator for Defense Production; 3) a prestigious but still 
powerless Assistant Secretary General for Production and 
Logistics of the International Staff aided by national delega­
tions of technical assistants; and 4) a subministerial Defence 
Production Committee reminiscent in structure of the original 
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Military Production and Supply Board. Thus, after much ex­
perimentation, final authority was once again in the hands of a 
committee of national representatives. 
The system as developed by the end of 1954, with the De­
fense Production Committee sitting at the apex of the collabo­
ration process, was essentially the one that is in use today 
(1964), though the name was changed in 1958 to the Arma­
ments Committee.86 
National representatives to the Armaments Committee tended 
to be military officers of the rank of Colonel or their civilian 
equivalents. Such individuals had relatively little leeway in their 
instructions with regard to specific projects, with room for nego­
tiation only between the green line of the best position and the 
red line of unacceptability drawn by their home ministries. Only 
in rare cases, like the Hawk project, was there evidence that 
national representatives were persuaded of the merits of the pro­
ject and induced national decision-makers to participate against 
their original inclinations. 
The leadership was not happy with the results produced by 
the existing structure, and attempted to reform it. Secretary 
General Stikker formulated the "doctrine of flexibility' which 
opened the way to forms of association which were partial, rather 
than including representatives from all nations. He explained 
that "the doctrine of flexibility implies that no single member of 
the alliance can impose its course of action on the others; that 
several members can together take such action as they consider 
necessary; and finally, that the right of any one member to 
prevent the other members from taking an action they deem 
vital to their interests is excluded." The NATO Production and 
Logistics Organizations were the fruit of this tree, "NPLO'S are 
joint efforts of certain individual member countries of NATO," 
Stikker said. "As such they are part of the entire NATO effort, but 
not every case is part of a unanimous effort."87 
Although the doctrine of flexibility attempted to cut down the 
number of instructed delegates sitting at any given table, it did 
little to bring them there in the first place; and the future of 
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NATO Production and Logistics Organizations seemed limited 
with the completion of many of the existing programs. Conse­
quently the NATO leadership—specifically Brosio's Deputy, 
James A. Roberts—undertook the reform of the NATO arma­
ments procedure through the mechanism of AC 253. 
Roberts' major aim was to produce real co-operation in arms 
research, development, and production; and the way in which he 
hoped to do it was the abolition of the NBMR procedure and its 
replacement by one which was both flexible and binding. Rob­
erts favored a system of partial membership which would over­
come problems of unanimity; he also supported the principle of 
time limits on participation without contribution. If, by the 
second meeting of a given working group, a nation had not 
committed itself to participate in research and development ex­
penses, he hoped that it might be required to withdraw. 
The report by Brigadier General Vandevanter—an outside 
expert from the RAND Corporation—provided Roberts and his 
supporters with valuable ammunition. Vandevanter stated that 
the existing "institutional system'' was incapable of coping with 
competition in cases where more than one nation had a candi­
date for joint production, since the NBMR procedure required not 
only buyers, but all potential sellers, to agree on a piece of 
equipment. In its place Vandevanter recommended a partial and 
binding "permissive system." Under this procedure influence in 
a given co-operative program would be roughly proportional to 
the amount each nation had committed itself to purchase.88 
Within the NATO bureaucracy Roberts was faced with a cer­
tain degree of apathy and opposition from those groups which 
stood to lose from the change, SHAPE, although not opposed, 
made little active contribution to a reform which ultimately 
scrapped the whole set of military requirements which it had 
helped to bring into the world. More personally involved was 
General Fischer, a French officer who had served as Director of 
Armaments on the International Staff/Secretariat and as Chair­
man of the Armaments Committee. Fischer was identified with 
the system under attack and favored leaving it roughly the way it 
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was. He opposed the reform, was not a regular participant at the 
meetings of AC 253, and—already beyond retirement age—left 
NATO after the report was approved. 
AC 253, the high-level review committee, was the immediate 
medium for change. Although the representatives to this special 
committee were national delegates, they were higher level 
officials than those who usually served on the Armaments Com­
mittee. While they were heavily instructed, they came to NATO 
for extended visits of up to two weeks; and they were sufficiently 
well placed that they could, to some extent, produce changes in 
their instructions. Once Roberts had achieved agreement within 
this group, he visited the Military Committee in Washington 
and received its support. 
The Council approved AC 253's report in June, 1966, but 
within a year's time one could legitimately wonder what had 
been accomplished. Following the completion of the exercise 
Roberts no longer maintained regular contact with the field of 
armaments, leaving this task to General Fischer's de facto succes­
sor. Under the new procedure, committees of national delegates 
remained the mechanism of decision-making. Implied tendencies 
toward reduced instruction by the establishment of the new 
high-level Committee of National Armaments Directors were 
offset by the fact that it was supposed to meet only twice a year 
and that the members of its more permanent subordinate group, 
the NADREPS, tended to be military officers with the rank of 
Colonel—a situation reminiscent of the old Armaments Com­
mittee. 
The most radical idea presented in the whole debate had 
never even been seriously considered by AC 253. In 1965-66 
Robert Rhodes James, a British historian, had been a NATO 
Research Fellow and had undertaken a study on Standardization 
and the Common Production of Weapons in NATO. Rhodes 
James had received access to NATO'S classified files and according 
to rumor, had been personally commissioned by Brosio. In con­
cluding his work, Rhodes James stated his "firm conviction that 
little success can be achieved in the field of major ab initio 
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joint equipment projects in the future without central funding 
arrangements, at least for feasibility and design studies." He 
estimated that £50 million a year would probably be adequate 
to enable the new Conference of National Armaments Directors 
"to commission a number of important studies to determine 
whether projects were technically and economically viable." 
Without such central funding, NATO remained completely de­
pendent on national governments or individual firms for even 
the most basic initiatives.89 
COALITIONS 
The leadership's inability to work through instructed dele­
gates went with its failure to construct a broad or stable support­
ing coalition. During the early years of NATO, arms co-operation 
was implemented largely through American military assistance, 
which helped to raise European stock levels, provide some stan­
dardization through the dispersal of uniform American equip­
ment, and rebuild European production facilities. In the late 
195O's the NATO program underwent a sea change as American 
grants receded; and NATO'S leaders placed heavy emphasis on the 
joint production projects. The United States and Germany re­
presented the vortex of the new effort—with few exceptions the 
systems produced were American and the principal purchaser 
was the rearming Federal Republic. During the mid-1960's this 
program also dried up; the United States grew less willing to 
co-operate on advanced systems or basic research; Germany had 
substantially completed its rearmament; and the Europeans in­
sisted not only on participation in production but also in research 
and development at the frontiers of technology. 
AC 253 was the leadership's attempt to revitalize the springs 
of co-operation; and it drew major support from the combination 
of the United States, Britain, and France. As early as December, 
1962, French Defense Minister Messmer had endorsed the doc­
trine of flexibility in armaments when he publicly stated that it 
was nonsense to have a committee of 15 working on cooperative 
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projects and (that) it would be far more effective to confine 
production agreements to two or three powers.'' Thorneycroft, 
his British counterpart had agreed.90 The American attitude was 
implied by Defense Department endorsement of Vandevanter's 
study, which had recommended that a nation's influence be 
proportional to its purchase of NATO armaments. 
Although Canada and the Netherlands provided peripheral 
backing, most smaller nations, presumably the purchasers under 
the new system, were not eager for change. For such countries, 
the old NBMR procedure represented access to advanced technol­
ogical information without cost. Through low-level forms of 
resistance, they attempted to undermine the impact of the pro­
posed reforms. 
In this situation, the leadership's main objective was to pre­
vent the coalescence of an oppositon bloc. In his position as 
Chairman of AC 253, Deputy Secretary General Roberts held 
regular private meetings with the different national representa­
tives, attempting to deal with national problems on an individual 
and detailed basis. 
To obtain agreement, however, Roberts was forced to accept a 
watered-down program. Thus, on the subject of voting within 
the limited groups, the larger nations favored weighted voting 
based on contributions—along the model of stockholder voting 
—while the smaller countries wished the retention of unani­
mous decision-making. Ultimately voting was left to ad hoc 
arrangements by the members of each particular project, scarcely 
an improvement on what had gone before. 
FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER 
Integration and spill-over might have been expected from a 
political-technical mixture in the area of armaments and logis­
tics. Resources in this sphere were limited to portions of national 
defense budgets; utilitarian sanctions and specialized personnel 
were involved in the research, development, and production of 
military material. 
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Nevertheless, the political element proved strong while the 
technical element was weak. Advances took place mainly in 
situations of crisis. Otherwise the benefits of co-operation were 
outweighed by its costs and by conflict of interest. 
The initial crisis which had given impetus to NATO'S military 
force program, the Soviet military threat of the late 1940's and 
early 195O's, was also behind initial American military aid to 
Europe. Under further pressure of the Suez crisis of 1956 and 
the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, steps were taken to 
broaden European participation. Thus in 1957 the Italian Fiat G 
91 was selected as the NATO Lightweight Strike Reconnaissance 
Aircraft and work was in full swing for the NATO Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft. 
Suez and Sputnik provided much of the driving force for the 
heads of government meeting in December, 1957, and subse­
quently for co-operation on the Hawk and Sidewinder missiles. 
The press communique announcing the establishment of the 
Hawk Production Organization stated that "this marks the first 
success of the NATO policy, established in the December, 1957, 
NATO heads of government meeting, at which the US promised 
NATO nations help in establishing large scale production of ad­
vanced type weapons in Europe." A similar statement was in­
cluded in the press release which announced joint production of 
the Sidewinder. "This represents further tangible progress under 
the NATO policy of co-ordinated production of armaments, origi­
nally proposed in a meeting of the NATO heads of government 
in December, 1957," it said.91 
Of the remaining production projects, the F 104 G was the 
only one which included either substantial innovation or finan­
cial resources. Although there is no concrete evidence, it is likely 
that the Berlin situation made the United States government 
willing to assist joint production and the Europeans eager to 
purchase this completely modern fighter-bomber, which could be 
used not only for air defense but also for various battlefield 
and interdiction missions. 
In the absence of immediate crisis, however, co-operation 
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faded. Paul-Henri Spaak recalled that "When the Russians 
launched their first sputnik, it was thought that the West would 
be jolted into greater understanding of the true state of affairs," 
and Eisenhower and Macmillan issued a communique calling 
for Western interdependence. "For a few weeks," Spaak said, 
"there was an apparent awakening of interest, but it soon 
flagged, and although it would be unjust to say nothing has been 
done along the bold lines suggested, the measure of success 
achieved compares unfavorably with the issues at stake." 92 
Theoretically, there were substantial advantages to be derived 
from arms collaboration. Politically it should help to cement the 
Alliance. Militarily there should be a better fit between strategy 
and available means; increased tactical mobility from better 
availability of spare parts, fuel, and ammunition; and consoli­
dated training. Economically, pooled efforts should involve cost 
reductions from economies of scale and shared costs of research 
and development. Technologically, the Allies would be provided 
with the best equipment available. Administratively there could 
also be gains in terms of tax and customs benefits, facility of 
control for classified material, and quasi-diplomatic privileges.93 
Such incentives for co-operation were neutralized by conflicts 
of interest at all levels. Politically, outright purchase of material 
implied for the buyer nation a loss of independence and prestige. 
In concrete terms, the sale of weapons often depended on the 
recipient nation accepting restrictions on use and transfer. Mili­
tarily, national defense establishments had different geographi­
cal commitments, strategies, existing stocks, and resources. Eco­
nomically, national military procurement—while it represented 
a financial outlay subordinate to total defense expenditure—was, 
as Table 10 shows, a significant sum. Procurement on a non-na­
tional basis could have deleterious effects on national employ­
ment and the balance of payments; and larger nations were 
unwilling to bear large costs for smaller ones. Cutting across the 
political, military, and economic arguments against co-operation 
in armaments and logistics were strictures of scientific secrecy, 
the product of attempts to achieve, maintain, and increase tech­
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nological leads for purposes of political prestige, military advan­
tage, and saleability. 
Moreover, technical progress in armaments could have fall­
out effects in civilian sectors of the economy. This did not mean 
that the devotion of the same resources directly to the civilian 
sector would not produce the same or better results, but simply 
that military problems frequently offered the opportunity for 
government to support research which they otherwise might 
TABLE 10 
NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON THE PROCUREMENT

OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT: 1960-1963 *

(In Millions of Dollars)

Country 1960 t 19611 1962 t 1963 t 
United States 17,519.00 20,850.00 22,120.00 23,470.00 
United Kingdom 1,823.56 1,844.77 1,974.36 2,155.41 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 1,270.92 1,092.22 1,592.40 1,933.25 
France 1,065.34 1,037.82 1,021.02 1,411.68 
Italy 121.00 t 140.00 t 180.00 t 220.001 
Netherlands 95.69 127.50 129.70 168.30 
Belgium 46.12 52.60 75.36 84.94 
* Joint Production of Armaments, Doc. No. 304 (Paris: Western European Union, February 26, 
1964), p. 14.
t Fiscal years 1960, etc., signify 1960/61, etc., for countries whose fiscal years do not correspond to
calendar	 years. 
X Secretariat estimate. 
have neglected. If military research and development were left 
to other nations, from whom only the finished product were 
obtained, then the civilian fall-out benefits would accrue mainly 
to these nations. 
There were also difficulties at a more modest administrative 
level. In the NATO situation production runs were not usually 
large enough to offset increased costs involved in the learning of 
new techniques, language differences, and problems of co-ordi­
nation; and NATO'S unanimity rule created unwieldy manage­
ment conditions.94 
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The convergence of interest between sellers and buyers upon 
which the NATO armaments program finally came to depend was 
inherently unstable. Seller nations were interested mainly in 
moving existing products off the shelf with as little production 
participation as necessary to consummate the sale; and the 
United States, Britain, and France all had competing seller 
policies. Buyer nations, on the other hand, wanted not only 
extensive participation in production, but also in research and 
development phases, which the seller was unwilling to grant. At 
the same time they were inclined to buy less. Germany, which 
had played the part of consumer, had largely completed her 
postwar rearmament, and had her own armaments industry, 
estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 people. Moreover, the 
German government was attempting to reduce its offset obliga­
tions to the United States, through which German military 
purchases partly counterbalanced American currency losses aris­
ing from the stationing of American troops in the Federal Re­
public. The smaller Allies, faced with the decline of American 
aid, were unable to make significant purchases. In this situation, 
a staff study for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
concluded that "the defense common market is little more than 
an area for arms competition between resentful pygmies and an 
affable giant." 95 
The continuation of the NATO armaments program and the 
reform proposed by AC 253 depended on an extremely modest 
base. For seller nations, NATO represented a forum in which they 
could hope to gauge export markets and in which they might 
promote sales. For buyer nations the NATO program represented 
an opportunity to maintain contact with the technology of the 
seller nations, particularly the United States, and to attempt to 
achieve either special terms with the sellers or counter-groupings 
against them. 
NATO Infrastructure

5 
The structures of the NATO infrastructure program date from 
1951 when the Infrastructure Committee was formed to assume 
responsibility for infrastructure policy under the Council. Be­
neath the Infrastructure Committee were established a Pay­
ments and Progress Committee, administering controls over the 
expenditure of funds, and Working Groups for Signals; Air­
fields; and Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants ( P O L ) . With the formal 
creation of the International Staff/Secretariat in 1952, an Infra­
structure Section was established as part of the NATO Production 
and Logistics Division; and the technical staffs of the Working 
Groups were brought into the Section, organized according to 
the same subject areas.1 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
By 1968, there had been changes in nomenclature and ad­
vances in structural differentiation and scope. The Infrastruc­
ture Committee and the Payments and Progress Committee 
remained the institutional core, but the NATO Staff/Secretariat's 
Infrastructure Section was now the Infrastructure Branch of the 
Defense Support Division, larger than any full NATO Division 
with the exception of its parent; and there were Sections in the 
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Infrastructure Branch to deal with Budget and Analysis, POL 
and Construction, Signals, Airfields and Naval Bases, and Mis­
sile Sites. Within SHAPE'S Logistics Division was a small Infra­
structure Branch; and a semi-autonomous set of agencies had 
been established, including the NATO Air Defense Ground Envi­
ronment Management Organization (NADGEMO) and the NADGE 
Policy Board. 
As Table 11 makes clear, there was task differentiation in 
NATO infrastructure. Starting with a program centered around 
TABLE 11 
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM 
MAJOR PRODUCTS THROUGH 1965 * 
(In Millions of Pounds Sterling) 
Airfields program f 418 
Signals network 184 
Fuel supply systems 157 
Naval facilities 103 
Radar warning installations 32 
Air defense ground environment (NADGE) 110 
Special ammunition sites (SAS) 37 
Missile sites (SAM and SSM) 96 
Other projects 88 
Total rj25~ 
• The Cost oj Defending Western Europe, Doc. No. 391 (Paris: Western Euro­
pean Union, 1966), p. 14. 
t The costs of airfields in Germany for Slices earlier than Slice VII are not 
included. 
airfields and telecommunications, NATO had moved into the con­
struction of war headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage systems, 
naval facilities, radar warning systems, NADGE installations, spe­
cial ammunition storage sites, missile sites, and categories of 
smaller projects. Among more recent projects were a new politi­
cal-military situation and consultation center to be located at 
Evere, Belgium, and the development of NATO communications 
satellite facilities. A pilot satellite network was established link­
ing SHAPE and AFCENT in Naples. Subsequently NATO was to 
develop a comprehensive SATCOM system to supplement and 
partially replace existing Allied communications capabilities. 
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TABLE 12 
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM: SLICES I-XX * 
(In Millions of Pounds Sterling) 
Total Annual 
Budgets Expenditures Expenditures 
Slice I  f 32 32.0 
Slices II-VII 702 117.0 
Slices VIII-XI 244 61.0 
Slices XII-XV 250 62.5 
Slices XV-XX 228 45.6 
European Union, iy61); Leonard Beaton, Guardian, uecember 13, lyoU: 
Ronald Koven, New York Herald Tribunt, February 23, 1966. Some statistical
inaccuracy is present because even the official source materials discuss agreed 
programs, authorizations, and actual expenditures interchangeably. See Van­
devanter, Common Funding in NATO, p. 35.
t In 1951, agreement was reached on a cost-sharing formula for financing the
first NATO Slice of the common infrastructure program that had been begun 
under the Western European Union. Because of the earlier program, this in­
crement was labelled Slice II. 
In spite of such development in structures and tasks, it was 
not clear that institutional autonomy had significantly advanced. 
On the one hand, the requirement for unanimity might be 
avoided at lower levels—by upward referral of non-resolved 
issues from such groups as the Infrastructure Committee and the 
Payments and Progress Committee, and by the non-voting proce­
dures within the Staff/Secretariat and the NATO military com­
mands. Formal procedures for binding arbitration also existed. 
They provided that: 
In the event of disputes not capable of solution by the (Pay­
ments and Progress) Committee, a Board of Arbitration may 
be appointed by the Secretary General. Its decisions are by 
majority vote, and no minority report is permitted; its decisions 
are final. In the event of the Committee itself not agreeing to 
go to Arbitration, the responsibility goes to the Council; if 
the Council, after three separate discussions, cannot agree, 
the Secretary General refers the dispute to a Panel of Inde­
pendent Advisors who work on the same principles as the 
Board of Arbitration.2 
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Yet unanimity remained the final rule. The arbitration proce­
dures had been invoked only once since 1962; nations could not 
be bound at any level without consent which was at least tacit; 
and ultimate decisions were made by the Council, where it 
always remained possible that a national veto would be the last 
word.3 
Nor was it apparent that there had been task expansion. The 
largest part of construction on airfields, telecommunications, war 
headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage systems, and naval facil­
ities had been programmed in the first nine Infrastructure Slices; 
succeeding projects—radar warning installations, air defense 
ground environment, special ammunition sites, missile sites, and 
others—were not added to a stable base of on-going programs 
but served partly as replacements. In absolute terms, the result 
was impressive; one could estimate that NATO would have spent 
approximately £1.5 billion for infrastructure by the end of 1969. 
Table 12 however, shows that the annual rate of expenditure 
decreased from an estimated £117 million for earlier program 
Slices to £45.6 million for later ones. 
AUTHORITY 
Not only was institutional autonomy weak, NATO authority 
was also limited in terms both of its balance between direct and 
indirect decision-making and its effectiveness. 
Direct NATO authority was implicit in the system of budgetary 
authorization. Under a cost-sharing procedure initiated in 1953, 
national governments authorized contributions independent of 
individual project allocations. The scope of this procedure was 
extended by progressively enlarging the authorization period 
from the initial three years (Slices V—VII) to four years (Slices 
Vllb-XI and XI-XV) and then to five years (Slices XVI-XX). 
Nevertheless, a complicated system of indirect decision-mak­
ing, covering all infrastructure phases from initiation through 
utilization, operated in the allocation of these funds. National 
governments were responsible for most direct action, committees 
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of national representatives for control, and international military 
and civilian bureaucracies mainly for advice. 
Under this system, nations were divided into hosts, on whose 
territory the project was to be constructed, and users, for whose 
forces the project was intended. The responsibilities of hosts and 
users clearly dominated all phases of decision-making. Host na­
tions were accountable for: 
1.	 Submitting program requests to the NATO Major Subordi­
nate Commands 
2.	 Providing land at no cost 
3.	 Providing local utilities at no cost (except in the cases of 
certain missile sites for which NATO had adopted a cost-
sharing formula) 
4.	 Submitting detailed construction drawings and cost esti­
mates to the Payments and Progress Committee together 
with the request for funds 
5.	 Advertising for bids under the international competitive 
bidding procedure 
6.	 Supervising construction 
7.	 Preparing scale drawings of completed projects 
8.	 Scheduling and participating in the Joint Final Accept­
ance Inspection 
9.	 Furnishing contract documents and invoices for audit by 
the International Board of Auditors 
10.	 Negotiating bilateral user agreements with foreign users 
11.	 Submitting the latest cost estimates and other financial 
data in semiannual financial reports 
User nations' responsibilities included: 
1.	 Initiating the program request 
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2.	 Justifying program requirements and guaranteeing utili­
zation 
3.	 Co-ordination with the host during construction to ensure 
that the requirements were met 
4.	 Participation in a Joint Final Acceptance Inspection 
5.	 Maintenance of the completed project until it was as­
sumed by a new user or by NATO if the facility became 
redundant 
The major committees under the Council, composed of na­
tional representatives, were responsible for the control of host 
and user national governments. All proposed infrastructure pro­
grams passed before the Military Committee, which reviewed 
them in the perspective of military requirements and adequacy; 
the Infrastructure Committee, which considered eligibility for 
common funding and technical adequacy; the Payments and 
Progress Committee ( P P C )  , which exercised budgetary control; 
and the International Board of Auditors, which concerned itself 
with fiscal integrity. Above all of these bodies was the Council, 
which acted as the main forum for negotiating cost shares and 
final authority for all matters not resolved at lower levels. 
The military bureaucracies headed by SACEUR and SACLANT 
played a major advisory role at all stages of the infrastructure 
process. They forecast military requirements prior to the negotia­
tion of cost-sharing agreements; they published annual guidance 
setting the aims of each annual Infrastructure Slice; they 
screened submitted projects against the issued guidance; they 
assigned initial relative priorities between projects; and they 
issued recommended Infrastructure Slices. They sponsored An­
nual Infrastructure Conferences and were represented in Infra­
structure Committee meetings for Slice screening. They partici­
pated in site selection; the Joint Final Acceptance Inspection; 
the notification of the Payments and Progress Committee when 
all deficiencies were corrected; semiannual inspections of all 
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completed facilities to ensure satisfactory operation and mainte­
nance; and declaration of usership changes in such cases as 
additional usership, national renunciation of usership, or the 
declaration of a facility as surplus to NATO requirements. 
A subordinate advisory role was played by the International 
Staff/Secretariat. In preliminary planning, it reviewed SHAPE-
recommended Slices for technical, financial, and eligibility as­
pects and forwarded its findings to the Infrastructure Commit­
tee. In the phases of contract and construction it participated in 
interim inspections and in the Joint Final Acceptance Inspec­
tion. In the terminal stage it conducted the final audit under the 
supervision of the International Board of Auditors.* 
The effectiveness of this decision-making system seems lim­
ited when NATO decisions are compared with subsequent na­
tional deviations and exemptions. The corpus of NATO infrastruc­
ture rules evolved in piecemeal fashion, by precedent rather than 
direction; the rules were never codified, nor the precedents 
cross-referenced. At every stage of the infrastructure process— 
project eligibility criteria, construction standards, international 
competitive bidding rules, project authorization, audit standards 
and residual value—such rules appeared honored through 
breach as well as through compliance. 
Eligibility criteria for projects existed, but they were partly 
undermined by a system of prefinancing. Under this system 
nations informed the PPC of their intent to construct a project 
which had not yet been submitted for programming in an Infra­
structure Slice, which was contained in a Slice which had not yet 
been approved, or which was not within current NATO criteria. 
PPC acceptance of such projects signified that the host was 
eligible for reimbursement if the project became eligible for 
NATO funding and was included in a NATO Slice program. Begin­
ning in 1963, the United States submitted prefinancing state­
ments on all categories of infrastructure work not currently 
eligible for NATO funding. 
Construction standards for projects also existed, but their 
impact was diminished by extremely flexible interpretation. 
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Such criteria were supposed to standardize the type of facility to 
be supported by the NATO infrastructure program. In practice 
there remained deviations both upward—for example, to support 
American aircraft varying from standard NATO aircraft in sophis­
tication, weight, or other particulars—and downward when it 
was considered that unreasonable costs would result from the 
application of NATO criteria.5 
There were international competitive bidding rules, but they 
were not easily enforceable. Under these rules, host nations 
were supposed to include foreign enterprises in the bidding for 
infrastructure contracts and to make awards to the bidder offer­
ing the lowest price (under constant technical conditions). For 
civil engineering projects, this procedure was almost abandoned. 
Non-host nations rarely seemed to win such contracts, and host 
nations were less and less frequently required to submit interna­
tional calls for bids. For electronics projects, the international 
competitive-bidding procedure was distorted by host taxes and 
tariffs. Theoretically host taxes and tariffs were neutralized by a 
blanket-tax rebate formula which returned to NATO a stable 
percentage on infrastructure contracts of all types. In practice, 
this tax rebate formula failed to allow for the much higher tax 
incidence on electronic imports.6 
The international competitive bidding rules were reinforced 
by a prohibition on the use of NATO funds to pay military salaries 
for construction. Increasingly, this prohibition was eroded by 
NATO allowances for payment of military per diem, temporary 
duty, and expenses of civilian employees. 
Projects introduced into the system remained unapproved and 
uncompleted for increasingly long periods. While early projects 
were usually completed within three to five years of initiation, 
later and more complex ones like NADGE required over ten years 
to complete the cycle.7 Program inertia grew in spite of special 
acceleration, streamlining, and clean-up programs.8 
Following project completion, NATO audited the accounts; and 
by 1966 it had recovered approximately £14 million. Neverthe­
less, the International Board of Auditors applied sanctions only 
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in cases of major misallocation and tended to overlook misman­
agement. 
In the event that facilities would no longer be required by 
NATO, basic agreements existed which called for negotiations 
between the host country and the other partners to determine 
"residual value." No provisions, however, existed to enforce com­
pensation. The French military withdrawal provided the first 
major test of this procedure and indicated its serious weakness. 
Beginning in spring of 1966 the French and the Fourteen began 
negotiations, but after two years the two parties seemed no 
closer to agreement on the 'residual value' of most Allied facili­
ties remaining in France than when they had started.9 
LEGITIMACY 
Related to the inadequacy of authority was the fact that 
legitimacy of NATO infrastructure showed no growth. At the 
national level, the United States exerted increasing pressure to 
reduce its major share of expenses. Other nations were unwilling 
significantly to expand their contributions and supported the 
program mainly in the areas where it benefited them directly. At 
the non-national level support was limited. Industrial groups 
interested in specific contracts gave expediential and ad hoc 
co-operation, while legislators and political groups were either 
apathetic or opposed. 
The American share of infrastructure expenses was originally 
dominant, but later receded as the European nations were per­
suaded to take on larger burdens. Table 13—which depicts gross 
national contributions before the deduction of currency returns 
from infrastructure programs—shows that the United States 
subscription declined from almost 44 per cent of Slices II—VII to 
25.77 per cent of Slices XVI-XX. Table 14 depicts net contrib­
utors—after the deduction of currency receipts from NATO 
infrastructure—for Slices I—VIII. The use of net contribution 
as an index of Allied participation makes apparent that, by 1958, 
the United States had been joined in the role of donor by the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. 
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At approximately this time Belgium also became a net 
contributor;10 and it is likely that France later crossed over the 
line. Table 15 shows that, during the early years of the infra­
structure program, France was host for almost 25 per cent of 
NATO infrastructure, with concomitant gains to French industry. 
By 1965-66 France hosted only 6.6 per cent. Germany probably 
remained a net recipient. In spite of its increase in gross contri­
bution to 21.86 per cent for Slices XVI-XX, the Federal Repub­
lic was host to 32.2 per cent of NATO projects and probably re­
ceived the lion's share of the contracts involved. 
Notwithstanding the broadening of the infrastructure base, 
national government policies reflected a growing unwillingness 
to support NATO infrastructure except when it was to their own 
immediate advantage. The United States originally contributed 
almost half the funds of the infrastructure program, seeing it as a 
means to encourage the general growth of the alliance and to 
provide military fixed facilities for the deployment of American 
troops and equipment. Gradually not only did the United States 
reduce its gross contribution share; it also gave greatest support 
to those undertakings in which prospects were best for sales 
of American equipment. In the early days a high percentage of 
infrastructure funds was spent on brick and mortar types of 
projects such as airfields, naval bases, training facilities, and 
pipelines. Here there were very limited American contracts for 
airfield equipment, communications materials, and electronic de­
vices. In later efforts the United States stood to gain from a 
greater proportion of NATO investment in advanced equipment 
—for example, very low frequency ( V L F  ) stations for submarine 
communications, high frequency single side-band radio links, 
radio relay systems in Italy and Turkey, a submarine cable in the 
Mediterranean. In the NADGE program, major components in­
cluded special purpose computers, pencil beam radars, medium 
power radars of the FPS-27 variety, and supporting communica­
tions equipment. 
The British gross contribution share declined slightly follow­
ing NATO assumption of infrastructure responsibility from West­
ern Union with Slice II; and the British government became 
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more concerned that the infrastructure program bring specific 
benefits. In the early years, Britain received NATO support for a 
significant number of facilities, particularly in Scotland; but 
subsequently, though the British continued attempts to get NATO 
funding, the Allies approved less work in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, the British, like the Americans, eventually began 
giving lower priority to concrete-laying projects than to electronic 
ones. If there had to be construction of the first type, the British 
government preferred activity which benefited its BAOR—i.e., 
more construction of forward supply depots in Germany and less 
construction of pipelines on the Southeastern flank. In the elec­
tronics field, British aims were also similar to American, but 
tactics were different. Rather than 'sell U.K.," the British aimed 
at "design penetration," hoping to achieve immediate adoption of 
British designs which would later create demands for British 
services. 
As its host role declined, the French government eventually 
shared with the Anglo-Saxon governments a lack of enthusiasm 
for concrete-laying projects. Instead France supported tasks, such 
as NADGE, in which military benefits for air defense, economic 
benefits for French industry, and technological learning might 
all be combined. 
The Germans emerged as major beneficiaries of the program. 
The government was enthusiastic about new concrete-laying 
projects in Germany, such as bridges and depots, though there 
were problems with land procurement under the federal system. 
At the same time, it favored modern technological co-operation 
from considerations both of military benefits and industrial-tech­
nological participation. 
The major non-national actors concerned with NATO infra­
structure were business concerns with a financial interest in 
contracts. Their support remained expediential and largely ad 
hoc. Industrialists in search of contracts lobbied at both the 
national and international levels—at national defense ministries, 
national delegations to NATO, and SHAPE. Their concern followed 
the contours of the NATO infrastructure program, with specific 
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TABLE 14 
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

NET NATIONAL FOREIGN CURRENCY RECEIPTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGETS, 1951-1957 *

Net 
Country- Contributions 
France 
Turkey 
Germany 
Italy 
Greece 
Norway 
Portugal 
Denmark 
Luxembourg 
Iceland 
Belgium 
Netherlands 0.73 
Canada 6.13 
United Kingdom.. 7.74 
United Sta tes . . . . 42.80 
" "Support Costs and Defence Payments in the Alliance," Doc. 107 of West­
ern European Union Assembly (mimeo., December 9, 1958), Appendix 2. 
national and industrial groups gaining or losing interest with 
shifts in the prospects for NATO contracts. Interest was strongest 
in such industries as construction, communications, and elec­
tronics which had been centers of infrastructure investment. 
Until the estalishment of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group in 
1968, the most formal institutional tie had existed between the 
American Delegation and the Defense Industry Advisory Group 
in Europe. As of 1967 DIAGE'S membership included not only 
aircraft executives but also representatives from companies inter­
ested in NATO infrastructure—for example, General Electric, 
Hughes, and IT&T. 
Contractual relations traditionally existed between national 
Ministries supervising NATO infrastructure projects and individ­
ual industries concerned. With approval of the NADGE program, 
international consortia appeared for the first time in NATO infra­
structure. The final stage of bidding was carried out by three 
large consortia headed by Hughes, IT&T, and Westinghouse, 
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respectively. In each of these groups, the consortium leader was 
in charge of the preparation and submission of bids as well as 
being responsible for the immediate supervision of work in the 
event of award of the contract. Neither of the losing consortia, 
however, survived defeat, and there was no indication that the 
winner—the Hughes consortium, rebaptized NADGECO—would 
outlive the completion of NADGE. 
TABLE 15 
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

DISTRIBUTION OF WORK BY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

As PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGET, SLICES II-XVII *

Slices II-XV Slices XVI & XVII 
Country (1951-1964) (1965-1966) 
Germany 15.0 32.2 
SHAPE/ ACE. . . . 10.8 14.0 
Turkey 
Norway 
Italy 
France 
12.3 
7.1 
9.8 
24.4 
7.8 
7.5 
6.8 
6.6 
Netherlands 2.6 5.9 
Greece 6.2 5.4 
United Kingdom. 
Denmark 
3.9 
2.4 
5.0 
4.8 
Belgium 
Portugal 
Iceland 
3.8 
1.3 
0.4 
4.0 
Total. 100.0 100.0 
* "Infrastructure: A Commonly Financed Program" (U.S. Department of 
Defense mimeo., 1967), Chart No. 6. 
Legislators and political groups took less interest in the 
program. The NATO Parliamentarians mentioned NATO infra­
structure by name only three times in their resolutions and rec­
omendations (1957, 1958, 1959).11 American legislators empha­
sized the economic burdens that accompanied support of NATO'S 
infrastructure. In June, 1963, Senator Fulbright suggested that 
the Europeans should pay a larger share of infrastructure ex­
penses; in April, 1966, Senator Douglas stated that the French 
government should reimburse the United States for evacuation 
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of military bases on French soil. In October, 1966, the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations said that if "the same 
inefficiency and misunderstanding that has affected U.S. partici­
pation in the NATO common infrastructure program in the past" 
were continued, "the United States stands to lose many millions 
of dollars as a result." The Committee believed it "imperative 
that such a disaster be avoided." Furthermore, the Committee 
thought that "U.S. relocation costs should be shared, to the 
maximum extent possible, by all the NATO allies and that the 
United States should not be made to pay more in the future 
simply because it provided more in the past." 12 
Elsewhere, apathy succeeded opposition for the British La­
bour Left and the German SPD, both of which had resisted, as 
part of a more general protest, construction of NATO infrastruc­
ture projects on their national soil. 
LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
Although integration appeared to be limited, the infrastruc­
ture program was supported by the NATO leadership with an 
ideology including both general, sweeping ends and also more 
particular concrete activities that the Allies could undertake 
together. The most salient general aim, although obscured by 
more diffuse overlays and by lack of explicit statement, was the 
same as that for the NATO military force program—peace and 
security. Below this level, however, the justification for NATO 
infrastructure was more concrete than for NATO military forces. 
First, defense rather than deterrence received the place of honor; 
second, particular NATO military tasks, such as air defense, com­
munications, and command and control, provided a general justi­
fication for specific programs of Allied military construction. 
This ideology could be expected to appeal especially to the 
European Allies, for whom it could be expected that defense 
would be of paramount importance should deterrence fail, and 
who would be reassured by tangible progress toward a defensive 
capability. 
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The broadest justification for NATO infrastructure came from 
the first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who stressed not only 
military, but also financial and political benefits: 
From the military point of view, a volume of infrastructure 
has been, and is being, built that would have been unattainable 
by national or bilateral plans alone. From the financial and con­
stitutional point of view a remarkable new technique in the 
expenditure of money contributed to an international under­
taking has been evolved. From the political point of view the 
realization of a common effort of such dimensions does resound­
ing credit to the spirit of mutual understanding and joint 
purpose which has grown up in the Atlantic Community.13 
For early SACEUR'S the program had a more focused general 
orientation. Eisenhower viewed NATO infrastructure as part of 
"the common defense." While the military forces would do the 
fighting, the task of infrastructure was included in that of "forg­
ing the weapons." " 
Less generally, in their reports commemorating the first and 
second anniversaries of SHAPE as an operational headquarters, 
Generals Eisenhower and Ridgway supported NATO military pro­
grams in air defense, and communications, and establishment 
of Allied military command and staff structures. Within these 
programs, they advocated and defended the inclusion of specific 
types of NATO military construction activity—the building of 
new airfields, jet fuel storage tanks, distribution pipelines to 
airfields, radar installations, radio-navigational aids, communica­
tions facilities, and headquarter sites. In addition, new supply 
depots, harbor facilities, and naval bases were urged.15 
The specific client group at which the program aimed seemed 
to be the European Allies. Not only would they benefit from 
new defensive capability; they could also rally behind Eisenhow­
er's proposal that "a major and special contribution' in the field 
of "equipment" should come from the United States.18 
Later SACEUR'S and Secretaries General, although they did not 
often refer to NATO infrastructure as such, continued to support 
general NATO military programs in air defense, communications, 
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and command and control. Implicit here was backing for specific 
NATO infrastructure activity in airfield construction and moderni­
zation; radar warning installations; surface-to-air missile sites; 
special ammunition sites; NADGE and its succeeding generations, 
and such innovations in communications as systems based on 
principles of radio wave reflection from different atmospheric 
layers, automatic switching equipment, and communications sat­
ellites. 
General Gruenther was particularly concerned with air de­
fense, claiming that "air defense has been one of the least 
effective operations of my command." He proposed that the 
NATO Council grant SHAPE specific authority to co-ordinate a 
Western European early warning system and to consolidate it 
into four proposed regions (Northern, Southern, Central, and 
United Kingdom). 
General Norstad also emphasized the importance of establish­
ing an "integrated air defense." In the words of his colleague 
Stikker, "The views of General Norstad were precise. 
They were simply that without integration there is no air de­
fense.'' General Lemnitzer stated that "We must ensure that 
the undoubted ability of modern air defense weapons to stop 
attacking aircraft is fully employed in an integrated defense of 
the Alliance.' "Forward bases and airfields" were an "essential 
part'' of the strategic system. In reply to the argument that 
NADGE was obsolete because it was unable to bring down low-
flying aircraft or missiles, Lemnitzer stated that aircraft remained 
effective until weapons "systems exist in sufficient quantity to 
repel air attack." Until then, "the attacker's aircraft are every bit 
as effective as they ever were." Antimissile defense was a pro­
gram for the future. Finally, for Dirk Stikker, "integration of air 
defense meant for NATO in Europe, one unified system." "Inte­
gration," he said, should comprise the joint detection, identifica­
tion, interception and, if need be, destruction of enemy 
aircraft." ir 
In the area of communications, General Gruenther backed 
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the establishment of a system based on tropospheric and iono­
spheric scatter principles. General Norstad supported the NATO 
Forward Scatter Communications System, with tropospheric and 
ionospheric links. In addition, he noted that "the subject of 
command and control will continue to pre-occupy us.' Finally, 
General Lemnitzer emphasized "the importance of command 
and control procedures and communications networks, which are 
soundly conceived, and fully effective on a constant basis. Any 
and every improvement that is possible will be searched out and 
promptly adopted," he said.18 
While the United States was no longer eager to bear the 
brunt of the financial burden, this program could still exert an 
appeal for the European nations. Particularly in the area of 
integrated air defense, NATO infrastructure promised to provide 
defense advantages—detection of enemy aircraft and control of 
national air forces—which could not have been achieved within 
national boundaries. 
With the French military withdrawal, a new broad canopy 
was added to the foregoing ideological justification. In addition 
to defense benefits appealing to the European Allies, Manlio 
Brosio pointed to NATO infrastructure as an important demon­
stration of the cohesion of the remaining Fourteen, who, by 
'working to adapt communications, infrastructure, and Agenices 
to the new situation" had "reasserted by deeds as well as words 
the necessity and vitality of NATO." 19 
DECISION-MAKING 
The leadership was restrained in implementing its ideology by 
a decision-making structure in which instructed delegates had 
the last word. During the early years the leadership and its 
experts were sometimes able to exert a significant impact. Thus 
Lord Ismay recalled how he and three assistant secretaries-gen­
eral helped in the negotiation of one of the initial cost-sharing 
formulas. 
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They dumped the whole problem in my lap, so I called in 
three assistant secretaries-general and each of us drew up our 
own list of what we thought the percentage of sharing should 
be, and then we averaged them out. I couldn't for the life of 
me possibly say on what basis I acted, except that I tried to 
take into account all sorts of things like the ability to pay and 
whether the building would be going on in a country so that 
it would benefit from the construction and the money spent. 
Then we got into the Council meeting in April of 1953, 
and everybody around the table thought it was a jolly good 
distribution except for his own, which they thought was too 
high. Anyway, we went around the table and finally got 
agreement of each to take what was given within 1.8 per cent 
of the total, and then we simply divided up that 1.8 per cent 
among the fourteen, and that's all there was to it. That's why 
all the shares are in those funny percentage amounts.20 
Subsequent organizational development, however, upgraded 
national instruction at the expense of independent expertise. 
The most important decision-making role was played by individ­
uals within the national delegations charged with special infra­
structure responsibilities. These men briefed the permanent re­
presentatives when infrastructure issues reached the Council 
and sat on the Infrastructure Committee and Payments and 
Progress Committee. In general their behavior was determined 
by home Ministries which exercised control on general ceilings 
for national contributions and on specific projects of significant 
size or importance as precedents. Most infrastructure representa­
tives were middle-level civil servants, the civilian equivalents of 
army colonels, who exercised little influence on the drafting of 
their instructions. Although national representatives responsible 
for infrastructure occasionally used discretion or deviated from 
guidance, this did not necessarily imply gains for the NATO 
program. First, such independence was likely to be granted only 
for smaller projects which national ministries believed to be 
relatively unimportant; second, national representatives were sel­
dom able to modify their instructions to concede more than 
originally intended; rather, their bargaining tactics were fre­
quently aimed at conceding less. 
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SACEUR was able to exert a direct influence and provide some 
impetus for objectivity at SHAPE. Thus one American concerned 
with infrastructure stated that, "SHAPE is under political pressure 
by everybody, and SACEUR seems to succumb to everybody ex­
cept the United States. Many times he decides against American 
projects in favor of the Europeans, and you have to go through 
the American delegation to fight him. Sometimes I think the 
United States would get a better hearing if SACEUR were a 
German." Nevertheless, the same variables of personality, Amer­
ican dominance, and national instruction which neutralized 
SHAPE as a vehicle for the military force program probably 
also weakened infrastructure. Wariness of subversion by the 
Americans, the importance of national policy, and ultimate 
control of the SHAPE officer by the national delegation are all 
implied by the following excerpt from an interview with a 
member of a European delegation to NATO Headquarters. 
The officers going to SHAPE are handpicked by the Ministry 
of Defense and brainwashed before they are sent. On arrival 
they are briefed by me, and from time to time we contact each 
other. That doesn't mean they have to push the national line. 
The United States puts a pretty tight curb on its people but 
other countries do it much less. 
For example, the man comes in and I brief him on our posi­
tion, what will be acceptable, not necessarily the maximum. 
Three months later that officer will take a completely different 
position. Then I have to go back to the Ministry of Defense and 
fight him. 
The Comptroller for Infrastructure, an American member of 
the International Staff/Secretariat, acted as Chairman of both 
the Infrastructure Committee and the Payments and Progress 
Committee. Yet any independent impact by the International 
Staff/Secretariat was limited by the jealous watch of national 
delegates, and also by delegate skepticism about the Staff's effec­
tive expertise and internal organization. Within the Interna­
tional Staff financiers had usually occupied the top positions; 
under them were both civil and electronics engineers. National 
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delegates claimed that it was difficult for the financiers either to 
shape or advance the recommendations of their subordinates and 
that the influence of the subordinates was limited by misorgani­
zation. For example, the airfield section was composed mainly of 
civil engineers with little capability for electronics aspects, while 
in the radar section there were mainly electronics engineers and 
a lack of electricians and mechanics to handle such projects as 
roads for the radar sites. 
Secretary General Stikker tried to expand the role of the 
International Staff in the case of NADGE, but without success. 
Successive SACEUR'S had supported the concept of integrated air 
defense which NADGE advanced; and the Allies were in favor of 
the project. One of the important remaining problems was that 
of maintaining security. Stikker was willing to undertake respon­
sibility for the security of NADGE if he were given authority over 
the whole project. He suggested that a NATO Production and 
Logistics Organization be created as part of the International 
Staff/Secretariat, with a Director immediately responsible to the 
Secretary General. If NADGE were established to be independent 
of the International Staff/Secretariat—as was the case with the 
other NPLO'S—then he would refuse security accountability. 
Stikker had discussions in the initial stages of negotiation with 
the Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, John 
McCone, and received indications of American backing. Ulti­
mately, however, his proposal attracted few favorable clients. 
National opposition, particularly from France, and American 
retreat resulted in the establishment of a NATO Production and 
Logistics Organization for which the Secretary General would 
not be directly responsible and for which he was granted only a 
species of "watching brief." 
COALITIONS 
There is insufficient evidence positively to identify either a 
coalition supporting NATO infrastructure or subcoalitions sup­
porting most particular projects. Those facts which are available, 
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however, suggest that coalitional support did exist but was of 
limited use in furthering the goals of the leadership because of 
restricted membership and reluctance to agree to more than 
minimal programs. 
The outlines of a general supporting coalition for the leader­
ship's ideology are indicated by the differentiation between net 
contributor and net recipient nations. If net contributor status is 
equated with support, then the general infrastructure coalition 
probably consisted only of the United States, Britain, Canada, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Within this group the 
United States exerted efforts to reduce its contributions and 
increase its share of contracts, while the others were reluctant to 
assume large burdens. Consequently, the size of the annual 
infrastructure program gradually decreased in spite of the sup­
port of the leadership. 
In two specific sub-programs—NADGE and relocation following 
the French military withdrawal—the pattern was roughly simi­
lar. The major supporters of the NADGE program may probably 
be identified by national participation in the major industrial 
consortia bidding for the contract shown in Appendix C. The 
United States, Britain, France, and Germany were represented 
in each of the three groupings; Italy appeared twice; and Bel­
gium and the Netherlands each appeared once. The winning 
consortium, Hughes, included all of these nations except Bel­
gium. 
As a result of divisions within the coalition, the NADGE pro­
gram remained minimal, NADGE had originally been programmed 
in Slices XII-XV at an estimated cost of £100 million. The 
European Allies had favored it as necessary support for such 
aircraft as the F 104 G and as an improvement on existing 
systems of air defense. The United States, however, opposed it 
on both military and economic grounds; the Department of 
Defense estimated that the projected air defense and control 
system was already obsolescent and that triple the existing esti­
mate would be required to construct one which was militarily 
acceptable. Following substantial delay, the United States 
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agreed in 1963 to allow NATO to begin planning, but only on 
condition that the program have an absolute ceiling of £110 
million and that the entire American contribution be returned to 
the United States in the form of NADGE contracts. The other 
nations agreed, extending the agreement to include all contribut­
ing countries so that NADGE would produce no national foreign 
exchange benefits.21 
In the second specific program, De Gaulle's military with­
drawal faced the remaining Fourteen with the problems of relo­
cating the major military headquarters—SHAPE and AFCENT— 
and the possible construction of bypass facilities for pipelines, 
communications, and the like. Financial problems were made 
more difficult by the gradual departure of France, a member of 
the general coalition, not only from the military force program 
but from infrastructure as well. 
French officials in early 1966 emphasized that the withdrawal 
was not for infrastructure reasons, and that infrastructure was 
part of the "Alliance,'' which De Gaulle had endorsed, rather 
than the "Organization," which he had castigated. Following 
exchange of notes, however, the French position became more 
complicated. On the one hand, the government was eager to 
reap the benefit of infrastructure programs such as Forward 
Scatter and NADGE, which provided air defense data. On the 
other hand, it was unwilling to contribute to the expenses of 
relocating Allied facilities. As for facilities remaining on French 
soil, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville presented the issue 
when he said, "If there is what is known as residual value, 
questions of compensation will arise." 22 France's position crystal­
lized when the French government countered an anticipated 
Allied claim of residual value by its own plea for reconversion 
costs. As host the government contended that it had invested a 
significant amount in addition to the NATO contribution and that 
not all projects on French soil were directly to French benefit. 
Continued French participation in the NATO infrastructure pro­
gram was problematical. French representatives to NATO were 
uncertain how far their writ would run and urged their Allies to 
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limit 1966 discussion to the 1967 program which they had the 
authority to approve, rather than probing 1968 intentions which 
they felt would draw unfavorable attention from the Elysee Pal­
ace. In September, 1966, the French government publicly an­
nounced that it would cease to contribute to the cost of most 
NATO infrastructure beginning January 1, 1967. In practice it 
continued to pay for NADGE and to participate in project authori­
zations by the Payments and Progress Committee on an ad hoc 
basis.23 
The remaining Fourteen decided to move not only NATO'S 
military facilities but its political headquarters as well. Under 
the Chairmanship of Deputy Secretary General Roberts, Work­
ing Group No. 1 of the Fourteen was established to investigate 
legal claims against France for facility relocation and loss of use; 
in mid-1967, after one and one-half years of study, the members 
had assessed the damage in billions of dollars and sent their 
report to their home capitals for consideration of further action. 
While the Fourteen agreed on these broader issues, they were 
less dynamic about details. Following the French withdrawal 
from the blanket cost-sharing formula for Slices XVI-XX, the 
Fourteen began renegotiation. They were unable quickly to 
consummate a new compact; in the meantime they bargained on 
a project-by-project basis to share the expenses of activities in 
which France refused to participate. 
Conflict over the financial burdens of relocation was more 
serious, SACEUR opposed taking relocation expenses from the 
regular infrastructure budget, which he claimed was already 
austere. Infrastructure, he felt, should be supported at the an­
nual average of £45.6 million implied in the previously agreed 
cost-sharing formula for Slices XVI-XX; relocation costs should 
be met either from other budgets or from supplemental infra­
structure authorizations. He was supported by the Germans who 
wanted most relocation expenses to come from the military 
budget, presented in Table 16, where their gross percentage was 
lower than in the infrastructure formula. 
The United States, on the other hand, favored an annual rate 
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of expenditure substantially below £45.6 million and a heavy 
infrastructure contribution to relocation. This would leave room 
for meeting the relocation costs of American military facilities 
under NATO'S pre-financing procedure. Britain also favored the 
lion's share of relocation costs being taken from the infrastruc­
ture budget. Britain's infrastructure portion was relatively small 
and there was a fairly rigid ceiling, in contrast to the military 
TABLE 16 
NATO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

BUDGET, 1961 *

Country Percentage Amount 
United States.. . . 24.20 $1,785,960 
United Kingdom. 19.50 1,439,610 
France 17.10 1,261,980 
Germany 16.10 1,188,180 
Italy 5.96 439,848 
Canada 5.80 428,040 
Belgium 2.86 211,068 
Netherlands 2.85 210,330 
Denmark 1.65 121,770 
Turkey 1.65 121,770 
Norway 1.15 84,870 
Portugal 0.65 47,970 
Greece 0.39 28,272 
Luxembourg. . . . 0.09 6,642 
Iceland 0.05 3,690 
• U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Mutual 
Security appropriations jor 1961, 86th Congress, 2d session, p. 2565. Adjust­
ments through 1966 were minor. See Vandevanter, Common Funding in NATO, 
p. 81. 
budget where the British contribution was higher and the ceil­
ing was more flexible. 
Eventually the American-British position won general sup­
port; and SACEUR'S recommended Slice XVI was reduced by 
approximately 25 per cent. This meant that projects already 
underway were to be delayed and the number of new ones 
reduced. In any case, the new military headquarters were to be 
"streamlined" versions of the old ones, more efficient perhaps, 
but also smaller. 
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FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER 
There is little evidence of the integration or spill-over in NATO 
infrastructure which might have been ancitipated in a techni­
cally infused area. Identical or convergent interests could have 
been expected to be more prominent in infrastructure than in 
political consultation or military forces for a number of reasons: 
national military construction budgets represented only a frac­
tion of national foreign or defense expenditures; military con­
struction contracts involved the utilitarian sanctions associated 
with business activity; technical personnel such as military and 
civilian engineers played a more prominent role in this sector of 
activity than more traditional categories of diplomatic or military 
personnel. Nevertheless, the political element was strong and 
the technical element weak. Crisis was the context of important 
infrastructure progress; in other circumstances there was sub­
stantial conflict, interest convergence was unstable, and common 
interests were inherently non-expansive. 
In the early years of the Alliance, the same Western percep­
tions of the Soviet threat which led to the military force and 
armaments programs occasioned the construction of supporting 
NATO airfields, communications, headquarters, fuel supply, radar, 
and naval, navigational and training facilities. Following Suez 
important funding was approved in February, 1957, for the 
construction of an extensive early warning radar network, a 
communications system based on principles of ionospheric and 
tropospheric forward scatter surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, 
and special ammunition storage (SAS) facilities. The Berlin crisis 
gave new impetus to certain aspects of NATO infrastructure. 
Western weakness in the air was indicated by the fact that the 
air defense system of the German Democratic Republic brought 
down several allied planes over East Germany while the West 
was unable to maintain contact with them. The Allies responded 
during 1961 with an infrastructure acceleration program, center­
ing around SAM and SAS facilities, and with the approval in 
principle of NADGE.24 Finally, the French withdrawal of 1966, 
202 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
because it had implications for an important territorial link in 
NATO'S chain of communications, helped to produce the Alli­
ance's initial use of communications satellites. 
In more routine circumstances, conflict of interest centered 
around the finances and technology of infrastructure. As Table 
TABLE 17 
ESTIMATED NATIONAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES

AT PURCHASING POWER PARITY CONVERSION RATES *

(In Millions of Dollars)

Country Year 
Total Defense 
Expenditures Construction 
United S ta tes . . . . 1964-65 $51,467 $1,000 
Germany 1964 4,398 427 
United Kingdom. . 1964-65 5,178 251 
France 1963 3,164 100 
Italy 1965 1,276 70 
Canada 1963-64 1,725 51 
Turkey 1964 340 31 
Norway 1964 226 20 
Netherlands 1965 707 18 
Greece 1962 141 (13) 
Portugal 
Belgium 
1962 
1964 
264 
336 
(10) 
7 
Denmark 1962-63 195 1 
Luxembourg 1964 8 
• Emile Benoit and Harold Lubell "World Defense Expenditures." Journal of Peace Research No. 2 
(1966), p. 107. The figures in parentheses represent estimated amounts. 
17 suggests, military construction budgets, though a small pro­
portion of national defense budgets, still represented substantial 
sums. National governments making these expenditures were 
unwilling to support NATO infrastructure at the expense of their 
own industries and workers. In areas of more advanced technol­
ogy, nations like the United States were tight-fisted with their 
secrets. In some cases they did not even apply for prefinancing 
because of government unwillingness to reveal project details. 
Interest convergence was increasingly undermined by conflict. 
Original convergence between user-host, contributor-recipient 
interests had been complex. Net user nations, which tended also 
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to be net contributors, benefited from the NATO infrastructure 
program through NATO funding of projects useful for defense, 
access across the territory of host nations, and host provision of 
land and utilities. Net host nations, which were usually also net 
recipients, received jointly funded defense installations as well as 
employment, business contracts, and foreign exchange gains 
through project construction and subsequent emplacements of 
Allied troops. This convergence gradually deteriorated. User-
contributors such as the United States attempted to avoid pro­
gram expansion, to reduce their financial shares, or at least avoid 
raising them, and to steer the program in directions which would 
help meet their particular military needs and involve larger 
shares of infrastructure contracts. At the same time they hoped 
to increase International Staff efficiency and control. Host-recipi­
ents tended to be more favorable toward program expansion, 
though poorer nations like Greece and Turkey found that NATO 
infrastructure's economic benefits sometimes proved to be less 
than the burdens, for example, of providing land and utilities. 
These nations, however, resisted attempts to increase NATO au­
thority over their administration of NATO contracts, where loose 
procedures of accountability might hide significant profits. 
Finally, the area of interest identity diminished with time. 
The common technical interest of the Allies was served by the 
fact that NATO infrastructure provided a viable war-time chain of 
command and logistics, as well as a base for peacetime military 
planning. Limits on this consensus were implicit when the NATO 
military force program, which logically preceded the NATO infra­
structure program, failed to expand. In this situation common 
interest in new infrastructure itself naturally became smaller. 
Once facilities such as war headquarters, pipelines, air bases, 
and training facilities were in place—first in the central states 
and then increasingly in the peripheral ones—it became diffi­
cult to justify more than marginal increments or maintenance/ 
modernization expenditures. Program expansion then became 
dependent on finding more elusive common interests in areas of 
the new technology. 
NATO Science

6 
The institutions of NATO science can be divided into categories of 
pure science, defense science, and military science.1 While there 
was a general pattern of structural differentiation and change in 
each of these areas, binding procedures did not develop past the 
unanimity rule, and ultimately the NATO Science program 
amounted to an approximate annual total of only $10 million. 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
Pure Science 
Following the Suez and Sputnik crises, and the reports of the 
Committee on Non-Military Co-operation and the Task Force 
on Action by NATO in the Field of Scientific and Technical 
Co-operation, the heads of government in December, 1957, ap­
proved the creation of specific NATO institutions in the area of 
pure science. They "decided to establish forthwith a Science 
Committee on which all of the NATO countries will be repre­
sented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scien­
tific policy. In addition," they stated, "'a scientist of outstanding 
qualifications will be appointed as Science Advisor to the Secre­
tary General of NATO." 2 In March, 1958, the first Science Ad­
visor to the NATO Secretary General took office and the Science 
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Committee held its first meeting. The Science Advisor's rank 
was raised to Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs in 
1962. His staff gradually increased until by 1966 it numbered 
ten persons, approximately two-thirds of whom were concerned 
exclusively or primarily with pure science. 
During this period the Science Committee created a subcom­
mittee and a series of advisory groups. In 1959 it established the 
Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research, the Advisory Panel 
on the Advanced Study Institutes Program, and the Advisory 
Panel on Meteorology. In 1960 it created Advisory Panels on the 
Research Grants Program, on Defense Psychology (later to be­
come the Advisory Panel on Human Factors), and on Opera­
tional Research, and in 1961 the Advisory Panel on Radiometeo­
rology.3 
Table 18 outlines the five major sets of activities which devel­
oped and cut across the pure science structures, providing re­
sources for their tasks. In 1959 programs of Fellowships and 
Advanced Study Institutes came into existence; in 1960 a pro­
gram of Research Grants began; in 1962 Operational Research 
was inaugurated; and in 1967 Human Factors were introduced. 
The first of these, the Science Fellowship Program, had as its 
main aim "to increase the numbers of scientists and engineers 
trained in research, and to facilitate the exchange of graduate 
and post-doctoral research workers between member countries." 
Most fellowships involved study abroad, but in some cases they 
were awarded for study in home universities. The dominant 
subjects of study were chemistry and physics, but engineering, 
mathematics, the medical sciences, biology, and geology were 
also "'substantially represented." The Advanced Study Institutes 
program supported summer schools "originally patterned after 
the annual summer schools in physics held at Varenna in Italy 
and Les Houches in France.'' Subjects of study included such 
diverse topics as air-sea interaction, electronic aspects of bio­
chemistry, quantum electronics and coherent light, and geophys­
ics: the earth's environment. The Research Grants Program 
stressed "international research rather than fellowships and 
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meetings," though "about 20 per cent of the program may be 
devoted to helping scientific research in the less developed mem­
ber countries." One of the largest projects involved the study of 
the propagation characteristics of signals from satellites. It was 
conducted under the direction of the National Research Council 
Microwave Center in Florence, and scientists from the Universi­
ties of Paris, Manchester, and Athens, and from the Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment, the Ionospheric Institute of 
the German Postal Service, and the United States Air Force 
Research Laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts participated. 
Another large grant, under the direction of the University of 
Bristol, focused on the study of cosmic rays with balloons. Other 
smaller projects involved the co-operation of only two or a few 
laboratories from different nations, or—in the case of countries 
like Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Iceland—purely na­
tional research efforts. The Operational Research Program em­
phasized the application of scientific methods to the study of 
business problems, both military and civil, in order to provide 
executives with quantitative bases for decisions, NATO supported 
''a series of visits by consultants to countries where there was an 
insufficient awareness of the value of this approach," a Graduate 
Apprenticeship Program "to enable young scientists to spend one 
or two years periods in operational research centers in some of 
the NATO countries,1' and a series of international conferences 
each year, ranging "from introductory courses to more special­
ized discussions on particular topics.'' In later years, these confer­
ences were 'almost entirely concerned with problems of direct 
interest in a military context." Finally, the Human Factors Pro­
gram concentrated on psychological and social-psychological 
processes in defense and non-defense contexts. The Advisory 
Panel hoped to promote information exchange and advanced 
instruction through conferences, symposia, Advanced Study In­
stitutes, seminars, visiting lectureships, and study visits. In addi­
tion NATO aimed to support the conduct of co-operative research.4 
In spite of these developments, binding institutional proce­
dures remained anemic. Neither the Assitant Secretary General, 
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his staff, nor the Advisory Panels were formally able to manipu­
late nations against their will. Although the first two could make 
recommendations and influence outcomes, and although the Ad­
visory Panels adopted an informal pattern of majority decision-
making, the decisions in NATO'S pure science program were 
ultimately made by the Science and Civil Budget Committees, 
where the unanimity rule gave each nation a veto on projects 
and policies to which it might be strongly opposed. 
Moreover, the total pure science program exhibited a period of 
initial growth but then stabilized at a low level relative to 
national programs. As Table 18 (above) shows, between 1959 
and 1966, pure science programs were supported by a budget 
which rose from $1.15 million to $4.2 million. In the years 
between 1962 and 1966, however, the budget remained in the 
area of $4 million, and there were indications that it was being 
undercut by rising price levels. A Science Committee document 
reported that, in "comparison with the 1963 programme viewed 
as a whole, the 1964 programme represents a constant budgetary 
level but is somewhat smaller both in the number of fellowships 
and in the number of months of study that it supports. While 
the total cost has remained level ( + - 3 per cent), total fellow­
ships have declined by 3.2 per cent and total months of study by 
8.0 per cent." s 
Defense Science 
In 1964, a new Assistant Secretary General for Scientific 
Affairs, Dr. John L. McLucas, was appointed. McLucas came to 
the position from the United States Department of Defense, 
where he had been Deputy Director of Research and Engineer­
ing for Tactical Warfare Programs. A new emphasis on defense 
science was represented by McLucas' appointment. The four 
men who had preceded him in the posts of Assistant Secretary 
General for Scientific Affairs and Science Advisor had all been 
academic, physicists from major American universities—Prof. 
N. F. Ramsay (Harvard), Prof. F. Seitz (Illinois), Prof. W. A. 
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Nierenberg (Berkeley), Prof. W. P. Allis (MIT)—rather than 
defense scientists. McLucas, in a news interview which he held 
upon assuming office, said that he hoped to see the NATO science 
program shift toward a greater military emphasis and toward 
greater alignment with NATO'S military needs. The Defense Re­
search Directors Committee (DRDC) would meet three or four 
times a year and would concern itself with programs such as 
modern tanks, Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) 
aircraft, electronic data processing, anti-submarine warfare, air 
defense, aircraft identification equipment, long-term scientific 
studies, defense research seminars, and the spread of operations 
research techniques. Furthermore, he hoped for a greater de­
fense emphasis in such fields as communications, ionospheric 
studies, meteorology, and data processing.6 
The dominant structure in NATO defense science was the 
Defense Research Directors Committee, which was composed of 
officials from national defense research establishments. Initially 
an informal annual assembly, the DRDC was eventually given 
regular NATO status and held its first meeting in October, 1964. 
The terms of reference of the DRDC directed it to: consider 
future weapons requirements and co-operate in research pro­
grams that would provide the necessary knowledge for the devel­
opment of these weapons; provide advice to the Military Author­
ities and the NATO Council on the application of advances in 
science; review for the benefit of the NATO Military Authorities 
the possible military consequences of current and forecast ad­
vances in technology and the application of these to weapons 
development. 
The DRDC developed no binding procedures; it took no con­
crete action nor did it recommend specific activity to govern­
ments. Its major project was the updating of several technologi­
cal forecasts in a series which had reviewed the state of fourteen 
areas of military technology and projected the findings into the 
1970's.7 Related projects included emphases in the areas of NATO 
Basic Military Requirements, air defense, aircraft identification, 
communication satellites, and military operational research. 
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DRDC activities were supported by no substructure of commit­
tees similar to that of pure science, by only half the number of 
international staff, and by no independent budgetary allocation. 
The studies undertaken by the DRDC were the product of work 
by the national agencies which were represented by the DRDC 
members. 
The high level committee which had reviewed NATO activities 
in arms co-operation, AC 253, had also considered NATO defense 
science. In its report which the Council approved in June, 1966, 
the Committee called for the abolition of the DRDC and removal 
of military aspects of science from the jurisdiction of the Assist­
ant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs. In its place the 
report recommended the establishment of a Defense Research 
Group (DRG) to be responsible to the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors and to be connected with the division of 
the Secretariat headed by the Assistant Secretary General for 
Armaments and Infrastructure. 
In the summer of 1966, Dr. McLucas left NATO, taking with 
him two members of the defense science staff. By autumn 1967, 
no successor had been appointed, the post being occupied for a 
year by an "acting' assistant secretary general chosen from 
within the Science Division. 
At the last meeting of the DRDC in December, 1966, provision 
was made for the initial assembly of DRG. When the DRG met in 
March, 1967, its mission had been downgraded and Science 
Division participation reduced. While it would continue to em­
phasize basic defense research, the attempt to formulate NATO 
Basic Military Requirements had been abandoned. Whereas the 
Chair had previously been occupied by Dr. McLucas, the new 
DRG Chairman was the Norwegian representative, Mr. Finn 
Lied, and the Acting Assistant Secretary General for Scientific 
Affairs attended only as an observer. 
Military Science 
Three technical research structures were responsible to the 
NATO military authorities. The first of these, the Advisory Group 
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for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) was recom 
mended in February, 1951, by an Ad Hoc Conference of NATC 
Research Directors; existed for a trial period of two years undei 
United States logistic support; and became a NATO Standing 
Group Agency supported by NATO funds in 1954. In February 
1955, the second body, the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center 
was officially opened at The Hague. During its early years it was 
sustained financially by the United States and administered by i 
Dutch non-governmental research agency, RVO-TNO. Following a 
Council decision in February, 1960, the Air Defense Technical 
Center was maintained by NATO'S military budget; in March 
1963, it severed ties with RVO-TNO and became an International 
Military Organization immediately subordinate to SACEUR and 
in October, its name was shortened to SHAPE Technical Centei 
and its mission enlarged to include not only the limited area ol 
air defense but also the whole spectrum of "defensive and offen­
sive operations relating to Allied Command Europe." The third 
group, the SACXANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centei 
(SASWREC) was commissioned by SACLANT in May, 1959, at La 
Spezia, Italy, under initial American funding. In October, 1962. 
the council adopted a Charter designating SASWREC as an Inter­
national Military Organization under SACLANT'S continuing pol­
icy direction; and the transfer to NATO occurred during the firs) 
half of 1963.8 
The structure of AGARD included a National Delegates Board 
a number of technical panels and committees appointed by the 
NDB, and a permanent staff of about fifteen experts in Paris. Its 
mission was to bring together the leading personalities of the 
NATO nations in the fields of science and technology relating to 
aerospace for the following purposes: 
(a) Recommending effective ways for the member nations to 
use their research and development capabilities for the com­
mon benefit of the NATO community; 
(b) Providing scientific and technical advice and assistance 
to the Standing Group in the field of aerospace research and 
development; 
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(c) Continuously stimulating advances in the aerospace 
sciences relevant to strengthening the common defense pos­
ture; 
(d) Improving the co-operation among member nations in 
aerospace research and development; 
(e) Exchanging of scientific and technical information; 
(f) Providing assistance to member nations for the purpose 
of increasing their scientific and technical potential; 
(g) Rendering scientific and technical assistance, as requested, 
to other NATO bodies and to member nations in connection with 
research and development problems in the aerospace field. 9 
AGARD placed special emphasis in the areas of aerospace, avion­
ics, combustion and propulsion, flight mechanics, fluid dynamics, 
structures and materials, and technical information; an Interna­
tional Consultant and Exchange Program; technical meetings, 
symposia, and colloquia; and a series of surveys and technical 
studies under the AGARDograph program. In support of these 
activities, the total annual AGARD budget was approximately $1 
million. 
The SHAPE Technical Center, as it existed in 1967, was under 
the direction of SACEUR, who received advice from a Scientific 
Committee of National Representatives, STC'S task consisted of 
two major segments: first, there were problems of air defense, 
communications and data handling, areas of concern since the 
mid-1950's; here STC was concerned with the ACE High commu­
nications system, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment 
(NADGE) project, and NATO satellite communications. Secondly, 
STC activity centered on analytical problems of current ACE sys­
tems in such fields as operational research and systems analysis. 
STC had a staff of approximately 90 scientists, 80 technicians, 
and 150 support personnel, drawn from all of the Allies1 except 
Iceland, Luxembourg, and—beginning in 1966—France. Its 
budget was about $3 million annually.10 
The SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Center 
(SASWREC) came under the policy direction of SACLANT, assisted 
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by the SASWREC Scientific Committee of National Representa­
tives which was to "assist SACLANT in establishing the Center's 
work programme and . provide the Center with scientific and 
technical advice in the field of anti-submarine warfare." The 
Center's mission was 
to provide scientific and technical advice and assistance to 
SACLANT in the field of anti-submarine warfare, and to be in 
all respects responsive through SACLANT to the requirements 
of NATO naval forces in this field. As a subsidiary function 
the Center may, without prejudice to its main task, render 
scientific and technical assistance, within the approved pro­
gramme, to NATO nations requesting aid with anti-submarine 
warfare problems. The Center shall perform the following 
functions: 
(a) operational research and analysis; 
(b) research and limited development (but not engineering 
for manufacture) in the field of anti-submarine warfare, in­
cluding oceanography; 
(c) advisory and consultant work; 
(d) exploratory research; 
(e) such other related tasks as may be necessary.11 
SASWREC'S task centered around the goal of antisubmarine 
warfare to seek, find, and destroy enemy submarines. It involved 
data collection in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, with tests for 
water temperature, salinity, and bottom conditions; the evalua­
tion of present ASW systems; and the projection of future ASW 
requirements. Various groups at the Center worked in support of 
these assignments. The oceanography group was the largest and 
utilized both a smaller workboat and the 2,000-ton research 
vessel "Maria Paolina," which was run by the Italian govern­
ment and leased to the Center, and represented a laboratory 
extension of the La Spezia facilities. Of special importance was a 
study of the Straits of Gibraltar with reference to the'problems 
of cross-currents, temperature, salinity, and the nature of the 
ocean bottom. An operations research group studied such sub­
jects as convoy formation and search patterns. Finally there were 
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groups whose activities were focused around sound propagation 
and target classification. 
SASWREC was originally staffed by 19 scientists. In early 1966, 
50 scientists were included in an authorized personnel comple­
ment of 205, and the annual budget was between $2 and $2.5 
million.12 
Binding institutional procedures were weak in each of the 
three agencies. Ultimate decisions, influenced by advice from 
the military commanders and various committees of national 
representatives, remained with the Military Budget Committee, 
where nations preserved their right of veto. 
AUTHORITY 
The lack of substantial institutional progress was comple­
mented by slight evidence of increase in NATO'S authority, either 
in terms of direct administration or of effectiveness. 
The major NATO pure science effort was the Science Fellow­
ship Program, where NATO administration was indirect, with 
grants applied for and administered through national agencies. 
Thus the NATO Scientific Affairs Division stated that 
the Science Committee exercises general supervision over the 
Programme, but the detailed administration is carried out by 
an agency in each country, which, in many cases, is the same 
agency administering other national fellowship schemes. These 
agencies select the Fellows, determine and pay their stipends 
and travel expenses, and negotiate with the universities in 
other countries to gain acceptance for them. Selection is based 
entirely on scientific merit and ability, but practices vary from 
one country to another.13 
The only tangible accomplishment of the NATO fellowship 
program was an indication that its establishment had led the 
governments of Greece and Turkey to set up national science 
councils, a goal of the Armand report, in order to administer 
applications and grants for their own nationals.14 
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NATO'S Science Committee, subcommittees, and the Interna­
tional Staff directly administered the smaller portion of the pure 
science effort: advanced study institutes, research grants, and 
operational research. Table 18 (above) shows that, between 
1959 and 1966, the budgets of these activities increased both 
absolutely and relative to fellowships. The real share of the 
directly administered programs was further expanded by the 
transfer of a growing proportion of their administrative expenses 
to the fellowship budget.15 Nevertheless, NATO did not maintain 
tight control over its projects. In the Advanced Study Institutes 
and Research Grants programs, NATO guidelines emphasized 
international attendance and international collaboration; but fol­
lowing approval of their requests, NATO awarded money to indi­
vidual program directors who then redistributed it without strict 
supervision by, or strict reporting to, the Organization on either 
the extent to which the original proposal had been implemented 
or the specific degree of international co-operation which had 
taken place.16 
In defense science there was also little evidence of NATO 
authority. The major activity of the DRDC was making studies 
which culminated in conclusions rather than explicit recommen­
dations for action. There is no public reason to believe that 
whatever implicit recommendations were contained in these 
studies achieved a serious positive effect on government 
policies. 
The military agencies also concentrated on studies, with no 
formal recommendations to member nations. Some impact was 
achieved by AGARD, which took part in the selection of the Fiat G 
91 as the NATO Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, 
and by STC, which participated in the original design, implemen­
tation, and operation of the ACE High communications system 
and played a role in the development of NADGE and NATO 
SATCOM. Even here, however, influence depended on support 
from the NATO military commanders and on the voluntary agree­
ment of national decision-makers.17 
216 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
LEGITIMACY 
The deficiencies of NATO science in institutional autonomy 
and authority accompanied a lack of significant progress in legiti­
macy. At the national level, there were increases in the number 
of net contributors, but nations were reluctant to expand the size 
of the program. At non-national levels, support came mainly 
from scientific groups and the NATO Parliamentarians, but had 
little impact on the program. 
The general pattern of national support for NATO science was 
one in which the United States bore the brunt of the initial 
burden, but reduced its share as other nations could be per­
suaded to take it up. While contributer nations increased in 
number, they showed no disposition radically to expand the 
science program. 
In pure science, this pattern is hinted at by Table 19, which 
shows gross national contribution percentages, without allow­
ance for different program benefits. Thus in 1959 the United 
States' gross contribution was half the pure science budget; by 
1964-1967 this had been reduced to less than one-quarter. Table 
20 presents net national contributions to the NATO Fellowship 
program, with allowance for national distribution of fellowships. 
It shows that in 1960 the United States was alone in providing 
net fellowship support; but by 1967 it had been joined by the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium. Although comparable figures are not available, a 
similar pattern probably existed in Research Grants. During the 
years through 1966, NATO had awarded 235 research grants, 159 
of which had involved international co-operation. The 76 re­
maining projects, which were purely national, were distributed 
among net fellowship recipients: Turkey received 34, Greece 
19, Portugal 14, Italy 6, and Iceland 3.18 
In defense science, the United States again provided the 
initial support, but the Allies were less eager to increase their 
contribution. Not only were they unwilling to give money for a 
separate budget; they were also reluctant to supply additional 
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personnel for the international staff. In 1964 Assistant Secretary 
General for Scientific Affairs McLucas requested staff assistance 
from the governments of the United States, the United King­
dom, and Canada. In spite of his personal visits to London and 
Ottawa, the British and Canadian governments rejected the 
requests. The United States was somewhat more helpful, even­
tually sending three officers, but lack of support from the Allies 
resulted in these officers being only tangentially attached to 
NATO. The Allies refused to authorize the NATO salary contribu­
tion provided for under the special remuneration agreement in 
effect for U.S. nationals, and the United States government was 
forced to bear the entire expense. By the summer of 1966 the 
United States had withdrawn these individuals.19 
In the military technical programs, the United States initially 
established and financially supported all three agencies, or their 
precursors—AGARD in 1952, the SHAPE Air'Defense Technical 
Center in 1954, and SASWREC in 1959. Subsequently, as these 
agencies came under the aegis of NATO, other nations assumed 
part of the American contribution. 
The pattern of legitimacy was such that net contributor na­
tions to the NATO science program—those which did not receive 
their full financial contribution back in the form of scientific 
program benefits—tended to combine their financial support 
with resistance to rapid expansion. Thus a considerable number 
of countries contributed to the pure science program while at the 
same time opposing broad program growth, arguing that such 
aims of NATO science as political cohesion, Western scientific 
progress, and information exchange were amply served by budg­
etary increases keeping pace with the cost of living. When task 
expansion in excess of this guideline was proposed, national 
delegates were quick to invoke the greater legitimacy of the OECD 
or UNESCO for international scientific endeavors. Net recipient 
nations—those whose contributions were less than their program 
benefits—tended to advocate more rapid expansion, seeing pro­
gram growth as a form of economic aid and income 
redistribution. 
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The most important source of domestic support for NATO 
science came from scientific bodies. The agencies shown in 
Appendix D were among those that contributed administrative 
services and occasional financial supplements to the pure science 
program. Scientific groups, both governmental and non-govern­
mental, gave expediential support to the program because they 
saw it as a useful tool for extracting financial support from their 
national governments. Scientists felt that money taken away 
from NATO would be totally lost to science, and would not be 
reinvested in other national or international scientific programs. 
Nevertheless, they admitted the greater legitimacy of OECD or 
UNESCO as a frame for new international programs. 
At the supranational level, there was verbal support from the 
NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, mostly in the context of 
pure science projects. According to one analysis, the NPC be­
tween 1956 and 1963 passed twenty-eight scientific and techni­
cal resolutions in which the ratio of concrete policy proposals to 
platitudinous or procedural statements was exceptionally high. 
Yet the NPC seemed to have little positive effect on national 
policies. National executive officials tended to view many NPC 
proposals as Utopian; legislative bodies were not eager to contrib­
ute money; and most legislators remained unaware of the NATO 
science program.20 
LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY 
The lack of integration in science came about in spite of 
leadership support. Over time, most NATO leaders promoted NATO 
science, though with an ideological mix which included exhorta­
tion in terms of general, relatively abstract goals, but also often 
concentrated heavily on more tangible and more limited objec­
tives. At the highest level of generality, scientific cooperation 
was defended in the name of the Atlantic Community and as a 
response to the Soviet scientific threat. At a lower level of 
abstraction, the leadership promoted joint efforts for reasons of 
social welfare and defense capability. Next came justification in 
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terms of defense programs which NATO science was supposed to 
support. Most specifically the leadership identified those con­
crete tasks and structures which should be the center of co-opera­
tive action and implied the specific client groups at which the 
program was aimed. 
The widest range of appeal was that expounded by Spaak, 
under whom the NATO Science Program formally began, who 
spoke in terms of the Atlantic Community, Adantic integration, 
and response to the challenge of the Soviet Sputniks. In Septem­
ber, 1958, he wrote that "the organization of scientific coopera­
tion' should be accomplished "as quickly as possible. In a 
word," he continued, "the Atlantic Alliance should become the 
Atlantic Community." A few months earlier he had called the 
second Soviet Sputnik "another potential risk in the field of 
scientific research and technical development.'' He summoned 
the West to respond by "procedures beginning in mutual assist­
ance and wide-scale cooperation and moving towards the goal of 
integration." 21 
Below this level of generality, Spaak emphasized that Allied 
scientific co-operation was the only way in which a modern 
defense could be achieved without sacrificing the benefits of 
social welfare. Posing the issue in terms of the choice between 
"Sputnik and the washing machine," he went on to say that the 
"dual effort to maintain and increase the standard of living of 
our peoples and to make constant progress in the fields of science 
and defense cannot be continued by any one Western country 
alone—and when I say any one Western country, I mean even 
the most powerful and prosperous of them. If we want to go on 
doing both these things we must unite and we must 
collaborate." 22 
More specifically, Spaak laid special emphasis on the activities 
of pure science. In his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians in 
1960 he not only supported existing pure science programs but 
also the "magnificent idea of an Atlantic Institute of Science and 
Technology." By 1960, however, Spaak was openly discouraged 
about NATO science. He confessed to the Parliamentarians that 
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"things are not exactly as I should like, because our progress, in 
spite of all our efforts, is slow in spite of often being along the 
right lines."23 
Subsequent Secretaries General moved to ground which had a 
less sweeping view than the terrain he had staked out. In lieu of 
Spaak's formula of Atlantic Community, response to the Sput­
niks, defense, and welfare, Stikker and Brosio stressed a subtask 
of defense—arms standardization—as a rationale for Allied sci­
entific co-operation. Stikker pointed to NATO'S failure to achieve 
''standardization of weapons'' and stated that, "as the pace of 
progress becomes so rapid that there is more than a little truth in 
the scientist's epigram 'if it works it's obsolete,' we are being 
driven further, almost in spite of ourselves, towards a greater 
measure of cooperation in development and production. The 
best way of achieving this," he said "is to get agreement at the 
earliest possible stage and indeed, if it can be achieved, before 
detailed designing even starts."2i Brosio repeated the same 
theme, saying that the goal of 'standardized armaments'' re­
quired "cooperation at the earlist possible stage, before national 
attitudes have hardened" and intensification of "activity in the 
fields of pure science and initial research." 25 
As for specific tasks and structures, Stikker emphasized the 
establishment of an International Institute of Science and Tech­
nology, while Brosio advanced the cause of the Defense Re­
search Directors Committee. Stikker hoped that the Interna­
tional Institute would "be given the strongest support." Brosio 
said that he regarded the DRDC as a ''major step forward in the 
field of allied cooperation." 26 
Although military leaders made few public statements directly 
in support of scientific co-operation, they tended to favor it for 
defense reasons. In a broad vein, General Norstad praised collab­
oration in science as a means of responding to the Soviet techno­
logical threat and maintaining a convincing deterrent. "The So­
viets have underway a mighty technological program that is a 
stern challenge to NATO, to its military planners, and to its scien­
tists and leaders of industry," he said. Allied co-operation in sci­
224 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
ence and technology represented one way of "answering the 
challenge. It is here that the great burden must fall," he 
believed, "if we are to maintain a convincing deterrent in the 
face of Soviet pressure over the long haul." 27 
On a more specific level, the military backed tasks—such as 
air defense and standardization—which implied joint efforts. 
SACEUR and SACLANT supported AGARD, STC, and SASWREC, as 
indicated by General Gruenther's relatively public role in estab­
lishing the antecedent of STC, the SHAPE Air Defense Center.28 
Following the conclusion of the McMahon study on the dura­
tion of national service, General Norstad proposed further study 
of human factors within the framework of the NATO science 
program. He stated: 
We have scientists working in all of our establishments, work­
ing on the "gadgetry," the equipment, the system of this busi­
ness, but we don't have, in these times, the scientists really 
working on the problems of the man. I have discussed this 
with Dr. Ramsay, the Scientific Advisor to the Secretary 
General of NATO, and suggested to him that this is onefield to 
which the Scientific Committee very properly could devote 
some attention.29 
The specific clients to which the leadership's ideology was 
designed to appeal must be deduced, since there is little explicit 
evidence. Although Spaak's formulation was general enough to 
appeal to all—and although he noted that "even the most power­
ful and prosperous'' ally, i.e., the United States could not af­
ford to go it alone—it is likely that his ideology was designed 
particularly for the European nations. Scientific co-operation 
would help them modernize defense capabilities in spite of their 
limited resources. Thus Spaak's linkage of science, defense, and 
welfare suggested that a co-operative program might cost his 
European clients less in the long run than independent national 
efforts. The narrower ideology of Spaak's successors was proba­
bly planned to appeal more specifically to the same audience. 
Defense remained salient; and Stikker, in justifying the Interna­
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tional Institute of Science and Technology, stated that "the 
European countries now find it individually impossible to 
rival the scientific resources of the United States and the USSR. 
Only united can they maintain their levels and enhance their 
i . . J> 30 
traditions. 
Even for the Europeans, however, the ideology implied sacri­
fices. Specific tasks and structures such as fellowships; summer 
courses; oceanographic, meteorological, and human factors pro­
grams; the Atlantic Institute of Science and Technology; the 
DRDC; AGARD; STC; and SASWREC meant immediate resource con­
tributions, and corresponding client resistance. 
DECISION-MAKING 
In spite of the leadership's hopes and wishes, the dynamic of 
Allied co-operation was blunted within NATO'S structure for sci­
entific decision-making, which contained imbalances between 
independent experts and instructed delegates. 
Initially, four major advisory groups advanced the leadership's 
ideology. The first of these was the Committee on Non-Military 
Co-operation, appointed by the Council in May, 1956. In its 
report the Committee emphasized the importance of developing 
scientific and technical co-operation through concrete action and 
recommended that a conference be convened composed of one 
or at most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental 
from each country." In the aftermath of Suez, the Council 
meeting in December, 1956, approved the Report of this Com­
mittee and in June, 1957, formed the second group, a Task 
Force on Action by NATO in the Field of Scientific and Technical 
Co-operation, headed by Dr. J. Koepfli of the United States. In 
November, the Task Force recommended the creation of a NATO 
Scientific Committee, the appointment of a NATO Science Ad­
visor, and encouraged the establishment of NATO military techni­
cal agencies.31 
Two years later the Science Committee, seeing as part of its 
task to study the "ways whereby science in the Western World 
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could be strengthened," sponsored the formation of a third advi­
sory group. This group, headed by Louis Armand of France, and 
financed jointly by NATO and the Ford Foundation, met between 
September, 1959, and June, 1960. Among the recommendations 
of the Armand Report were several with implications for the 
NATO Science program, including the suggestion that an Interna­
tional Institute of Science and Technology be created.32 The 
recommendation by the Armand Report for the establishment of 
an International Institute led the Council to authorize the Secre­
tary General to appoint, before the end of 1960, a fourth group 
to study the question. Again joindy financed by NATO and the 
Ford Foundation, the group met under the chairmanship of Dr. 
James R. Killian, Jr., of the United States. In October, 1961, the 
Killian Group presented its report to the Council, recommend­
ing the Institute's formation.33 
These groups proved productive in advancing the leadership's 
ideology in direct relationship to the immediacy of the Suez and 
Sputnik crises. At the same time, their effectiveness was related 
to the balance which they maintained between independent 
experts and instructed delegates. The recommendations of the 
Committee on Non-Military Co-operation and the Koepfli Com­
mittee led to the creation of the NATO Science Committee, the 
post of NATO Science Advisor, and the establishment of the 
military technical agencies. The Committee on Non-Military 
Co-operation was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, 
Italy, and Norway—Lester Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Hal­
vard Lange—whose combination of superior delegate status and 
superior expertise was indicated by their informal designation as 
a second incarnation of the Three Wise Men. The Koepfli 
Committee mixed national delegates to the Science Committee 
with eminent scientists independent of NATO or national govern­
ment control in a six to four proportion. The ten participants in 
the Koepfli group included representatives to the NATO Science 
Committee from Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
United Kingdom. By contrast the major specific recommenda­
tion of the later Armand and Killian Committees—the creation 
of an International Institute of Science and Technology—re­
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mained unimplemented; and here the national delegates were 
heavily outweighed by the independent experts. The Armand 
Committee's twelve members included only four delegates to the 
NATO Science Committee, from Belgium, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The Killian Committee, with 
seven participants, had only one NATO Science Committee repre­
sentative, from Germany. 
As the NATO science program developed, the leadership tried 
to use other experts in different ways—with varying degrees of 
success. One of the earliest such attempts about which public 
evidence exists was connected with the creation of the SHAPE Air 
Defense Technical Center. General Gruenther's emphasis on 
the improvement of air defense led him to appoint an interna­
tional team of officers at SHAPE, chaired by a European, to 
consider the problems of Allied Command Europe. In addition, 
the United States Air Force sponsored an air defense planning 
group, chaired by Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage. The SHAPE commit­
tee pointed to the need for advanced technical development in 
air defense; and its recommendations formed the basis for the 
more specific proposals of the Overhage Committee which, in 
turn, led to the establishment of SADTC.34 
Another effort was the appointment of Dr. McLucas as Assist­
ant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, which was less fruit­
ful, partly because of internal administrative tensions. Dirk Stik­
ker had been dissatisfied with the Assistant Secretary General 
for Scientific Affairs who had preceded McLucas and had asked 
American Secretary of Defense McNamara to supply a more 
dynamic individual. When McLucas arrived from the Depart­
ment of Defense, he found nothing in his terms of appointment 
which indicated his responsibility for defense research; and he 
requested very specific instructions from Stikker concerning the 
extent and limitations of his authority, particularly with respect 
to the field of armaments and infrastructure. 
At this point Stikker retreated. In advancing NATO science, he 
did not wish to diminish the position of the Assistant Secretary 
General for Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure—Mr. 
Johnson Garrett, an American financier. Stikker believed it im­
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portant to safeguard the administrative integrity of NATO infra­
structure, which he considered one of NATO'S most successful 
activities, and which he felt had been financially administered in 
an exemplary manner. Stikker had already decided on his own 
resignation, and he informed McLucas that he would have to 
deal with the next Secretary General. For the interim he drafted 
a memorandum with the assistance of Garrett and the Assistant 
Secretary General for Economics and Finance, outlining McLu­
cas' primary mission as defense science. This memorandum care­
fully avoided giving McLucas a dominant position in the area of 
armaments and infrastructure and was neither changed nor re­
placed when Brosio arrived. 
Secretary General Brosio took a different tack with a project 
which began in mid-1966. At the June Ministerial meeting, 
Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani warned the Council of the 
consequences which would result if the ''technological gap" 
between Europe and the United States were not reduced. The 
Italian government submitted supporting documents during the 
fall, and the Ministerial Council in December instructed the 
Permanent Representatives to prepare a report for the spring 
Ministerial session. In March, 1967, the Permanent Council 
created AC/262, a Special Working Group on International 
Technological Co-operation, which was to be under Brosio's 
Chairmanship.35 Under its terms of reference, the Working 
Group was to: 
1.	 Further define the problem 
2.	 Outline the activities of other international organizations 
3.	 Outine measures for further implementation 
4.	 Investigate what concrete NATO action was possible, espe­
cially in the area of defense technology 
This working group represented a forum within which Brosio 
could quietly probe the possibility of expanding the ideology and 
program of NATO science. He attempted to emphasize, at differ­
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ent levels of generality, an over-all increase in scientific and 
technical co-operation; promotion of co-operation in all possible 
contexts; and a special role for NATO. 
Brosio delegated day-to-day responsibility to M. Andre Vin­
cent, a French member of the International Staff/Secretariat 
who served as Director of Economic Affairs. Vincent collated 
and redrafted material submitted by the national delegates—par­
ticularly by the Belgian delegate, Dr. Spaey—and, in some parts 
of the final report, made original contributions.36 
The delegates to AC/262 came from the various national 
capitals. Some of them were high-ranking individuals—the 
American delegate was Robert Bowie, who had played a major 
part in the development of the MLF—and had some room for 
independent maneuver. Nevertheless, they tended to be in­
structed concerning possible concrete plans for NATO and espe­
cially about finances. 
These instructions left little room for constructive NATO ac­
tion. The United States and United Kingdom did not wish to 
increase their financial contributions; France was not eager to 
beat the drum for NATO by supporting new enterprises; the 
Germans were wary of being caught between the United States 
and France. Most support came from Italy, which had made the 
original proposal; from Belgium, which was the new site of 
SHAPE and the political headquarters; and from countries like 
Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, with little money to contribute. 
During the course of the debate, the American delegation 
produced a plan which, while it did not threaten substantial new 
financial outlays, seemed to aim at increasing the co-ordination 
of the science program and at making it more relevant to NATO'S 
central aims. It also attempted to increase the defense aspect of 
the pure science program while decreasing the purely military 
aspect of the scientific agencies. The plan included: 
1.	 An Atlantic Technological Center concerned with opera­
tions research, systems analysis, and strategic studies (The 
SHAPE Technical Center might serve as the basis for a 
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European computer center available to Central and East­
ern European countries. This facility should promote East-
West contacts and might even produce intelligence.) 
2.	 An Atlantic Aerospace Center centered around AGARD 
3.	 An Atlantic Oceanographic Center which might include 
SASWREC 
4.	 An Atlantic Center for Community Affairs, which might 
focus not only on the Atlantic Community but also on the 
intra-Western European and East-West relations 
SACEUR opposed this proposal. He neither wished to be consol­
idated into the civilian structure nor to lose NATO'S military 
science agencies. The SHAPE Technical Center, for example, 
provided him with valuable services in the fields of communica­
tions satellites, battlefield jamming, radar, and air defense. 
In June, 1967, the Council of Ministers received the report of 
AC/262 and passed a "resolution of international technological 
cooperation." This resolution made general comments concern­
ing efforts at national, European, Atlantic, and wider levels. 
When it came to the role of the Alliance itself, the Council 
merely "'noted with satisfaction" NATO'S existing scientific and 
technological activities and invited the Permanent Council "to 
pursue its studies'' and report further.37 
Within the more permanent machinery, decision-making was 
ultimately dominated by instructed delegates. The members of 
the Science Committee and its subordinate bodies—although 
most were connected with universities or research institutes (See 
Appendix E) , although many held established scientific reputa­
tions, and although a few, like Sir Solly Zuckerman had high 
domestic political influence—were appointed by their home gov­
ernments and responsible to them. With regard to substantive 
matters, they retained some room for bargaining in the intera­
gency politics leading to the formulation of their instructions 
and for their alteration in case of disagreement; with regard to 
financial ceilings, they usually had little leeway, particularly 
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since the final decisions lay not with the Science but with the 
Civilian Budget Committee. The members of the Defense Re­
search Directors Committee were all members of national gov­
ernment agencies (see Appendix F) . 
Officers responsible for day-to-day science affairs within the 
national delegations combined high instruction with low exper­
tise and status. The member of the national delegation charged 
with scientific affairs was likely to have had little or no scientific 
training. Usually, NATO Science was a collateral duty rather than 
a full-time assignment; in those cases in which it was a primary 
duty, the person assigned to the task was often one of the most 
junior members of the delegation. 
In the areas of pure and defense science, the leadership's 
experts were the members of the Science Division of the Inter­
national Staff/Secretariat. In pure science, they played a subor­
dinate role to the Science Committee, pushing for several pro­
grams—data abstracting, for example—without success.28 The 
members of the Science Division concerned with defense science 
between 1964 and 1966 were mostly American nationals paid 
entirely by the American government. 
Decision-making for the military technical agencies, although 
it included an independent input, was also dominated by in­
structed delegates, SACEUR and SACLANT provided major policy 
direction for STC and SASWREC. Nonetheless, the Standing 
Group was the ultimate authority in AGARD: the Military Budget 
Committee made final budgetary decisions for all three agencies; 
recommendations and advice came to AGARD from the National 
Delegates Board, to STC from the NATO Armaments Committee 
and the STC Scientific Committee of National Representatives, 
and to SASWREC from the SASWREC Committee of National Rep­
resentatives. 
COALITIONS 
The leadership's efforts were stifled not only by decision-mak­
ing unbalance, but also by a pattern of weak coalitional support. 
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There is insufficient evidence to be certain about the specific 
portions of the leadership's ideology which were supported by 
particular groups, but one may infer varying attraction from the 
pattern of national membership in the subordinate bodies of the 
Science Committee presented in Table 21. If participation is a 
measure of interest, then different combinations of national gov­
ernments sponsored programs in Oceanography, Operational 
Research, Meteorology, Radio-Meteorology, Human Factors, Ad­
vanced Study Institutes, Research Grants, and Lecture Pro­
grams. 
Perhaps more significant is the nature of the general coalition 
supporting the entire NATO science program, which can be de­
duced from the pattern of national financial contributions. The 
core of this coalition was the United States, which gave the bulk 
of initial financial support for the various aspects of the science 
program. As the United States became less eager to bear the 
lion's share of the financial burden, the coalition broadened to 
include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. In some programs, such as SASWREC, 
other countries—Denmark, Norway, and Italy—also contrib­
uted.39 But the greater coalition was unenthusiastic about sub­
stantial program expansion, and budgets for pure science and 
technical agencies remained relatively small. 
The limits of coalitional support were indicated in December, 
1960, when Paul-Henri Spaak reported to the Council on the 
Herter proposal for a NATO ten-year plan. One of his recommen­
dations was that there be a substantial increase in the NATO 
science budget. The Council rejected the suggestion. 
Coalitional bounds were also shown by the failures of the 
International Institute of Science and Technology and the de­
fense science program. The formation of an International Insti­
tute of Science and Technology, which had been supported by 
the Armand and Killian Reports and by the NATO Parliamentar­
ians in 1958 and 1960, implied a significant financial increase 
in NATO Science, NATO announced that "'some 1,000 students, 
400 academic staff and 1,000 supporting staff are envisaged. It is 
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estimated that the capital cost would be about $56 million and 
the annual running costs about $17 million."40 The proposal 
was never implemented. While the United States appeared 
willing to contribute almost half the initial sum, the other mem­
bers of the general coalition were less eager. Britain and France 
were not only financially reluctant but also feared a possible 
drain on their own national pools of scientists. 
In the case of defense science, the supporting coalition was 
undermined by a counter-coalition. The United States Depart­
ment of Defense had been an important force behind the ap­
pointment of Dr. McLucas as Assistant Secretary General for 
Scientific Affairs and the establishment of the defense program 
as a vehicle for the development of arms co-operation; the major 
European governments had given initial assent. Over time dif­
ferent programs developed supporters in areas where national 
research seemed deficient. The United States favored the study 
of V/STOL planes and aircraft identification, the French were 
anxious to pool efforts in communications satellites, and the 
British came to favor efforts in joint air defense. Nevertheless, a 
counter-coalition of opposition and apathy arose which sapped 
the vigor of the program. Leading this movement within the 
Staff/Secretariat was General Fischer, the Co-ordinator for Pro­
duction and Logistics, in charge of NATO arms production, who 
opposed the development of a competing program in the scien­
tific side of the house. Fischer was able to rally a growing 
number of followers behind him. Among these were the Euro­
pean Allies who increasingly came to mistrust McLucas as a 
spearhead for American arms sales, and turned to Fischer, be­
cause he appeared to represent a more authentic Continental 
interest in co-operative research and development. The United 
States Department of State had never been really enthusiastic 
about the McLucas appointment, since it allowed the Depart­
ment of Defense to dominate the position of Assistant Secretary 
General for Scientific Affairs, hitherto under State's control. 
Even Defense's initial support weakened. While it eventually 
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provided him with staff assistance, the delay was such that 
McLucas was gone almost before the last man arrived. 
FUNCTIONALISM AND SPILL-OVER 
There appeared to be neither integration within nor spill-over 
from the area of NATO science, though one might have looked for 
a significant technical dynamic here. The share of resources 
involved could be classified as moderate; in no nation, as Table 
22 shows, was the gross expenditure on research and develop­
ment substantially equal to more than 4 per cent of the gross 
national product. Furthermore, one might expect that economic 
and normative sanctions, centering around scientific grants and 
the scientific ethic would be dominant and that highly trained 
technical personnel would play a significant role. 
However, political conflict proved strong and technical con­
sensus weak. Crisis brought a temporary convergence of actor 
interests in support of a NATO science program; but, with its 
passing, interests were sufficiently congruent to support only a 
small common effort. 
Actor interests converged under the pressure of the Suez 
crisis, in which the Soviet threat, coupled with American opposi­
tion to Anglo-French intervention, was a primary causal factor 
behind Council acceptance in December, 1956, of the recom­
mendations of the Committee of Three for closer Allied co­
operation in the scientific field. The launching of Sputnik I in 
October, 1957, provided a second-stage boost to the program by 
leading to the implementation of the Koepfli Task Force Report. 
NATO'S Scientific Affairs Division reported that the 'psychologi­
cal shock of this event resulted in the Task Force's Report being 
presented directly to the heads of government of the Alliance 
at their meeting in December, 1957. The Report's recommenda­
tions were accepted, and both a Science Advisor and Science 
Committee were appointed to follow up the recommendations of 
the Task Force." 41 
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As the sense of crisis diminished, actor interests diverged. The 
science program, particularly in defense areas, implied co-opera­
tion in areas where the most advanced nations—the United 
States, United Kingdom, and France—were reluctant to reveal 
information which provided them with political and military 
advantages and which had been purchased at high cost. Interests 
also conflicted on economic issues. Gross expenditure on research 
and development, however small in relation to other sectors, still 
included substantial financial sums, as Table 22 suggests. More­
over Table 23 indicates that national business enterprise and 
higher education played important roles in national science. 
Here considerations of national full employment and balance of 
payments, of industrial secrets and security, worked against pos­
sible common benefits which might have been attained through 
pooled effort. 
Interest converged sufficiently to support only a low-level 
program compared to national efforts, which totalled $27,239 
million for the twelve Allies listed in Table 22. In pure science 
NATO resources were approximately $4 million and half a' dozen 
permanent international staff members; the budgets of the NATO 
military technical agencies were probably little more than $6 
million. At this level, the economic and normative incentives 
centering around the appeals of project grants and the scientific 
ethic could be relatively effective; and the program could be sup­
ported by convergent interests between two groups: contributors, 
who recognized the legitimacy of a low level of economic aid, 
and recipients at national, subnational, or supranational levels, 
who received financial or institutional payoffs—as well as by a 
common interest in Western political-military cohesion, scientific 
progress, and information exchange. 
NATO Past and Future
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There is scant evidence that integration has occurred in NATO. 
One cannot, of course, ignore the fact that NATO performed 
useful services in each of the five sectors which have been 
considered. The organs of political consultation established an­
other link in the bilateral and multilateral system of interna­
tional communication. The military force program signalled to 
the Soviet Union that the Allies intended to defend themselves 
against armed attack; activities in armaments and infrastructure 
also implied Allied resolve, NATO science contributed not only to 
selected military activities but also gave encouragement to the 
development of civilian knowledge and skills. 
Nevertheless, the preceding survey has indicated that, while 
structures and tasks in each area changed and became increas­
ingly differentiated, binding institutional procedures remained 
weak and there was limited task expansion, NATO authority 
remained mostly indirect and of limited effectiveness; there was 
little authoritative decision-making on matters of major impor­
tance to the participants. Legitimacy did not grow to the extent 
that actors were willing to support sizeable joint activity except 
when it was directly in their own interest. 
Of the three assumptions concerning integration in NATO 
which were initially presented, one was partially confirmed, one 
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was disconfirmed, and one was accurate. First, it was assumed 
that integration would be associated with a style of Alliance 
leadership that skillfully combined (a) ideological ambiguity 
and clarity, (i>) decision-making by independent experts and 
instructed delegates, and (c) coalitional membership which var­
ied between programs. On the positive side, successive Secre­
taries General and SACEUR'S did promote the construction and 
maintenance of NATO institutions and tasks with an ideology 
which, in the aggregate and in two of five specific areas of 
activity, blended ambiguous, abstract, general goals, with clear 
practical guidance for specific programs. Their doctrine leaned 
to generality in political consultation, was a complex combina­
tion of general guidelines and specific goals for military forces 
and armaments, and tended toward specificity in infrastructure 
and science. However, this ideology not only supported organiza­
tional gains for NATO, but also, on the negative side, implied 
sacrifices from organizational clients. For this reason, in spite of 
its ideological advocacy, the leadership and its experts were 
undermined by instructed national delegates, who maintained a 
dominant position in the decision-making structure, and by weak 
supporting coalitions. 
The second "functionalist" assumption proposed that integra­
tion would be unlikely in those sectors of alliance activity which 
were most political, but would be more possible where technical 
elements were involved. Contrary to expectations, integration 
occurred in no area of alliance activity—not even armaments, 
infrastructure, or science, which presented strong prima facie 
technical credentials. Possible technical tendencies toward inte­
gration in such substrata were outweighed by the political forces 
inherent in the Alliance's diplomatic-military focus. 
Third, it was suggested that spill-over was unlikely because 
the actors' interests would not be sufficiently convergent through 
time to generate a self-sustaining consensus promoting alliance 
growth, that integrative advances might take place in crisis pe­
riods but would be undermined in more routine circumstances. 
In fact, no alliance spill-over occurred; institutional innovations 
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appeared and actor interests converged significantly only under 
crisis pressure. As successive crises faded, sufficient convergent 
and common interest remained to hold together for the time 
being what had already taken shape, but there was not enough 
to provide significant expansion. 
Separating the wheat from the chaff, we may reach a refined 
conclusion that the most integratively significant NATO accom­
plishment has been the development and differentiation of NATO 
structures and tasks and that the principle supporting factors 
have been leadership ideology and the impact of a crisis situa­
tion. Unfortunately leadership ideology and crisis can not be so 
clearly defined, nor the links between them and institutional 
innovation so tightly drawn, as one might wish. Both elements 
are icebergs, significant segments of which remain invisible. The 
presentation of leadership ideology, by reason of the research 
blocks imposed by a long diplomatic military tradition of secrecy 
of state, overemphasizes public pronouncements at the expense 
of more secret statements and maneuvers which may have been 
more significant. A concentration on crisis incidents or crisis 
periods neglects the underlying tensions which made them into 
crises, and which may have exercised an incremental influence 
more significant than the discontinuous impact of the crises 
themselves.1 
The consequences of these two factors must also be considered 
with caution, for the effects of leadership pronouncements and 
crises on institutional innovations is not always clear. Interna­
tional leadership may publicly express institutional goals and 
these may be instantly implemented. It is, however, more likely 
that leadership ideologies will be expressed privately at one stage 
and publicly aired only later. At this subsequent time, the leader­
ship's position may be presented less in the form of ideological 
advocacy than as support of decisions already taken. Further, the 
ideologies of leaders no longer on the scene may exercise a 
delayed impact as new events give them added relevance. The 
impact of crisis on institutional development is also blurred. The 
effect of specific crisis incidents is not limited by discrete tern­
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poral boundaries; while an atmosphere of crisis may induce 
immediate institutional advances, the memory of crisis past may 
provide an input for institutions yet to come. Furthermore, the 
numerous crises of the postwar generation seem to leave only 
1953-55, 1958-59, and 1963-65 as non-crisis years. 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, we may pull together, 
rearrange, and supplement the material presented in the preced­
ing chapters. For each of several periods in the Alliance's history, 
NATO institutional innovations, the ideology of the leadership, 
and the nature of the international situation will be considered 
in turn. 
During the period from the signature and ratification of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 through 1952, the basic struc­
tures and tasks of NATO were established, with special emphasis 
on the sectors of military forces, armaments, and infrastructure. 
In September, 1949, the Council met for the first time and 
created the Defense Committee which, in turn, was to set up the 
Military Committee, the Standing Group, and the Regional 
Planning Groups. In November the Council created the De­
fense Financial and Economic Committee and took note of the 
establishment by the Defense Committee of a Military Produc­
tion and Supply Board. 
During 1950, Greece and Turkey accepted invitations from 
the Council to be associated with Mediterranean defense plan­
ning and for the first time communiques mentioned the hope 
that Germany might contribute "manpower and resources1' to 
the "build-up of the defense of Western Europe."2 The Council 
created a group of Deputies, and appointed General Eisenhower 
SACEUR. It also approved the Defense Committee's long-term 
defense plan and forward strategy, as well as the first draft of a 
medium-term defense plan. Finally it replaced the Military Pro­
duction and Supply Board with a Defense Production Board. 
In May of the following year, the Deputies announced that 
the North Atlantic Council was to become the sole Ministerial 
body of NATO through the incorporation of the Defense Commit­
tee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee. Dur­
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ing September an agreement covering the status of civilian 
National Representatives and International Staff was signed. In 
the military sphere, General Eisenhower activated SHAPE and 
ACE in April; and two months later, the Deputies adopted a 
status of forces agreement covering the position of the military 
personnel of one NATO nation serving on the territory of another. 
In November, the NATO Defense College was inaugurated. 
In military economics, the Finance and Economic Board was 
set up to consider economic and financial aspects of the NATO 
defense program. The Temporary Council Committee was es­
tablished and appointed its Executive Board, the Three Wise 
Men. NATO took over the infrastructure program, which had 
begun under the Western Union Defense Organization, when 
the Infrastructure Committee was created and reached agree­
ment on the financing of Infrastructure Slice II, which included 
the construction of airfields and communications facilities. 
The Military Agency for Standardization was created as a 
subsidiary agency of the Standing Group. Finally the establish­
ment of AGARD was recommended by an Ad Hoc Conference of 
NATO Research Directors. In the sector of political consultation, 
as well as civilian economics and cultural activities, a Committee 
on the North Atlantic Community was formed. 
Meeting in Lisbon in its ninth Ministerial Sessison, the Coun­
cil at the end of February, 1952, proposed "reciprocal security 
undertakings'' between NATO and the gestating European De­
fense Community, with the EDC "working within the framework 
of, and reinforcing" NATO. The Council also took note of the fact 
that, on February 18, Greece and Turkey had acceded to the 
Treaty and had agreed that their ground and air forces assigned 
to NATO would operate under SACEUR.3 
This ninth Ministerial Session was the one which the Council 
stated marked the transition "from the planning to the opera­
tional stage.'' The Council, while continuing to hold periodic 
Ministerial meetings, was to function in permanent session 
through the appointment of permanent representatives. Further­
more, the Council would "assume the functions hitherto per­
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formed by the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, 
and the Financial and Economic Board," and would take over 
their staffs. Finally a unified international Secretariat was to be 
located near SHAPE, at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. At its head 
was to be a NATO Secretary General.4 
In the sphere of military planning, the Council relied on the 
report of the Temporary Council Committee and agreed on the 
Lisbon force goals, "specific defensive strength to be built this 
year, and on a definite programme of measures to be taken to 
increase defensive strength in following years." 5 The responsi­
bilities of the Standing Group and SACEUR were increased in the 
fields of logistical planning and equipment priorities, and the 
Council accepted the report of the Committee on the North 
Atlantic Community which called for better political consulta­
tion, as well as increased economic co-operation, the expansion 
and liberalization of trade and the movement of labor, and closer 
ties with the OEEC. 
During the rest of 1952, NATO'S structure continued to evolve. 
The Civil Budget Committee and Military Budget Committee 
met for the first time. The first Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel Com­
mand (CINCCHAN) were appointed, and the Mediterranean 
Command was approved. The procedures of the Temporary 
Council Committee were institutionalized through the forma­
tion of an Annual Review Committee which was to reconcile 
NATO programs with political-economic capabilities. The Infra­
structure Payments and Progress Committee was established. In 
addition, Infrastructure Slices III and IV were agreed for cost-
sharing and were to include airfields, communications, war head­
quarters, a NATO pipeline system, and naval facilities, radar navi­
gational aids, and training installations. 
During this period international leadership existed only in 
relatively undifferentiated form; and co-operative Western ac­
tion depended largely on the tacit co-ordination provided by 
crisis incidents. In the Brussels Treaty's Western Union De­
fense Organization, set up in 1948, Field Marshall Montgomery 
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had served as Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Commit­
tee. When the NATO Council Deputies were established in 1950, 
the American representative, Charles M. Spofford, was made 
permanent chairman. Only between 1950 and 1952, with the 
appointment of General Eisenhower as SACEUR and Lord Ismay 
as Secretary General, did full-fledged Allied leadership roles 
emerge. Once in office, however, General Eisenhower, General 
Ridgway (who succeeded him in 1952), and Lord Ismay ex­
pounded an ideology emphasizing that peace and security might 
be attained through allied military force, armaments, and infra­
structure programs, and their efforts helped to give direction to 
NATO'S growth. 
In the sector of military forces, the requirements of deterrence 
and defense led SACEUR to support increases in army divisional 
strengths, combat readiness, redeployment, training, support, 
and reserves. Moreover, Eisenhower and Ridgway attempted to 
bolster air defense and naval forces. They also called for rearma­
ment and for the Allied military, economic, and financial effort 
necessary to forge the weapons to equip NATO'S military forces 
and to remedy Allied material deficiencies. In addition, infra­
structure was included in the weapons to be forged. Air defense, 
communications, command and control facilities all had to be 
built; and SACEUR specifically asked for airfields, fuel storage 
tanks, distribution pipelines, radar installations, radio naviga­
tional aids, an Allied communications network, supply depots, 
harbor facilities, and naval bases. 
Lord Ismay joined Eisenhower and Ridgway and strongly 
supported the Annual Review, stressed the economic necessity 
for joint arms production, and pointed to the political, military, 
and economic gains to be realized from NATO infrastructure. 
The main impetus not only for the signature of the North 
Atlantic Treaty but also for the early development of NATO had 
come from the deepening international confrontation between 
East and West following the Second World War. While this 
tension seemed eased on May 9, 1949, when the Soviet Union 
lifted the Berlin blockade in August, well ahead of Western 
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anticipation, the Soviets broke the American nuclear monopoly 
by exploding their first atomic device. On June 25, 1950, the 
North Korean attack on South Korea was perceived as a new 
intensification of the Communist threat. 
In May, France had proposed to the Council that there be 
created a tightly organized NATO military establishment. The 
attack on South Korea was an important catalyst in the realiza­
tion of a modified version of this plan. Dean Acheson related 
that the French plan 
was discussed at our meeting in London in May of 1950. Dur­
ing that summer we all went to work upon this project. One 
of the things that brought this beyond the realm of theory 
was the attack on Korea. This was the first time that force 
had been openly used by a Communist satellite, armed, pre­
pared, trained, and instigated by the Soviet Union, to ac­
complish its purpose. This threw a chill through Europe. 
Everybody said we must get on with the program. . There­
fore, in the fall session, the United States produced a plan 
creating what later became the NATO organization, then chiefly 
referred to as the United Command.6 
"The real clincher," Dean Acheson said, "was the attack on 
Korea. Korea was the first time that the Russians had clearly 
used power to change a situation in which we were vitally 
interested. After that, everybody said, 'You had better watch 
yourselves, this is very dangerous.' " 7 
Between 1953 and 1955 the ideology of NATO'S leadership was 
effective only in achieving forms of expansion which seemed 
limited in comparison to what had come before. During 1953 
the infrastructure program, which it had supported and which 
had already undertaken substantial Allied construction on the 
basis of annual funding, was buttressed by the signature of the 
first three-year cost-sharing agreement. The following year the 
Council, recognizing the impossibility of reaching the Lisbon 
force goals, approved MC 48, which began the substitution of 
nuclear armament for manpower. While the new plan reflected 
the conviction of General Gruenther, who had assumed com­
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mand at SHAPE, that the Allies required an atomic strategy and 
an atomic stockpile, it also included manpower losses about 
which he was less enthusiastic. 
Perhaps the major tangible gain for NATO during this period 
was the provision for German entry into the Alliance through 
the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. The twelve active 
divisions which the Germans promised to supply represented a 
response to the pleas of successive SACEUR'S for additional forces 
and made the manpower cuts of MC 48 a little less disturbing. 
Nevertheless, the impact of German entry was diminished by 
the fact that the forces would only become available over several 
years and also by the fact that the French had rejected the 
European Defense Community. It had been hoped that the EDC 
would not only incorporate the Germans into but also represent 
a major institutional gain for European defense. 
During the same year the Council established a Defense 
Production Committee, similar to the Military Production and 
Supply Board which had been abolished three years before. The 
new committee would presumably help to advance the arma­
ments goals which the original leaders had introduced, and 
which General Gruenther later adopted, but it also represented a 
return to a system in which national representatives held final 
authority. 
In 1955, a European air defense and early warning system 
was approved; and the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center was 
created to give SACEUR technical advice. Both of these develop­
ments could be traced to the heavy emphasis which General 
Gruenther had placed on air defense; nevertheless the European 
system, which had only been approved in principle, would take 
five years to become operational; and the SADTC had at its dis­
posal very limited resources. 
The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference also held its first 
meeting in 1955. A year later the Committee on Non-Military 
Co-operation, with which Ismay co-operated, would cite the 
need for improved contact between the NPC and NATO Head­
quarters. Because it was basically a legislative rather than execu­
248 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
rive body, however, the NPC would be of relatively peripheral 
utility in the improvement of joint diplomatic policy-making, 
which all of NATO'S Secretaries General were to emphasize. The 
fact that the NPC was not even officially connected with NATO 
further diminished whatever role it could hope to play. 
The lack of substantial institutional advance in the years 
1953-55 coincided with a reduction in East-West tension. 
These were years of change and ambivalence in Soviet policy. 
The challenge of the West seemed to abate in 1953, with the 
death of Stalin and his replacement by Georgi Malenkov; the 
signature of a treaty of friendship and collaboration between 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; and the conclusion of the 
armistice in Korea. In 1955, however, Malenkov was replaced by 
Bulganin and Khrushchev, a shift the meaning of which was not 
immediately clear. The Malenkov regime had ended the state of 
war with Germany. The new regime concluded the Austrian 
State Treaty and attended Geneva meetings with the West, both 
at the summit and at the level of Foreign Ministers. But nega­
tive omens were provided by the signing of the Warsaw Pact, 
which bound the nations of Eastern Europe in a military alliance 
intended to be the direct counterpart of NATO; the failure of the 
Geneva meetings to reach significant agreement; and the Treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Re­
public at the end of the year granting the G.D.R. the preroga­
tives of a state. 
The Western response was similarly mixed. Perhaps the best 
demonstration of shifting Western currents was provided by 
British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden. In August, 1954, 
the French Assembly refused to approve the European Defense 
Community. Eden played a crucial role in rescuing the German 
contribution to Western defense, acting as a catalyctic agent for 
the achievement of the Paris Agreements in October, through 
which the Western European Union was established and Ger­
many was invited to join NATO. A year later, however, Eden 
seemed to take a softer line by making a suggestion which might 
have neutralized the military benefits of German membership in 
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NATO. At the Geneva Summit Meeting in July, 1955, he pro­
posed that 'we should be ready to examine the possibility of a 
demilitarized area between East and West.'1 Going into more 
detail, he stated: 
There is the suggestion of a mutual security pact. There is the 
prospect of an agreement about the total of forces and arma­
ments of the two groups both in Germany and in the coun­
tries neighboring Germany. This would be subject to reciprocal 
supervision. There is the concept of a demilitarized area.8 
During the following two years, 1956 and 1957, the leader­
ship's ideology pointed the way to ground-breaking moves in the 
sectors of political consultation and science, and to expansion of 
the older Alliance programs of military forces, armaments, and 
infrastructure. Lord Ismay's farewell address and Spaak's empha­
sis on Atlantic political interdependence helped support the 
political recommendations of the report of the Committee on 
Non-Military Co-operation, which the Council of Ministers en­
dorsed in December, 1956. This report recommended establish­
ing a Committee of Political Advisors; empowering the Secretary 
General to offer his good offices for the peaceful settlement of 
inter-member disputes; instituting an annual political appraisal 
by the Secretary General; and close co-operation with the NATO 
Parliamentarians' Conference. In 1957, the Political Committee 
was created and Lord Ismay became the first of a series of 
Secretaries General who would offer good offices to settle dis­
putes over Cyprus. In future years Secretaries General regularly 
submitted annual reports and joined SACEUR'S in annual appear­
ances before the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. 
Spaak's emphasis on Atlantic scientific co-operation, particu­
larly in pure science, had a similar effect. The Committee on 
Non-Military Co-operation had recommended a conference to 
propose specific measures for future scientific and technical co­
operation and the Koepfli Task Force was formed in 1957. The 
most significant results came from the meeting of heads of 
government in December, 1957. After Spaak had assumed office 
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as NATO Secretary General in May, he had been approached by 
Prime Minister Macmillan with the suggestion that it would be 
an auspicious start to his tenure if President Eisenhower could 
be persuaded to attend the December session of the Council. In 
October, Macmillan, later joined by Spaak, had visited Wash­
ington; and Eisenhower had accepted their proposal. To justify 
the summit meeting, which was now to include leaders of other 
Allied nations as well, an agenda was constructed around the 
theme of Atlantic interdependence. A prominent item on this 
agenda was Atlantic science, and in December the heads of 
government decided to establish the NATO Science Committee 
and Science Advisor recommended by the Koepfli group. 
In military forces, the focus by Generals Gruenther and Nor­
stad on a NATO atomic stockpile, and Spaak's support of a com­
mon nuclear policy, helped to produce MC 14/2, which set 
forth a unified NATO strategy based on the use of nuclear weap­
ons. They also influenced the decision by the special meeting of 
the heads of government in December, 1957, that NATO should 
have stocks of nuclear warheads and IRBM'S at its disposal. 
Most of NATO'S leaders including Norstad and Spaak, publicly 
stressed the necessity for standardization and joint production of 
Allied armaments. At their meeting, the heads of government 
endorsed ''as high a degree of standardization and integration as 
possible in all fields' and the "coordinated production of ad­
vanced weapons." 9 During the course of 1957, a Panel for the 
Codification of Equipment was established; STANAG'S 3150 and 
3151—which created a uniform system of supply classification 
and item identification for Allied material—were promulgated; 
the Fiat G 91 was selected as NATO'S lightweight tactical strike 
reconnaissance aircraft; and studies were initiated for a NATO 
maritime patrol aircraft. Ultimately a whole series of joint pro­
duction projects would be implemented. Finally, in the area of 
infrastructure, the focus by NATO military commanders on air 
defense, communications, and command and control promoted 
the inclusion in Slices VIII-XI of funds for an early warning 
radar network, tropospheric and ionospheric forward scatter com­
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munication systems, and facilities for surface-to-air missiles and 
special ammunition storage sites. 
These advances occurred against a background of renewed 
stress. In 1956, Soviet policy had appeared to harden. Although 
Khrushchev had condemned the excesses of the Stalin regime at 
the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Soviet leaders were stern 
in the face of growing Eastern European unrest. When the June 
riots in Poznan, Poland were followed by the Hungarian revolu­
tion in October, control was re-established by Soviet military 
intervention. Moreover, Anglo-French military activity in the 
Suez Canal area was met by Soviet threats of counteraction, 
which, combined with American opposition, led the British and 
French to withdraw. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union 
launched its first satellite, Sputnik I, into space. Well ahead of 
comparable Western development, this technological achieve­
ment held obvious implications for long-range nuclear delivery 
systems. These developments demonstrated that the Soviet 
threat was still real, that it could be triggered by events in 
non-European areas, and that it was backed by a dynamic scien­
tific capability. 
Institutional progress which occurred in NATO during 1958 
and 1959 did not significantly advance leadership goals and 
seemed to represent either incremental growth or spin-off from 
earlier decisions. In the political sector, an Atlantic Congress 
took place, which drew together for a unique meeting 700 
delegates from all sectors of activity from all NATO nations, but 
which had no observable impact. Militarily, MC 70 and MC 
48/2 continued the trend which had been established by MC 48 
and MC 14/2. American Thor and Jupiter IRBM'S, in accord­
ance with the 1957 decision of the heads of government, were 
placed in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Previous statements of the 
heads of government in the areas of armaments and science 
continued to be followed up. They had endorsed arms standardi­
zation and co-ordinated production, and a number of projects 
had subsequently advanced. Now the title of the Defense Pro­
duction Committee was changed to the Armaments Committee 
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and the Council approved the creation of a NATO Maintenance 
and Supply Organization, a NATO Hawk Production Organiza­
tion, a NATO Sidewinder Program Office, and a procedure for 
formulating NATO Basic Military Requirements. The pure sci­
ence structures which the heads of government had established 
came to life; and the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Re­
search Center was commissioned under American auspices. 
The limited institutional innovation during these years proba­
bly resulted to some extent from the fact that 1958-59 repre­
sented a second period of Soviet transition and ambivalence. In 
late March, 1958, Khrushchev replaced Bulganin at the head of 
the Soviet government. In November, he challenged the West 
by announcing that the Soviet government wished to terminate 
the Four-Power Agreement on the status of Berlin. The follow­
ing month, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
rejected Khrushchev's proposals; and the NATO Council issued a 
communique fully associating itself with their position. Never­
theless, the following year seemed to bring some thaw in Soviet-
Allied relations. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union met in Geneva over the 
summer, emphasizing the problems of Germany and disarma­
ment. In September, at Eisenhower's invitation, Khrushchev 
visited the United States and conferred with the American 
President at Camp David. 
During this period, sparks of disengagement which had pre­
viously been struck produced a sizeable flame. The central figure 
in the discussion was perhaps Polish Foreign Minister Adam 
Rapacki. On October 2, 1957, Rapacki presented an official 
proposal for disengagement to the United Nations General As­
sembly. In December he followed it up with diplomatic notes, 
and confirmed it on February 15, 1958, in a memorandum 
delivered to Britain, France, the United States, Czechoslovakia, 
and East Germany. Following detailed Western analysis and 
argument Rapacki announced a second version of his plan on 
November 4, at a press conference in Warsaw. 
The debate on disengagement which occurred during 
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1958-59 was more far-reaching than anything which had come 
before. Though the expansion was less clear for the Eastern 
nations—where the Rapacki Plan in its several versions seemed 
to stifle rivals—it was more obvious in the West. Eugene Hinter­
hoff's inventory of disengagement proposals from the end of 
World War I through most of 1959 provides a rough indicator 
of the direction in which the wind was blowing. Nine projects 
are recorded for the Eastern nations for the seven and one-half 
years between April, 1947 and December, 1954; eight proposals 
for 1955; four for 1956; and nine projects prior to Rapacki's 
announcement in 1957. In the period from October, 1957, 
through December, 1958, Eastern spokesmen presented eleven 
designs and during the first nine months of 1959 they proposed 
thirteen. Twenty Western schemes are listed for the eight and 
one-half years between April, 1946 and December, 1954; seven 
for 1955; fourteen for 1956; seventeen for 1957; twenty-nine for 
1958; and thirty for the first nine months of 1959.10 
It is not surprising that NATO failed to expand in this atmos­
phere. On the one hand the debate seemed to bring with it a 
release of much of the tension of the previous period. Secondly 
most disengagment proposals explicitly or implicitly included a 
reduction in NATO'S importance and strength. Finally differences 
of opinion existed among the officials of Allied governments 
concerning how far it would be prudent to go. The British were 
the most enthusiastic about the possibilities for limiting forces 
and weapons in an agreed area of Europe. German Chancellor 
Adenauer and Defense Minister Strauss were strongly opposed. 
Between these two poles fell the United States, which tended 
toward the British position, and France, which aligned itself 
with the Germans. 
The situation of General Norstad illustrated the difficulty 
which the NATO leadership experienced in traversing this thicket. 
Norstad originally joined Adenauer and Strauss in opposition to 
current disengagement proposals; and in late 1958 he claimed 
that he would be unable to fulfil his mission if the Rapacki Plan 
were adopted. Subsequently, however, after apparent persuasion 
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by American Secretary of State Herter, Norstad endorsed the 
establishment of observation posts on both sides of the East-West 
border. Although Herter was to have cleared this idea with 
German Foreign Minister von Brentano, Strauss remained op­
posed, especially since Norstad's proposal involved the use of 
German territory for the observation posts and thus implied 
acceptance of a divided Germany. Chancellor Adenauer shared 
Strauss's position and was supposedly highly displeased with 
Norstad.11 
In spite of such differences, the next four years produced 
fairly broad NATO growth and innovation for which leadership 
ideology was again able to point the way. Spaak's emphasis on 
increasing scope and depth of foreign policy co-ordination led to 
the establishment of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in 
1960. In the sector of military forces, virtually every Supreme 
Commander had urged the improvement of air defense; in 1960 
the NATO European air defense command, approved in principle 
five years earlier, was finally established. General Norstad's for­
ward emphasis resulted in the constitution of an ACE Mobile 
Force in 1961. Stikker was a major proponent of the Force 
Planning exercise to equilibrate NATO strategy and capabilities, 
and Lemnitzer supported him. The Council adopted a new 
minimum force plan, MC 26/4 to run through 1966, expanded 
the Annual Review into a Triennial Review, and created a 
Defense Planning Committee and Defense Planning Working 
Group to elaborate future requirements. 
Spaak, who resigned in 1961, Stikker, and Norstad were all 
agreed on the desirability of strengthening Allied nuclear shar­
ing and capabilities. Their campaign led first to Athens where, 
in May, 1962, the Council adopted guidelines for nuclear con­
sultation. A year later, at Ottawa, the United States and Britain 
committed long-range nuclear striking components to the Alli­
ance, and a Nuclear Deputy to SACEUR and a SACEUR Liaison 
Group to the Joint Strategic Planning Staff in Omaha were 
created. Although it was not formally connected with NATO, an 
MLF Working Group was established in late 1963. 
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The emphasis by Norstad, Spaak, and Stikker on joint pro­
duction and standardization of armaments gave impetus to the 
Twenty Projects Exercise; aided the birth of the NATO Bullpup 
Production Organization and the NATO AS-30 Steering Commit­
tee; and led to the establishment of a NATO Supply Center. In 
infrastructure, Stikker added his weight to SACEUR endorsement 
of joint air defense facilities. With a special eye to possible 
trouble in Berlin, the Allies programmed NADGE in infrastructure 
Slices XII-XV and adopted a plan for infrastructure acceleration 
which had as its special focus surface-to-air missile sites and 
special ammunition storage facilities. As for the sector of science, 
Spaak and Stikker had both stressed the necessity for co-opera­
tion in defense research; the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Research Center-—with implications for military long-range nu­
clear capabilities—was given a NATO charter, and the SHAPE Air 
Defense Technical Center—important for air defense infra­
structure—became an International Military Organization un­
der the direction of SACEUR. In addition, the title of the Secretary 
General's Science Advisor was upgraded to Assistant Secretary 
General for Scientific Affairs. 
The foundation for this development was provided by ten­
sions during the years 1960-62, which brought home the fact 
that the Cold War might still present significant dangers and 
that nuclear interrelationships between enemies and between 
Allies were to be crucial in the new decade. During 1960, 
relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated. The May 
Summit Meeting in Paris failed after an American U-2 recon­
naissance plane was brought down over Soviet territory. In June 
the Communist delegates left the Geneva Conference; and at 
the September meeting of the United Nations General Assem­
bly, Khrushchev's personal behavior made clear the atmospheric 
change. 
The political weather continued to worsen through 1961. On 
February 17, the Soviet government sent a note to the Federal 
Republic of Germany re-opening pressures for a Berlin settle­
ment. In June President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev 
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met in Vienna with no substantive amelioration of the Berlin 
situation; in August the Communists erected a wall sealing off 
the Eastern sector of the city; the Soviet Union resumed nuclear 
testing; in October Khrushchev extended the deadline for a 
Berlin settlement. 
During the course of 1962, there occurred a climax of tension 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. American 
intelligence in October revealed the presence of Soviet missile 
bases on Cuba; President Kennedy ordered a partial blockade; 
and the Soviet Union, unwilling to force the issue, agreed to 
dismantle the installations. In December, another showdown 
took place—between the United States and Britain—over the 
American cancellation of the Skybolt missile on which the fu­
ture of British long-range nuclear striking power depended. 
1964 and 1965 were years in which NATO and its leaders made 
few institutional gains. The planning staff of the Standing 
Group was finally internationalized. When the MLF failed, a 
Special Committee of Defense Ministers, with working groups, 
was added to NATO'S structures for nuclear consultation. A high-
level committee, AC 253, was established to review NATO'S arma­
ments program; and the Defense Research Directors Committee 
was given formal NATO status. 
This lethargy coincided with another period of international 
relaxation. Beginning in 1963 Cold War relations had seemed 
once more to become uncertain. In June the United States and 
the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Geneva setting up a 
"hot line'' between the two capitals. In July the United King­
dom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. concluded a treaty 
banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
under water. On October 15, 1964, Khrushchev was replaced by 
a team of Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev. During 1964 
and 1965 the major focus of East-West conflict shifted to Asia. A 
day after Khrushchev's replacement, Communist China ex­
ploded its first atomic bomb. As the struggle escalated in Viet 
Nam, Chinese-Soviet rifts became increasingly apparent, and 
NATO: Past and Future [ 257 
Eastern Europeans, as in the case of Rumanian leader Ceau­
sescu, seemed to move toward greater independence. 
During 1966 and 1967, NATO decided to relocate its political 
and military facilities; to establish a central communications and 
intelligence center; to create a Division of Defense Planning and 
Policy within the International Staff/Secretariat; to replace the 
Standing Group, on which France had a privileged position, 
with an international planning staff; to adopt, after a decade, a 
new common strategy; to implement the Five Year Rolling De­
fense Program beginning in 1967; to establish a new NATO force 
plan through 1970 and then through 1972; to provide NATO 
funding for the ACE Mobile Force; to create a Standing Naval 
Force Adantic; to establish two permanent nuclear committees, 
the Committee on Nuclear Defense Affairs and the Nuclear 
Planning Group; to revamp NATO'S armaments and defense sci­
ence structures; and to construct a communications satellite link 
between SHAPE and AFSOUTH. 
These changes occurred in the context of the crisis which was 
provided by President De Gaulle's abrupt announcement of his 
desire for French military withdrawal from NATO and NATO'S 
military withdrawal from France. This threat came not from 
without but from within, indicating that the Allied solidarity 
which had faced the tests of East-West tension might yet be 
undermined in a period of uncertain detente. 
Former NATO leaders spoke out publicly to identify De Gaulle's 
challenge as a crisis. General Norstad told Congress that, "in the 
year 1966, we have clearly moved from disarray to dissension to 
crisis. Let me emphasize and reemphasize," he said, "that this is 
a crisis, because we have been told in recent weeks that this is 
just another minor incident in the course of the long life of 
NATO. It is in fact a crisis." 12 Paul-Henri Spaak wrote that "it is 
necessary to be realistic and see facts as they are. The Atlantic 
Alliance and its indispensable organization, NATO, are in the 
throes of a grave crisis. All those concerned with problems of 
international politics must realize what this means." Spaak con­
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tinued, "The European policy of the United States, that of 
Canada, and the policies of thirteen European states as con­
ducted for nearly twenty years are all threatened. If the Adantic 
Alliance cannot find a solution to its problems, then one of the 
most important accomplishments of the last twenty years—one 
on which the equilibrium of the world is based—is doomed to 
disappear,1 he said. "Thus the hour of reflection and of choice 
has come." 13 
In this situation Secretary General Brosio helped pull together 
the Fourteen, continuing ideological support for existing pro­
grams, but placing special emphasis on the preservation of the 
military organization and command structure. 
NATO IN THE 1970's 
At this point in history, it is possible to envision three major 
alternative futures for NATO. These three roads involve different 
degrees and forms of integration and are marked Adantic Com­
munity, Atlantic Partnership, and Adantic Alliance. 
The day is probably past when the vision of an Atlantic 
political union, based on the federal institutions propounded by 
Clarence Streit and his followers, could seem a credible plan for 
the immediate future. At least for the decade ahead, the largest 
degree of plausible integration is probably embodied in a plan 
which can be labelled the Atlantic Community." 
In a sense the picture of the Atlantic Community represents 
an expansion on the unrealized programs of past NATO leaders, 
most especially Paul-Henri Spaak.15 First, institutional structures 
and tasks are strengthened. Provision is made for the Council to 
meet regularly at the level of heads of government (perhaps 
once every two years) and at the level of deputy foreign minis­
ters (once a month). An Atlantic Commission or permanent 
Committee of Three—similar to NATO'S previous experiments 
with the Three Wise Men of 1952 and 1956—is established. A 
NATO Policy Planning Council is set up for long-range planning, 
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and under it are created committees dealing with particular 
geographical areas and restricted in membership to those nations 
with immediately relevant interests. In addition a NATO War 
Cabinet system is organized for crisis use, "with one senior 
Minister in every NATO government designated as the man 
responsible for participation in such a standby system." ie The 
unofficial North Atlantic Assembly attains formal sponsorship as 
an advisory body. Its Secretariat is greatly strengthened and it 
receives regular access to NATO official information. 
While the MLF and its brothers probably sleep, an Executive 
Committee, consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, West Germany, Italy, and one smaller rotating member, 
is established for nuclear decision-making, with authorization to 
act in emergencies for the Alliance as a whole. The Chairman of 
the Military Committee is given the title of NATO Chief of Staff 
and undertakes to oversee and co-ordinate the activities of the 
regional military commanders. A NATO Payments Union is cre­
ated in order to redistribute the economic burdens involved in 
the stationing of foreign troops on German soil. 
The Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support begins 
to receive an annual budget for a limited number of feasibility 
and design studies; and a NATO Satellite Organization is created 
under the Secretary General to supervise a joint telecommuni­
cation and reconnaissance satellite program. In scientific and 
cultural affairs, a NATO University provides facilities for co-opera­
tive study and research in all areas of learning. 
Binding institutional procedures are strengthened by provi­
sions for majority voting in all NATO committees, though votes 
are weighted. Each ally maintains the right of appeal to the 
Council, which renders its verdict by two-thirds majority. 
NATO authority is increased by granting the international civil­
ian and military bureaucracies greater scope for direct adminis­
tration, NATO ambassadors, subordinate to the Secretary General, 
are accredited to the capitols of non-NATO Nations, NATO major 
military commanders have command authority in such areas as 
260 ] Integration and Disintegration in NATO 
logistics, deployment of forces, air defense, and possibly the 
firing of nuclear weapons in certain clearly defined tactical situa­
tions. In armaments, infrastructure, and science, the military and 
civilian staffs increasingly assume responsibility for the conduct 
of new programs. 
NATO legitimacy also grows. Following De Gaulle, France 
resumes full co-operation in all areas of NATO activity. National 
permanent representatives to NATO are given formal national 
Cabinet rank and are national political figures of the highest 
importance. National contributions of money and personnel 
steadily mount; and nations contributing nuclear capabilities to 
the Alliance remove physical and electronic controls which for­
merly prevented independent NATO use. At the domestic level, 
political opposition to NATO remains isolated in splinter groups of 
the right and left; stable NATO associations of industrial, labor, 
and scientific actors appear. 
The second possibility for NATO'S future is the Atlantic Part­
nership. In part this represents an extension of President Ken­
nedy's "grand design" for interdependence between the United 
States and a United Europe. "I will say here and now," Kennedy 
stated on July 4, 1962, "that the United States will be ready for 
a 'Declaration of Interdependence,' that we will be prepared to 
discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a 
concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership 
between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old 
American Union." Almost a year later in Frankfurt, he said, "It 
is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of 
decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see 
Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal 
with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look 
forward to a Europe united and strong—speaking with a com­
mon voice—acting with a common will—a world power capable 
of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner. It 
is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us against 
fragmentation of our alliance." 1T The idea was carried forward 
by President Johnson. In his first address to Congress, Johnson 
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referred to the new "American dream' of "partnership across the 
Atlantic."1S 
In part this plan also represented an elaboration on more 
cautious endorsements, like that of Secretary General Brosio. 
Brosio supported President Kennedy's "two-pillar approach'' as 
"the most positive and far-reaching idea so far in the Atlantic 
relations field" and as "probably the most promising way to build 
a more balanced, solidly-based Alliance.' At the same time, 
Brosio allowed for discontinuities in the process of European 
integration. He noted that "the second pillar would have 
to be set up gradually' and that "'a lengthy, tentative and doubt­
less difficult series of discussions would be required before the 
plan matures." In Brosio's vision, Kennedy's "concepts should be 
accepted as a long-term solution as a bridge between the 
present concept of a multi-member alliance and the future idea 
of America and Europe becoming equal partners within a de­
fense alliance."19 
The Atlantic Partnership's institutional characteristics are 
similar to those of the Atlantic Community, but rearrangements 
are added which give much greater weight to Europeans.20 
Should the elan of European unification be recaptured following 
De Gaulle's departure, European political co-operation may take 
form either around a European Political Community or the 
expansion of the framework of the Franco-German Treaty. One 
can imagine the revival of the idea of the European Defense 
Community, or at least a strengthening of the Western Euro­
pean Union; moves toward a European Nuclear Force based on 
French and British capabilities; and consideration of a European 
Technological Community to co-ordinate defense research and 
development. In this situation, there are provisions to represent 
the new entity of Western Europe and to regroup the other 
Allies congruently. Institutions are altered to represent corpo­
rately the North Americans, Canada and the United States; the 
Western Europeans, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem­
bourg, the Netherlands, and perhaps the United Kingdom; and 
the Border States, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, 
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and Turkey. The new EDC, ENF, and ETC are either housed 
directly under the new NATO roof or linked with NATO through 
WEU. 
If European reunification remains in the doldrums for some 
time, Europeans still make gains within NATO. Thus the position 
of SACEUR changes from American to European hands, although 
nuclear planning and control are under an American Dep­
uty. Within NATO'S military organization, command positions are 
reapportioned to give Europeans a much larger representation. 
In either case, the authority of the NATO bureaucracies and 
NATO legitimacy continue to grow along the same lines as in the 
Atlantic Community. 
The third picture, that of the Atlantic Alliance, is a painting 
in which the brush strokes of President de Gaulle are clear. 
Although NATO'S status quo may remain unchanged for some 
time, sooner or later some disintegration occurs. Both sides of 
this portrait have been suggested by Brosio's analysis of the 
effects of the French military withdrawal. On the one hand 
Brosio implied that the status quo remained much the same. 
"Actually, France has withdrawn from only the Organization's 
integrated military part," he said, "She still participates in the 
civil and political organization—the Council, several Commit­
tees and several agencies. Perhaps we should avoid subde­
ties by merely saying that France remains both an Alliance 
member and a participant in certain parts of its Organization. 
The Organization from which France has partly withdrawn 
has continued to live."21 At the same time, Brosio recognized dis­
integrative tendencies in a NATO of multiple tiers. "Events have 
induced the fourteen countries to establish what may be de­
scribed as a two-tier organization. By belonging to certain Al­
liance bodies and abstaining from participation in certain others, 
France's tier is that of a special-status Ally.'' He continued, "at 
best, the idea of different classes of allies is not at all popular 
with at least several member governments, even if the classes 
are loosely conceived and freely selected by the individual allies. 
At worst, such a system might be an open invitation for member 
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countries to opt for the widest possible independence and to re­
fuse the stricter, costlier path of tighter integration. In both cases 
it would probably have a divisive effect." 22 
In the picture of the Atlantic Alliance, the Europeanization of 
NATO eventually goes so far as substantially to weaken American 
participation, transforming NATO into a primarily European 
grouping. Institutionally, this means the establishment of an 
Atlantic Summit in Washington, where Europe may be collec­
tively represented, to supervise the Alliance's civil and military 
affairs in a general way. Direct oversight of the European Com­
mand, however, is exercised from a European capital by Europe­
ans; and the International Staff/Secretariat is close by. American 
participation in Allied headquarters is progressively reduced, 
except perhaps in nuclear affairs, until United States officers 
perform mainly liaison and observer functions. Should the Euro­
pean Nuclear Force come into existence, there are close ties with 
the United States and Canada, but the ENF is still autonomously 
controlled.23 
One can then envision the gradual disappearance of NATO into 
a web of special relationships. The Alliance is composed of 
several categories of members, acting together and pooling re­
sources in varying degrees depending on particular interest in 
the activity involved. At an advanced stage one sees diminishing 
participation or individual withdrawal of NATO'S peripheral 
members: Portugal, Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Canada. In addi­
tion there occur the reduction or elimination of meetings of 
government delegates, from the Council downward, and the 
abolition of the International Staff/Secretariat and NATO'S mili­
tary headquarters.24 
France may continue half in and half out of NATO. Although 
no longer an active member in many Alliance programs, the 
French may still participate in early warning and air defense 
activities, as well as retaining their seat on the NATO Council or 
at the NATO Summit. After De Gaulle it will probably be difficult 
for his successor to make immediate changes. Gaullists should 
find it politically uncomfortable to repudiate at once a policy 
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with which they had been closely associated. Opposition candi­
dates may find more political profit in domestic than in foreign 
reforms. Moreover, the General's successor will be hard put to 
match his international dynamism and may be content not to 
undertake new and disturbing initiatives. Should any French 
participation in NATO remain, and should the exigencies of coali­
tion politics demand aggressive action—on nationalist, neutralist, 
pacifist, or economic grounds—the French may, however, finish 
the job.25 
In any case, NATO authority continues to be conspicuous by its 
absence and NATO legitimacy eventually declines. Should West­
ern European unification recapture the political tide, the Euro­
peans decide increasingly to travel outside NATO'S umbrella, 
without American help or interference. With or without Euro­
pean unification, the United States and Britain leave military 
forces on the continent for some time, but gradually cut their 
number. The German army is reduced, perhaps to eight divi­
sions and turned into a largely professional body, "backed with 
sizeable militia type forces for static defense."26 
The decline of NATO may, but will not necessarily, coincide 
with an East-West settlement of European differences, NATO 
may have a role in achieving a general security treaty and may 
even serve in a reduced capacity as one supercomponent of a 
new European system. Nevertheless, individual national govern­
ments would still sign the document, with the United States, 
Britain, perhaps France, and the Soviet Union possibly serving 
as guarantors. Alliance strength may be reduced by disengage­
ment either before or after signature involving: the substantial 
dismantling of command structures on both sides, withdrawal of 
American and Soviet troops from Central and perhaps Western 
and Eastern Europe, agreement on force ceilings within a speci­
fied area, denuclearization of Germany and perhaps other Cen­
tral European nations.27 
The road to a general European settlement, however, will 
probably remain under construction for some time. The building 
of bridges seems the obvious first step, with calculated promotion 
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of cultural, social, scientific, and economic links between East 
and West Germany and between the nations of Eastern and 
Western Europe. Yet ultimately, the success of gradualism in 
uniting all of Europe will still depend on several uncertain 
assumptions. Most obviously, the creation of the greater Euro­
pean security community relies on continued moderation in the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It is by no means certain that 
the Soviet leadership, having passed through the transitional 
period following Khrushchev's departure, will not reconcile its 
differences with the Chinese and undertake increasingly aggres­
sive policies in Europe. The military intervention in Czechoslo­
vakia during August, 1968, indicates that it might be premature 
to assume that either the Soviet Union or the other states of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization are ready to move quickly and 
decisively along the highway of detente. Second, the future of 
the Common Market remains ambiguous. While substantial EEC 
advances seem blocked for the next several years, it is possible 
that it may regain forward momentum in the 197O's. It is still too 
early to say whether such a development would help or hinder 
the formation of a broader Europe. Third, it is not sure that 
Germans will content themselves with building bridges until the 
millenium, when the European security community will already 
have been established. One can indeed imagine a new and more 
aggressive German leadership hurrying reunification by moving 
quickly and forcefully to the East. Such a development might 
seriously damage an atmosphere of general European detente. 
Finally French policy after De Gaulle is not completely predicta­
ble. While it remains unlikely, it is not altogether impossible 
that a Rightist government will come to power and seek to 
recreate strong ties with the West. In the end the weakening of 
NATO and the building of bridges may merely result in the 
resolidification of existing divisions. 
Given these three alternative sets of possibilities for NATO, it 
seems possible that some of the institutional innovations of the 
Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership may be real­
ized, but improbable that the heavier integrative burdens in 
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either version of the future can be achieved. It is more likely that 
either relatively empty versions of one or the other will develop 
or that the Atlantic Alliance will be the mold for NATO in the 
1970's. 
NATO leaders may formulate ideologies which support the 
Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership. At a general 
level the leadership emphasizes the common danger, using varia­
tions on the domino theme, in which no piece falls alone. In 
situations of external crisis, it is pointed out that the threat is 
relevant to all Allies, not only to that Ally immediately under 
attack; in situations of internal crisis, NATO leaders show that 
defection from the ranks not only increases the dangers to die 
remaining members but also to the defector. At the specific level, 
the leadership calls for particular structures and tasks of the 
Atlantic Community or the Atlantic Partnership. As for clients, 
nations under immediate external threat agree to leadership 
suggestions which seem to make more certain the commitments 
of their Allies. In situations of internal strain, the possibility of 
mass defections persuades core members to support leadership 
platforms promising to maintain cohesion. 
Future crises may provide fertile soil for institutional innova­
tion. The ultimate external crisis is World War III, a situation 
presenting a wide range of violent options, some of which may 
be particularly relevant for the Alliance: Soviet nuclear strikes 
on European targets, but not American ones; Soviet nuclear 
strikes on American targets, but not European ones; poststrike 
Communist advances into Western Europe; prestrike Commu­
nist advances into Western Europe. At a lower level of strug­
gle, external crises may include escalation of East-West conflict 
in Asia to the extent that European governments feel themselves 
in serious and immediate danger; armed conflict in Eastern 
Europe between, for example, Soviet forces and those of Ru­
mania or Yugoslavia, involving dangerous redistributions and 
activities of Soviet troops; new Soviet ultimatums demanding 
permanent settlement of the status of the two Germanies and 
Berlin; blockades of land and air access routes to Berlin, possibly 
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leading to armed conflict; unintended escalation of incidents at 
the Berlin wall; substantial Communist military assistance to 
revolutionaries in Greece or Turkey; border incidents in Den­
mark or Norway; Soviet breakthroughs in offensive missilery, in 
antiballistic missile defense, or in antisubmarine warfare neutral­
izing all or part of Western long-range nuclear capability. 
Among future internal crises, one possibility involves French 
cessation of what remains of its co-operation in NATO and signa­
ture of a bilateral friendship and non-aggression treaty with the 
Soviet Union. Included in such a treaty may be provisions for 
political co-operation in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Af­
rica; military co-operation in the preparation of plans to counter 
possible threats from the United States; armaments co-operation 
in research, development, and procurement; infrastructure co-op­
eration in building a satellite communications system linking 
Eastern and Western Europe; and scientific co-operation in the 
exploration of space. Another possible candidate for such a treaty 
is a West Germany which has placed the goal of reunification 
ahead of its border claims and differences with the East German 
regime. 
Such combinations of leadership and crisis may lead to struc­
tures and tasks of the Atlantic Community or Atlantic Partner­
ship, but it is less probable that stable patterns of binding 
institutional procedures, authority, and legitimacy will appear. 
This study has produced no evidence that innovations in NATO 
institutions are likely to generate this kind of development. 
Conflict has outweighed consensus not only in NATO areas like 
political consultation and military planning, but also in more 
usually technical areas, armaments, infrastructure and science. 
There are no indications that conditions have been different in 
areas of NATO activity which were not selected for special empha­
sis—economic co-operation, co-ordination of air traffic, civil 
emergency planning, cultural co-operation, or even information 
activities. It appears visionary in most circumstances to expect 
such components of the Atlantic Community or the Atlantic 
Partnership as majority voting; corporate representation of West­
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em Europe; greater direct administration by civilian and military 
bureaucracies (NATO Ambassadors subordinate to the Secretary 
General, NATO military commanders with substantial command 
authority, armaments, infrastructure, and scientific program con­
trol); permanent representatives of Cabinet rank; steadily in­
creasing national contributions of money and personnel; the 
removal of national nuclear controls; and stable NATO-centered 
subnational groupings. 
While the NATO leader may ardently wish a more integrated 
future, he has available no important coercive or utilitarian 
sanctions. He is unable to compel actors to follow directives 
which they prefer to ignore or to undertake actions which they 
are reluctant to implement. He controls no significant budget 
which he can use to reward the faithful and punish the way­
ward. Ultimately, the leader's only major tool is the normative 
power of his ideology, through which he can appeal to the 
common perceptions and aspirations of the Allies. 
Nevertheless, the leader's achievement of institutional innova­
tion, or even the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance, may be 
significant accomplishments by themselves. In crisis, actors may 
exhibit "bandwagon behavior,' a self-reenforcing sequence of 
increasingly polarized activity which can lead not only to new 
NATO structures and tasks, but can also proceed in an opposite, 
disintegrative direction.28 The leader's ideology is a fragile bar­
rier indeed should there develop a sudden rush to neutrality or 
surrender. Bandwagon behavior, and the problem it poses for 
leadership, is illustrated by the elaboration of one internal crisis 
scenario, the signature of a Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship 
and non-aggression. With the French decision to cross the ice in 
the Cold War, other nations—particularly Germany—become 
anxious to reach the other side before it melts completely. France 
makes the German choice more obvious by playing on desires for 
reunification and by using the French position in the European 
Economic Community as a bargaining lever. As Germany moves 
to accept the gambit, its EEC partners—the Benelux nations and 
Italy, if not Britain—cannot afford to remain far behind, and 
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may even push ahead. In the end the United States—faced with 
the difficult choice between the benefits of NATO in a European 
setting which tends to detente, and NATO'S costs in terms of 
sharing nuclear control, provision of military forces, and eco­
nomic contributions—decides to withdraw. 
During the course of NATO'S history, international crises have 
provided much of the impetus for the growth of the Alliance, 
while institutionalized leadership has helped to channel this 
energy in constructive directions. The 1970's will probably bring 
new crises, new opportunities, and new dangers for NATO'S lead­
ers. Ultimately, as Machiavelli long ago pointed out, the leader 
will have to pit intelligence and will against the vagaries of 
fortune. Machiavelli's Prince received ample compensation, but 
the rewards to the NATO leader are likely to be less attractive. 
While he may establish new institutions, he will probably not 
create authority or legitimacy. Thus he seems destined either to 
seemingly endless construction of the Alliance's formal edifice or, 
should his proposals fail to meet the challenges of the future, 
identification as a scapegoat for its collapse. In this perspective 
he more closely resembles Sisyphus or Prometheus. 
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UNITED KINGDOM Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
UNITED STATES Mr. Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of State, State 
Department 
1
 Agence France Presse, February 15, 1967. No data were presented for 
Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. 
Studies on the Future Tasks of the Alliance: 
Subgroup Topics and Rapporteurs* 
B 
EAST-WEST RELATIONS Mr. J. H. A. Watson, Assistant Under 
Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, United 
Kingdom 
Mr. K. Schiitz, Secretary of State, Foreign 
Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany 
INTERALLIED RELATIONS Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of State, 
Belgium 
GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of 
State, United States 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER Dr. C. L. Patijn, Professor in International 
COUNTRIES Political Relations, University of Utrecht, 
Netherlands 
* NATO Press Release (67)3, April 13, 1967. 
NADGE: Major Industrial Consortia* 
C 
CONSORTIA 
Hughes NADGE Consor­
tium (NADGECO Ltd.) 
•T.T. NADGE Consortium 
PARTICIPATING

INDUSTRIES

Hughes Aircraft Com­
pany 
Compagnie Franchise 
Thomson Houston (C.F.T.H.) 
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t Subcontractors but not full members of the consortium. 
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PORTUGAL Presidencia de Conselho 
TURKEY Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Science Fellowship Com­
mittee 
UNITED KINGDOM Science Research Council 
UNITED STATES National Science Foundation 
*NATO Doc. AC/137-WP 37, May 22, 1967. 
Affiliations of Representatives 
to NATO Science Committee* 
E 
BELGIUM Professor P. Bourgeois, Universite Lihre de Bruxelles 
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CHAPTER VI 
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5. "Science Committee: The NATO Fellowship Programme, Report on 
the Programme for 1964," NATO Doc. AC/137-D/271, February 15, 1966, 
p. 2. 
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CHAPTER VII 
1. Furthermore there are many facets to crisis, not all of which seem 
relevant in the NATO context. One aspect is the threat which crisis presents 
to fundamental values; this is included in our earlier definition (footnote 9, 
p. 281 above). Two other dimensions—length of time and origin of the 
event—appear less applicable. 
With regard to time, it is obvious that a crisis "incident" can not be 
excessively long. Yet a series of connected crisis incidents, though they may 
extend over a period of years, may make up a crisis "period," crowded with 
threatening activity. The postwar period which formed NATO's temporal 
environment presented an almost continuous succession of incidents—espe­
cially during the years 1946-1952, 1956-1957, 1960-1962, 1966-1967— 
which appeared to threaten NATO's participants. The problem of access to 
Berlin alone, which deeply concerned the Alliance, has been defined to 
include only five years of "inactivity or extinction" (1954-1956, 1958, 1963) 
during the fifteen years 1948-1963. See Charles A. McClelland, "Access to 
Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963," in J. David Singer 
(ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: 
Free Press, 1968), p. 179. 
As for the origin of the crisis event, this has seemed to make relatively little 
difference in NATO. NATO has been threatened both externally and 
internally by the intermittent intensification of the perceived Communist 
danger and by the divisions represented by Suez, Nassau, and De Gaulle's 
military withdrawal. It is not apparent that the origin of a given incident was 
necessarily related to the magnitude of the perceived threat, nor that the 
origin always made a significant difference in terms of NATO integration. 
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